



This research project foregrounds an investment in affect as having a transformative 
potential that aesthetic experience mediates. My claim is that in staging an encounter 
for the viewer, art can engender affects that activate the viewer into a self-
transcending dialogue.1 Here the terms ‘self-transcending’ and ‘dialogue’ stand for 
the potential of becoming through affect and the alternating modes of viewing 
produced by encounters. Both the practice of staging a sculptural encounter and the 
intrinsic modality of art to stage presentation2 are catalytic in opening up the potential 
of affect to alter the viewing subject. This affective embodiment is a function that 
restores a connection to a visceral dynamic substratum that precedes the linguistic 
structures of subjectivity, a sense of original force that manifests in the altered 
awareness of what becomes a visceral subject.3 This sense of communion with primal 
vitality feeds the subject and is a privileged site for the aesthetic. As such the aesthetic 
excavates a pre-order, which, transmitted across other spheres, disturbs existing 
systems of order. 
 
                                                
1 By ‘self-transcending’ I mean an expression (an affective manifestation) through the experiencing 
subject that taps into something felt as a force or something new, or something common, and felt as 
transcending the self or reaching out to otherness; by ‘dialogue’ I describe the opening up of a 
communication. Stephen Zepke, in his reading of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, writes about ‘[t]he 
overcoming of its [the body’s] own limits’: ‘[T]his path to the absolute requires a rigorous program of 
experimentation, as experimentation is the way a body, as Deleuze puts it, “transcends its limits in 
going to the limit of what it can do”.’ Stephen Zepke, Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and 
Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari, Routledge, 2005, pp. 59-60. This transformation is also central to 
the notion of affect: ‘Affect, at its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces – visceral 
forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond 
emotion – that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension […]’ In Melissa 
Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, The Affect Theory Reader, Duke University Press, 2010, p. 5. 
2 Alison Ross writes on Jean Luc Nancy: ‘[i]n art meaning is not given but is rather sensuously staged 
or presented but always underway, so to say, and never complete as a ‘truth’ would be.’ In Nancy’s 
thought this is the advantage of art over philosophy – a ‘sense’ that is bound to aesthetic presentation. 
Ross observes: ‘This feature of the arts qualifies them as a ‘ “presentation of presentation,”’ [Nancy] 
but also makes the way they stage presentation a general model for the ontology of sense.’ Alison Ross, 
The Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy, Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 135-6. 
3 Brian Massumi writes in Parables of the Virtual on the enteric nervous system as autonomically 
functioning: ‘Physiologically, what is termed “viscerality” here pertains to the enteric nervous system. 
This is a neuronal network in the gut which “functions independently of control by the brain or spinal 
cord. […] It empirically describes one of the ways in which our body thinks with pure feeling before it 
acts thinkingly.’ Brian Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, Duke University Press, 2002, p. 265. This 
pre-linguistic ‘visceral substratum’ manifests in affects. A different account of visceral manifestation as 
spontaneous instinctual emergence is Julia Kristeva’s ‘semiotic,’ which manifests in the rhythm of 
language. The ‘visceral’ subject that I propose here points to the possibility of a ‘body-subject’ or a 
subject produced by an encounter with a work of art as an aesthetic model, as opposed to a Cartesian 
construction of the subject. See also the Glossary [p. 142] for my definition of terms. 
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In this thesis I will examine the changing reception of the work of art from the 
centrality of the object to an experience that implicates the viewer in an affective 
environment. The triadic correlation of agencies that I locate as facilitating this 
interplay is one of staging, encounter, and affect, which supersedes the typical pattern 
of artist, artwork and viewer. I will consider the dimensions of these three agencies 
within the aesthetic event but also in their repercussions within a wider paradigm 
shift.4 The shift of attention from the status of the art object as autonomous entity to 
the potential of the art encounter to effect changes in the viewer (a renewed 
understanding of aesthetic support)5 reconfigures the relationship between the 
viewing subject and the work of art and departs from the scenarios of both a 
‘dematerialized object’ and a ‘decentred viewer.’  
 
In exploring the space of sculpture as expressive of these directions I connect the 
various turns mapped in recent artistic practices, identified as the social, performative 
and affective turns, as reflecting a change of the scene of art into a stage of encounter, 
privileging embodied events over forms of representation. A progressive cultural shift 
in the recent decades from the idealist configurations of formalism to the immanence 
of durational or participatory experience marked a turn from object to situation, from 
autonomy to agency, from what art is to what art does – a renegotiated idea of 
medium in a post-medium condition.6 This shift in art echoes wider historical 
changes; concurrent with the sea change in thought gradually brought about by post-
structuralist theory, it is symptomatic of a social alarm, triggered by the impasses of a 
general crisis of thought where the resources of rationalist schemes prove inadequate 
to explain or sustain the conflicting and politically relentless realities of contemporary 
life. The re-evaluation of affect as a formative force within the subject reflects a wider 
phenomenon of a ‘withdrawal of meaning,’7 as the organising principle of 
philosophical investigations, manifest across contemporary thought. The aesthetic, 
through this agency of affect, re-emerges as a source of authenticity, but this is an 
                                                
4 The roles of the affect and the encounter are particularly clear in the trajectories of thought triggered 
by the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as an ethico-aesthetic project. 
5 The idea of ‘aesthetic support’ is discussed in Shannon Jackson’s Social Works: Performing Art, 
Supporting Publics, Routledge 2011, p. 30. I will discuss the idea of aesthetic support in relation to 
medium, prop and heteronomy of space in the second chapter.  
6 The term was coined by Rosalind Krauss in A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the 
Post-Medium Condition, Thames & Hudson, 2000. 
7 Alison Ross refers to ‘what is experienced in our epoch as the withdrawal of meaning’ in the context 
of Jean-Luc Nancy’s questioning of metaphysical thinking. Ross, op. cit., p. 134. 
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authentic manifestation that is rooted in the culturally inassimilable nucleus of 
energies that are visceral, violent and unsettling to our habitual modes of 
interpretation.8  
 
In this present moment a speculation coordinated around the transformative forces 
active within the aesthetic as a site of negotiation of the sentient subject9 places a 
demand on how art affects its viewers – not only on how it reformulates its own self-
definition. There is an intense interest across contemporary art in how the work of art 
can empower its viewer, often realized as a creation of a type of insubordinate, quasi-
democratic space;10 but this strategy often fails to explore an aesthetic function that is 
intimately related to aspects of psychism of the viewing subject. The encounter that art 
is called to stage for its viewer opens up the possibilities of a corporeal mode of 
communication and its contingent realities, but it also attests to a level of being which 
does not exhaust itself in analytical thought and yet affects thought in a potent way. 
Within the space of art, these forces mould another subject; a subject produced by an 
encounter with a work of art is remodelled beyond its subjective boundaries, an 
elementary re-ordering triggered by vital affects. Recovering affect, and restoring 
affective autopoiesis,11 the aesthetic taps into a primal responsiveness, which needs 
no mediation, no interpretative structure, to empower the viewer. 
 
In conducting this research project in sculpture I have followed two parallel 
trajectories: a studio practice that has functioned as a rehearsal of events in staged 
encounters, and an exploration through writing of the agencies that mould the art 
encounter. In positing staging as a methodological element that is integral to spatial 
practices I explore the setup of the physical moment of the encounter of the viewer 
                                                
8 Antonin Artaud’s deliberations as a Theatre of Cruelty are in the same vein; ‘Theatre is the only place 
in the world, the last group means we still possess of directly affecting the anatomy, and in neurotic, 
basely sensual periods like the one in which we are immersed, of attacking that base sensuality through 
physical means it cannot withstand.’ Antonin Artaud, The Theatre and its Double, Calder Publications, 
1970, p. 61. 
9 Jacques Rancière has termed the radical potential of this aesthetic negotiation a ‘redistribution of the 
sensible’ in The Politics of Aesthetics, Continuum, 2004, pp. 7-45. 
10 A gradual expansion of artistic practice during the last decades has internalized live presence within 
its structure. In recent sculpture, the creation of stage-like spaces where objects act as agents of a 
critical dialogue inserts a different type of autonomy – centred on space – with political resonances. 
Andrea Phillips analyzes the ‘quasi-democratic’ function of recent sculpture in her essay Prop-objects 
from The Showroom Conference in 2007 – see Chapter 2. 
11 Autopoiesis is a process of self-creation. See also Glossary, p. 140. 
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with the work of art as an irreducible dimension of artistic practice. Staging is the 
totality of actions, thoughts and configurations within the making of sculpture and 
installation that imagine, prepare and set up the spatial encounter of the viewer with 
the work of art. The term also signifies the idea of the stage or scene both as the actual 
space of the work as well as the aesthetic event that takes place for the viewer.  
 
The word skené, σκηνή (= scene) in Greek, which literally means ‘tent’ (indicative of 
the origins of theatre under a makeshift tent), is the equivalent of stage in English. It 
is a word with many meanings: ‘scene’ signifies both space and event.12 A stage is 
both an inclusive viewing space and the charged platform where events unfold. The 
verb theorein (a root to both ‘theatre’ and ‘theory’)13 signifies ‘to view’; as such a 
stage is the object of vision, of attendance and encounter. Art as scene materializes a 
dynamic expansion of art into lived space and time. In the expanded scene of 
contemporary sculpture, a repurposed objecthood is organized into systems of 
interaction, heteronomy, exchange; this scene models the work of art as rehearsal site 
for the conditions of appearance of the sensuous, a structuring of the work as a field 
of forces, a situation.14 Staging in this context involves the viewer: the scene of the 
work will host the performative and contemplative aspects of the viewer’s experience 
– the affective assemblages produced by and producing the viewer. Staging in this 
sense mediates this experience, whose dimensions are multiple and dynamic.  
 
It has been an overall object of this study to bring together material and ideas that 
inform an understanding of the scene of art as it currently develops. In the next three 
                                                
12 In the opening of his essay An Art Scene as Big as the Ritz: The Logic of Scenes, David Burrows 
writes: ‘[I]n this sense, art both emerges out of a scene and produces a scene. This plurality is found in 
the word scene itself, which can refer to a performance and the setting of that performance, as well as a 
stormy or emotional encounter between two or more people and the milieu of a specific group or 
activity. A logic of scenes addresses two aspects of art then: that which captures our attention within an 
environment (content) and the responses, actions, articulations and statements (expression) which 
register and shape the sensible (and present specific encounters as art). At no point can either aspect of 
this equation be privileged as the genetic material of art scenes, indeed art as scene is defined through 
the relation of the two […] An art scene can be defined as a distribution of presentations: a field of 
activity marked by affective and intensive encounters but also articulations.’ In Stephen Zepke and 
Simon O’Sullivan, Deleuze and Contemporary Art, Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p. 158. 
13 I draw this etymology from Jonathan Miles’ Glossary (electronic format), pp. 253-256. 
14 In an interview with Robert Linsley titled ‘Around the Episcene,’ the artist Scott Lyall observes: 
‘[t]heatre is an innate condition of art, and even stands for the crisis of the disappearance (or 
structurally negative condition) of the mediums.  But scenes—the extroversion of an assemblage 
towards the audience—are not primarily a form of theatrical spectacle. They are firstly the place of 
visibility of an embraided or common speech.’ Accessed in April 2012 at 
 http://abstraction.uwaterloo.ca/ST/AroundTheEpiscene.html 
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chapters I will discuss a shift of the aesthetic event to the in-between-ness of the 
encounter, a renegotiated materiality of sculpture that stages autonomous spaces, and 
an engineering of aesthetic experience, as exemplified by certain sculptural practices, 
that taps into an affective re-ordering of the viewing subject. The first chapter of the 
thesis elaborates the pivotal methodological components of this project. Among them, 
the ideas of co-created in-between-ness and aesthetic function have been informed by 
the events witnessed in the performance of certain theatrical genres. Such is the 
exchange, or fusion, between actor and viewer in the performance of Kutiyattam that I 
narrate,15 or the insight into the functions at play in ancient Greek tragedy offered in 
the Translator’s Introduction to Euripides’ Medea by Yorgos Heimonas.16 These 
instances manifest the radical affective potential that is latent in the aesthetic 
experience. The aesthetic events of the dramatic stage also introduce ideas of a 
medium as means of aesthetic mediation – the in-between dimension of art. I will 
juxtapose these manifestations to the aesthetic events in the encounter with sculpture, 
to the spatiotemporal dimension of the activated space that weaves a type of 
performance that is particular to sculpture and which involves the staging by the artist, 
the encounter with the work of art and the affect on the viewer.  
 
The second chapter explores the agency of staging in sculpture and installation. 
Tracing the discussion of theatricality in sculpture, triggered by Michael Fried’s 1967 
essay Art and Objecthood, the chapter identifies staging as an expanded practice that 
converges the performative quality of contemporary sculpture with the performative 
dimension of the viewer’s affective experience. Visiting a number of essays that 
highlight the relational and performative patterns inscribed in the multidimensional 
assemblages of recent sculpture, the chapter revolves around the dynamics that mould 
an empowering space for the viewer. A position of self-seeing alternates with a space 
for self-production as modality of this activated space, blending spectatorship with 
performance. As multiplicity or dispersal of subject positions or as proposal of 
political autonomy through a restructuring of the sensible, this reinvented sculptural 
matter resonates heterogeneous spatial and relational spheres in a hybrid, transitional 
medium-specificity. 
                                                
15 See Chapter 1, Kutiyattam, an encounter. 
16 Euripides’ Medea, translated by Yorgos Heimonas, Kastaniotis Editions, Athens 1989, pp. 7-11. See 
Appendix, Part 1, pp. 112-118 for the Translator’s Introduction by Heimonas (my translation from 
Greek), one of the key references of this thesis. 
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In the last chapter of the thesis I lay out the origins of this project, the stages of its 
development and the areas of research through which it unfolded. During this time my 
studio practice evolved through a series of sculptures, installations, videos and 
performances. These works interweave scenes of artificial nature, ad hoc 
constructions and re-enactments of fragmented narratives into staged environments. 
The spaces are organized around the nexus of the encounter of the viewer with the 
work, functioning as platforms for encounters. Parallel to these descriptions I 
elaborate on the methodological components of my practice – a performative 
encounter with staged spaces, an element of re-enactment and a position of survey 
within spectatorship – through an account of my encounters with other artists’ work. 
These works manifest a grasp of the inner architecture of the affect and resonate with 
it through the staging of an encounter. To reinstate the performative in sculpture 















1. A metaphor and a gap 
 
‘It is a language,’ they said to us, ‘and we’re going to learn how it works.’ This was 
the first thing I heard in Art College.17 
 
A promising statement; yet this kind of metaphor – a cliché often pronounced in 
various disciplines – raised a set of issues about art. On a basic level, it was a simple 
way to indicate what it meant to learn the ‘vocabulary’ of forms, colours and volumes, 
the ‘syntax’ of composition – this was a painting studio after all. Learning to 
articulate these into a structure would then seem to enable a particular meaning-
making process, which would be pertinent to the ‘language’ in question. The claim 
also seemed to suggest that the art viewer was already equipped with the same 
‘language’ – at least this seemed to be the assumption across art education.   
 
I have used this crude illustration to highlight a question that arises each time the 
issue of the response to works of art is addressed: how is the aesthetic experience pre-
figured in the making of the work of art? To be asking this is perhaps to assume the 
metaphor mentioned above, namely that of a natural, inbuilt ‘language,’ or to claim 
that an artist foresees the response of the viewer as part of the configuration of the 
work; I will examine both these assumptions in order to retrieve the traces of intuition 
that they contain, even if the ‘linguistic’ frame described above obscures the 
potentiality of the aesthetic. Despite the fact that aesthetic reception as a domain of 
experience has been traditionally analyzed as separate from the production of the 
work of art,18 in the course of this study I will attempt to look at both fields through a 
single vantage point: the interface of the encounter. 
                                                
17 This incident took place in the 6th Painting Studio of the Athens School of Fine Arts in September 
1993. 
18 In classical philosophy this is the ‘third type’ of aesthetic theory, namely the ‘reception of the work 
of art.’ The other two are the ‘production or construction of the work of art,’ and the ‘ontology of the 
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There is a ‘gap’ that this study addresses – a gap in exploring affect as the building 
block of the encounter with the work of art. This lack is a practical one: it posits the 
ontology of affect as an uncharted territory in the perception – and production – of art. 
To address this faculty through a written text would, perhaps, appear to be a 
contradiction to the terms I have just described – to the nature of affect most of all; 
but language as a faculty has its own role in the art encounter. Human faculties 
communicate and interplay; the signifying registers of an encounter can be equally – 
or more, or less – compelling as the a-signifying registers for the subject that bears 
them. Yet the interweaving of these registers remains largely unexplored; with this 
text I will attempt to speculate on both the nature of these responses and on the 
medium that allows these responses to emerge and connect. ‘Encounter,’ in this 
context, is a crucial modality of the aesthetic experience, which foregrounds the 
projection of affect, as opposed to the process of recognition, which largely relates to 
signification.19 The implications of this prioritization are both subversive, against the 
normative role of signification, and affirming, in relation to the experiencing subject 
and its far-ranging field of self-structuring abilities, set in motion by the encounter. 
 
The events of the in-between space of the art encounter are triggered by what Simon 
O’Sullivan calls the ‘affective-gap’20 – the moment of suspension between encounter 
and response. The tension of this in-between moment invites a reaction from the 
viewer, which engenders affects of different origin, kind, intensity and potential. 
These affects urge the experiencing subject into a joint emotive, corporeal and 
cognitive response. For Henri Bergson the action triggered by the distance between 
our body and an object activates what he calls ‘pure memory’ (O’Sullivan describes it 
as ontological memory).21 Gilles Deleuze sees in this response the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                       
work of art.’ I cite this definition from Theodoros Georgiou, Aesthetic Theory and Modern Art, (Greek 
edition, my translation), Futura Editions, Athens, 2001, p. 132. 
19 ‘An object of an encounter is fundamentally different from an object of recognition. With the latter 
our knowledges, beliefs and values are reconfirmed. We, and the world we inhabit, are reconfirmed as 
that which we already understood our world and ourselves to be. An object of recognition is then 
precisely a representation of something always already in place.’ Simon O’Sullivan, Art Encounters 
Deleuze and Guattari, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.1. 
20 Ibid. p. 38. O’Sullivan employs this term in response to Henri Bergson. He further elaborates on it in 
the passage ‘Bergson: the gap,’ pp. 45-47. 
21 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, Zone Books, 1991, pp. 71-76. O’Sullivan remarks: ‘It is into 
this interval that memory, understood as the pure past, enters and as such the possibility of 
circumnavigating typical responses – of creatively responding to the world. We might say that this is 
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creative emotion, the release of ‘cosmic Memory,’ which allows the human to attune 
to ‘the whole movement of creation.’22 In their joint writings (in conjunction with 
ideas from their individual projects)23 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari explored the 
radical dimension of the art encounter, which allows a different setup of experience 
for the viewer triggered by affects; their exploration of affect and becoming sketched 
a collapse of boundaries and territories and an immanent transformation for what 
becomes a Body without Organs.24  
 
What Deleuze and Guattari offer an insight into, in their exploration of affect and 
encounter, is the performed act of viewing; in this respect, I will juxtapose Kaja 
Silverman’s views in her book World Spectators. Silverman explores an idea of care, 
the Heideggerian concept of ‘Sorge,’25 as an investment of energy from the viewing 
subject onto the encountered object, which actively affects the act of seeing and the 
pattern of our encounter with the world. In Silverman’s analysis the desire of the 
subject is the agency that allows the aesthetic object to ‘appear’; this charged 
exchange (as Silverman also speaks of Intending Objects)26 forms a ‘libidinal 
vocabulary’ for the viewing subject, a distinctive, powerful affective meaning through 
which we communicate aesthetically.  
 
This description of the role of affects in allowing the appearance of the aesthetic 
object bears a resemblance with the phenomenological account of Mikel Dufrenne in 
his Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Experience.27 For Dufrenne it is the spectator’s 
                                                                                                                                       
the definition of freedom, a disinterestedness which allows access to something bigger, more 
expansive, than one’s self. It is in this gap then that genuine events emerge.’ O’Sullivan, op. cit., p. 46.  
22 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, Zone Books, 1988, p. 111, as quoted by O’Sullivan, op. cit., p. 46. 
23 The joint writings that I refer to are A Thousand Plateaus from Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Continuum, 2004) and What is Philosophy? (Verso Books, 2004). From their individual projects, ideas 
from Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, (Continuum, 2004) and the ‘construction of subjectivity’ 
that Guattari explores in Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Indiana University Press, 1995, 
pp. 1-31, are instrumental to the mapping of the art encounter. 
24 The Body without Organs is an expression that Deleuze borrowed from Artaud and developed into ‘a 
kind of aesthetic machine, but its operating field is immanence rather than transcendence. It breaks 
down the subject/object boundary, tears apart, to use the quote from Guattari again, the ‘ontological 
iron curtain between being and things’.’ O’ Sullivan, op. cit., p. 116. 
25 Kaja Silverman, World Spectators, Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 24 and in Note 55, p. 154. 
26 In the last chapter of World Spectators Silverman analyzes the way objects address the perceiving 
subject. ‘If, as phenomenology teaches us, the subject tends toward objects, the reverse is then 
apparently equally true. Our subjectivity is objectively intended.’ Ibid. p. 133. 
27 Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Experience, Northwestern University Press, 
1973.  
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reflection and feeling that reveals the ‘aesthetic object’ in the work of art,28 
differentiating between the two latter terms in order to stress the viewer’s agency and 
the primacy of feeling as decisive in the art encounter.29 Dufrenne takes the 
spectator’s point of view in his analysis,30 echoing Heidegger in his essay The Origin 
of the Work of Art, where he resists the idea of the artist’s superior role in the work of 
art and posits the viewer as equal in his/her creative role.31 What Dufrenne calls 
feeling – albeit not ‘merely an emotional’ response – is a variation of the idea of 
affect that has an active role of extricating the quality which lies at the ‘depth of the 
aesthetic object.’ Although more classical an account in its terms (the depth of the 
‘aesthetic object’, for example), Dufrenne advances the centrality of affect both as 
catalyst for the viewer’s agency of feeling and core quality of the aesthetic object 
(resonating with Deleuze and Guattari’s description of artworks as ‘blocs of 
affects.’)32 He introduces the idea of an affective a priori, which inflects the Kantian 
idea of ‘schema,’ and in Dufrenne’s words ‘derives from the subject’s direct 
intuition.’33 Dufrenne’s view resonates with contemporary theory in its description of 
                                                
28 In his Translator’s Foreword, Edward S. Casey explains this distinction: ‘The work of art is the 
perduring structural foundation for the aesthetic object. It has a constant being which is not dependent 
on being experienced, while the aesthetic object exists only as appearance, that is, only as experienced 
by the spectator.’ Ibid, page xxiii. This description also resonates with Heidegger’s writing on the 
‘Thing’ (Das Ding): ‘The currently predominant thing-concept, thing as formed matter, is not even 
derived from the nature of the thing but from the nature of equipment.’ He also wrote: ‘[…] The 
Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things phusis.’ In Martin Heidegger, 
Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 38 and p. 42. 
29 Edward S.Casey summarizes Dufrenne’s thesis in the following passage in his Foreword: ‘The last 
stage in the full development of perception is one of reflection and feeling. When perception follows its 
normal course, it tends to flow into understanding and knowledge by becoming a form of objective 
reflection. But perception can also veer toward a different sort of reflection which is “sym-pathetic” 
rather than objectifying and is more closely related to feeling than to understanding. Such reflection 
clarifies and supports feeling, entering into a dialectical relationship with it. In the process, perception 
becomes properly aesthetic for it is above all through feeling that the aesthetic object becomes 
accessible. How so? Feeling, which stems from the depth of the perceiving subject, allows the spectator 
to respond to the depth of the aesthetic object, that is, to its expressed world. This response is not 
merely an emotional one but consists in the apprehension or “reading” of the singular affective quality 
characterizing the expressed world. Through feeling, then, we connect with the aesthetic object’s 
inherent expressiveness. Dufrenne concludes that “the very height of aesthetic perception is found in 
the feeling which reveals the expressiveness of the work.”’ Dufrenne, op. cit.,. p. xxix. 
30 Casey points out Dufrenne’s ‘attempt to support the choice of the spectator’s standpoint.’ Ibid. p. 
xxiii, in Note 17.  
31 ‘The preservers of a work belong to its createdness with an essentiality equal to that of the creators.’ 
Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ from Poetry, Language, Thought, Perennial 
Classics, 2001, p. 68. 
32 Deleuze and Guattari write: ‘What is preserved – the thing or the work of art – is a bloc of 
sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects.’ Deleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, op. cit., p. 164. 
33 Dufrenne, op. cit., p. 448. The Kantian ‘schema’ is ‘a procedure of the judgement which adapts 
otherwise heterogeneous concepts to the spatial and temporal conditions of intuition.’ Howard Caygill, 
A Kant Dictionary, Wiley-Blackwell, 1995, p. 360.  
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an a-signifying register (the ‘sym-pathetic’ reflection) and the ‘dialectical 
relationship’ that the subject finds itself in, within its own responses.34 The 
participation of the viewer is also a familiar term in more recent art history, even if 
Dufrenne’s idea is more like a role (an affective co-creation) than physical 
participation; again Dufrenne’s vision resonates with Heidegger’s description of those 
who ‘approach the work of art and preserve it in its truth,’35 as the viewer who 
activates the work. 
 
 
 2. The faculty: the affect 
 
Affects enable the faculty we possess to interpret events and objects in body 
sensations. Every event, and every object, engenders a different sensation. Therefore 
every encounter contributes to a sensory structure – a history, record, or ‘inner 
architecture’ of sensations – a ‘sculpture’ of the senses.  
 
This virtual structure is part of our experience. We perceive things physically, we 
sense the growth of a situation, its imminent explosion, its decline, affectively 
embodying these changes, these events, enfolding the world in our mind and senses 
and performing its movements. It is perhaps an intuitive urge, a propensity to know 
things in order to assess them, to make use of them or to protect ourselves from them. 
It is a virtual embodiment of a distributed sensation of difference. We all know 
examples of imagined or remembered sensations; we can instantly visualize, or 
virtually sense, the stroke on a cat’s fur. Memory retrieves the whole manifold of 
touch, warmth and smell, along with a host of visual impressions; it retrieves affects, 
it re-enacts them and interweaves them anew with our diverse registers.  
 
Affect/Affection. Neither word denotes a personal feeling (sentiment in 
Deleuze and Guattari). L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect 
and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage 
from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an 
                                                
34 The ‘sym-pathetic reflection’ with its etymological root of ‘pathos’ (passion) alludes to a visceral 
connection.  The ‘dialectical relationship,’ on the other hand, reflects an idea of self-spectatorship that I 
will elaborate in the following chapters. 
35 This quotation comes from the notes of translator Yannis Tzavaras from the Greek translation of 
Heidegger’s essay, which I have also used. Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, 
[translated by Yannis Tzavaras], Dodoni Editions, Athens-Ioannina, 1986, p. 32. 
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augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act. L’affection 
(Spinoza’s affectio) is each such state considered as an encounter between 
the affected body and a second, affecting, body (with body taken in its 
broadest possible sense to include “mental” or ideal bodies).36 
 
The definition of affect that Brian Massumi appends to his translator’s introduction to 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus draws qualities akin to 
sensations, responses, fragments of experience not easy to express in words – as none 
of these terms can transmit the prepersonal character of affect. It is a body that 
receives and reacts, a state of body reception and body production (as affects are body 
products). In this context we can appreciate the novelty of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
approach to affect: their turn to the biological basis of affect and the foregrounding of 
its pre-linguistic nature emancipated it from the psychological dimension.37 This 
approach had conflated affect with emotion. An affect may generate an emotion, but 
affect as (and when) it emerges is not yet an emotion – and in some cases, will not 
evolve into one. It is rather a minute sensation, a response to anything that enters the 
field of perception (an affecting body – with ‘body’ in a broad sense, as Massumi 
points out). Emotions may follow affects, but already on a far more conscious level 
and of a different composition that is easier to attribute and localize, whereas an affect 
is an intensity on the body that is hard to pin down in either origin or essence. In his 
book Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari, Simon O’Sullivan explores this notion of 
affect through the writings of Deleuze and Guattari and, through them, their 
precursors (especially Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson). The nature of affect has 
also been a particular subject of research for the philosopher Brian Massumi. 
O’Sullivan remarks: 
 
For Brian Massumi, in his essay ‘The Autonomy of Affect’38 […], affects 
are likewise understood as passages of intensity, which might resonate 
with linguistic expression but which strictly speaking are of a different, 
and prior, order [my italics]. For Massumi, as for myself: ‘Approaches to 
the image in its relation to language are incomplete if they operate only on 
                                                
36 This definition comes from Brian Massumi’s ‘Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements’ in 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, op. cit., p. 
xvii. 
37 Susan Best point this out: ‘Much of this scholarship, now dubbed part of the ‘affective turn’, follows 
the anti-psychological account of affect provided by the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari. See their explanation of affects as ‘non-human becomings of man’ in What is Philosophy?’ In 
Susan Best, Visualizing feeling: affect and the feminine avant-garde, I. B. Tauris, 2011, p. 146. 
38 Brian Massumi, ‘The Autonomy of Affect’, in Paul Patton, Deleuze: A Critical Reader, Basil 
Blackwell, 1996, p. 217. Also printed in Parables of the Virtual, op. cit., pp. 23-45. 
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the semantic or semiotic level, however that level is defined 
(linguistically, logically, narratologically, ideologically, or all of these 
combinations, as a Symbolic). What they lose, precisely, is the event – in 
favour of structure’ (1996, 220). Massumi identifies the realm of affect as 
being of increasing importance within ‘media, literary and art theory’ but 
specifies the problem that there is ‘no cultural- theoretical vocabulary 
specific to affect’ […].39 
 
Both Massumi and O’Sullivan stress the impossibility of a vocabulary specific to 
affect, as this would insert it in language and accord it a somewhat fixed meaning (a 
representation) and hence, invite its deconstruction.40 Despite this impossibility to 
define affect linguistically, an instinctive affective receptivity is immanent for the 
viewer in the art encounter; it is through these instinctive affective responses – prior 
to, parallel with, or on different levels than conscious reflection – that an autopoietic 
transformation takes place. Art encounters provide the platform for this self-
modelling to occur and disclose the potential of affect as the ‘capacity to affect and be 
affected.’41 The pragmatic conditions whereby a work of art facilitates this disclosure 
– through the staging, as I will argue, on the part of the artist – provide the setup of 
the encounter itself. If the faculty of imagination can bring things to the realm of 
thought, the faculty of affect can give them a place in our aesthetic memory and our 
lived sensation.42 
 
Αίσθηµα (=aesthema) is one of the Greek words for affect. ‘Aesthema’ is 
etymologically related to ‘aesthetic’; it is the core of aesthetic experience, its ground 
material. Aesthesis, a similar word, signifies sensation, or sense experience. Yet both 
terms are somehow elusive to a more detailed, conceptualized analysis. In his essay 
‘The Autonomy of the Affect,’ Brian Massumi describes: 
 
                                                
39 O’Sullivan, op. cit. p.170.  
40 In pages 39-45 of the same volume O’Sullivan gives an alternative account of affect in a way that 
deviates the urge to represent it, and the subsequent imperative to deconstruct it. 
41 In Gregg and Seigworth, op. cit., p. 5. 
42 The philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey wrote extensively on the poetic imagination: ‘Recollecting is at 
the same time metamorphosis. This allows us to see the connection between the most elementary 
processes of psychic life and the highest accomplishments of our creative capacities. […] And this 
transformation into something new that transcends what is contained in, or derivable from, lived 
experience and perception, also affects the connections of representational images. A thinking in 
images emerges, and in it the imagination attains a new freedom.’ Wilhelm Dilthey, Poetry and 
Experience, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 240-1. 
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One of Spinoza’s basic definitions of affect is an “affection [in other 
words an impingement upon] the body, and at the same time the idea of 
the affection” (emphasis added). This starts sounding suspiciously 
Bergsonian if it is noted that the body, when impinged upon, is described 
by Spinoza as being in a state of passional suspension in which it exists 
more outside of itself, more in the abstracted notion of the impinging 
thing and the abstracted context of that action, than within itself, and if it 
is noted that the idea in question is not only not conscious but it is not in 
the first instance in the “mind.”43 
 
Massumi points out that affect in Spinoza’s definition is an ‘impingement’ of a 
corporeal nature. In addition, he notes the displaced character (locality) of affect and 
the remote (and imaginary) sense of the other. The body virtually engulfs the other, 
reaches out to it. It is here that the radical collapse of spatial boundaries between ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ are virtually rehearsed by affective projection. Affect reaches out at the 
same time as it allows in. It is a double movement that follows a body’s intuitive 
pattern of communication; each new encounter connects to previous encounters, a 
selective process partly dependent on the ‘affective’ priorities, or histories, of the 
experiencing subject. This reverberation moulds the singular character of every new 
encounter and alters, retroactively, the importance of each past encounter – a process 
that I think of as a ‘sculpting of affect.’ The impact of impressions and the singular 
way that each thing stands inside the repository of memory that is structured by and 
filtered through affects can be more sensed than understood. It is hard to attribute any 
meaning to these ‘first–order’ intensities, but they accumulate into a totality, 
contingent to both new and re-emergent encounters, building a structure with its own 
properties – the bedrock of sensibility. The interplay of memory with affect is one of 
the most productive features of an encounter with a work of art. One presses itself on 
the other, creating a relief across one another – a visual impression mutates as the 
mapping of affects connects encounters.  
 
Over the recent years there has been a proliferation of affect-related studies – dubbed 
as the affective turn – across disciplines ranging from the social sciences and 
humanities to neurobiology and politics;44 these developments reveal an expanding 
                                                
43 Massumi, op. cit., p. 31. 
44 This surge of interest has generated relevant material in literature and philosophy but also in 
conferences and exhibitions. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth contend: ‘Undoubtedly the 
watershed moment for the most recent resurgence of interest and intrigue regarding affect and theories 
of affect came in 1995 when two essays – one by Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank (“Shame in the 
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interest in this research area, reflecting the need for a novel way to approach the 
underlying processes of our lives, a way that advances beyond a linguistic, signifying, 
representational register, to one that is immanent, intuitive, rhizomatic and dispersed 
in interrelated, interwoven fields of human activity. It also demonstrates that affect 
can be a ‘passe-partout’ in conceiving what, at least in the arts, has been suppressed 
under various dominating theories of criticism or art movements: the quality and the 
range of this faculty implants an aesthetic aspect to all experience.45 
 
In this respect the turn to affect forms a point of convergence for art, social sciences, 
philosophy and psychoanalysis, enabling a cross-disciplinary dialogue. Likewise there 
has been a common acknowledgment across these disciplines of the shortcomings in 
exploring affect.46 This increasing interest marks an attention to the processual and 
experiential registers that affect performs and which record moods, sensations and 
                                                                                                                                       
Cybernetic Fold”) and one by Brian Massumi (“The Autonomy of Affect”) – were published. […] 
These two essays from 1995, along with subsequent work undertaken by their authors, have given 
substantial shape to the two dominant vectors of affect study in the humanities: Silvan Tomkins’s 
psychobiology of differential affects (1962) (Sedgwick and Frank) and Gilles Deleuze’s Spinozist 
ethology of bodily capacities (1988a) (Massumi). Gregg and Seigworth, op. cit. p. 7. Affect also relates 
to non-representational theory: ‘Affect has strong links with ‘non-representational theory’ and 
challenges the objectivity of particular forms of representations, instead emphasising their role as 
artefacts of the research process itself.’ Extract from Affect Journal, issue 1, Autumn/Winter 2008, 
accessed in October 2008 at http://www.affectjournal.co.uk/  
45 Claire Colebrook, in her essay ‘On the Specificity of Affect’ observes: ‘The power of art is ethical: 
the power not just to present this or that affect, but to bring us to an experience of ‘affectuality’ – or of 
the fact that there is affect. Art is not a judgment on life but an affirmation of life.’ In Ian Buchanan 
and Gregg Lambert, Deleuze and Space, Edinburgh University Press, 2005, p. 199. 
46 In the introduction to her book Visualizing feeling, Susan Best notes: ‘This book addresses a 
methodological blindspot in art history: the interpretation of art’s affective dimension.’ Later also she 
says: ‘It is worth emphasizing that the neglect of feeling is not specific to art history. Charles Altieri, in 
his book The Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects, observes a similar methodological 
oversight in the study of literature. He notes that the emphasis on social and historical context rather 
than the literary text has led to a ‘tendency to overread for “meaning” while under-reading the specific 
modes of affective engagement presented by works of art.’ [Quoted from Charles Altieri, The 
Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) p. 2.] 
When he explored the work of theorists of emotions he found a similar eagerness to engage with the 
‘cognitive and moral dimensions of the topic’. In other words, Altieri argues, affects are consistently 
brought under the sway of reason; their disruptive power is not investigated.’ Best, op. cit., p. 1 and p. 
4 respectively. Likewise, in The Fabric of Affect, André Green remarks: ‘Psychoanalysts throughout 
the world […] still deplore the absence of a psychoanalytic theory of the affect, despite the many works 
devoted to the subject.’ André Green, The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, Routledge, 
1999, p. xv. In the second chapter of his book Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari, Simon O’Sullivan 
makes ‘a case for attention to be paid to the affective side of the art experience.’ O’Sullivan, op cit. p. 
38. Another view associates affect with the feminine: ‘[t]here is an important question of why “affect” 
has been so consistently ignored, along with other concepts like emotion and the body, in the dominant 
traditions of Atlantic modern thought. I think that part of the answer is no doubt, as feminists have 
argued, the association of women as somehow inferior with the assumption that the sexual difference 
manifested itself through a series of binary differences: rationality versus emotion, mind versus body, 
and so forth.’ Laurence Grossberg interviewed by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth in Gregg 
and Seigworth, op. cit., p. 317. 
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desires, and also influence actions and decisions. Affect sets the subject in motion; an 
interaction of responses, singularities, leanings and sensations is constantly at work in 
the affective life of the subject, converging physiological responses with emotional 
sensibilities – a unique grafting of the corporeal and the psychic. It is a generic mode 
of expression of the sentient being.  
 
Affect theory has arisen in reaction to the shortcomings of poststructuralist theory.47 
As Patricia Clough notes: ‘Affect and emotion, after all, point just as well as 
poststructuralism and deconstruction do to the subject’s discontinuity with itself, a 
discontinuity of the subject’s conscious experience with the non-intentionality of 
emotion and affect.’48 However, the fundamental difference with poststructuralism is 
that this sense of discontinuity in the emergence of affect is an affirming 
manifestation that the subject experiences, an affirmation in the sense of a unity in 
difference.49 In his review of ‘The Affect Theory Reader,’ Todd Cronan claims that 
there is a radical element of ‘newness’ across most theses around affect, as for 
example in Steve D. Brown and Ian Tucker’s essay, who ‘see affects as affording a 
“new space of liberty in the ineffable”.’50  
 
The dynamics within affect theory aim to restore the fundamental role that our 
primary body responses have in our self-structuring, and as such their contribution to 
our self-awareness. The wider movement inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s project 
privileges the body as the site of events that define our connectivity with the world 
and amongst ourselves. Art holds an important place in relation to these forces, which 
advance an aesthetic model of the subject as more compatible with its intuitive nature, 
more attentive to its creative manifestations, and more promising for its becomings 
than the conditions established by an unconditional conceptualism.51 Elizabeth Grosz 
                                                
47 Todd Cronan diagnosed that ‘[t]he tools and principles of poststructuralism were unable to 
accommodate or even recognize central facts about human experience, those that did not rise (or fall) to 
the level of signification.’ In Todd Cronan, ‘The Aesthetic Politics of Affect,’ accessed in May 2012 at 
http://nonsite.org/review/radically-private-and-pretty-uncoded. Cronan too locates the surge in affect 
studies from the mid-1990s onwards. 
48 Patricia T. Clough, ‘The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia, and Bodies’, in Seigworth 
and Gregg, op. cit. p. 206, also quoted by Todd Cronan, op. cit. (accessed online). 
49 Here I allude to a principle of Eastern philosophy; Simon O’Sullivan also links non-representational 
theory with certain Eastern practices (see Chapter 2: ‘Encountering Objecthood’). 
50 In Todd Cronan, op. cit. (accessed online). 
51 In this context Charles Altieri remarks: ‘So, ultimately, an aesthetics of the affects also becomes a 
means of elaborating how there may be profoundly incommensurable perspectives on values that are 
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observes (in response to Susan Best’s thesis) ‘Art works affect before they inform, 
perform or communicate.’52 Art works stage the emergence of affect by becoming 
springboards for radical encounters. 
 
 
 3. The argument: (the encounter) 
 
In centring my argument on the moment of the encounter with the work of art I attend 
to the projections from the viewer that invest this moment with particular energies. It 
is important to understand that both the anticipation that precedes the art encounter as 
well as an aspect of suddenness of appearance affect the experience that follows with 
regard to these projections.53 Given that the majority of art encounters takes place 
within a specifically purposed spatial context for the exhibition of art that the viewer 
is conscious of throughout, a state of psychological anticipation in view of 
encountering works of art prompts a physiological state of suspension, preparing the 
stage for the surfacing of affects.54 Consequently, the sudden appearance of an object 
or space creates an instant sensory relief propelled by the visual impact, which echoes 
in the events that follow. What is channelled in the encounter is initially activated by 
the two conditions described above. The dimension of aesthetic appearance in 
relation to the visual connectivity that is active in the art encounter is particularly 
relevant to the mode of knowing that the aesthetic experience advances, resonating 
with the subject’s response in the sense of ‘illuminating’ or charged vision that 
manifests in certain encounters.  
                                                                                                                                       
nonetheless all necessary if we are to realize various aspects of our human potential. Ironically, this 
perspective then provides a challenge to the benign imperialism of philosophy’s reaching out to the arts 
only so long as the arts turn out to sustain the hegemony of its modes of reflection.’ In Altieri, op. cit. 
p. 5. 
52 In Best, op cit., p. iii. 
53 Karl Heinz Bohrer remarks: ‘The aesthetic reaction that leads to a value judgment is always a 
synthetic act that can be divided into different phases, the first of which is finally overtaken by the last. 
We call the first and methodologically most relevant phase “anticipation.” We anticipate the final 
judgement through the process of sympathy. This sympathy is not based on any recognized formal 
property that carries aesthetic value, nor on the recognition of previously encountered ideas. It is an 
event between subject and object in which the entire diffuse complexity of the subject comes into play 
in an anticipatory way.’ Karl Heinz Bohrer, Suddenness: On the Moment of Aesthetic Appearance, 
Columbia University Press, 1994. p. 22. 
54 It does not follow that all gallery or museum environments unvaryingly prompt a ‘benign’ 
anticipatory effect in their visitors; what I describe is merely the mode of perception that is signalled 
for the viewer by these purposely set up environments – which does not rule out responses which are 
negatively determined precisely because of this framing. 
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In the case of sculpture and installation, the spatial encounter is the moment and place 
when invisible and immaterial registers are mapped on the body of the viewer. The 
object or form of art becomes a medium, which enables the embodiment of new 
affects that are imminent for the viewer in the encounter. The encounter occurs as an 
interface between agencies, offering a co-creative model for the aesthetic experience 
but also a model for a relation between the viewing subject and the work of art; it is a 
type of connectivity that simultaneously achieves virtual constellations and 
ontological dispersals as alternating levels of eclipse and appearance of both viewing 
subject and work of art. This dimension of in-between-ness, what is taking place 
between the work and the viewer, which merges the context of the work with that of 
the viewing subject, is the practice that manifests itself.55 Through an ‘engineering’ of 
an encounter – a staging – this in-between space becomes a fertile ground for the 
performance of a movement where affect links the viewing subject to a repository of 
unconscious imagery and formless emotion: there is a trace of a ritual ‘clearing’ in the 
way that the viewer allows this.56 The shift from a state of absorption to a moment of 
distanced observation occurs, according to Deleuze, in ‘a speed of absolute survey.’57 
 
A physical encounter – of a body to another body, a body to an object, a body to a 
space – is where a sense of the world is restored. This is where the sensibility of the 
viewing subject acts, responds and produces affect. In Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze describes the encounter as where ‘sensibility […] finds itself before its own 
limit, the sign, and raises itself to the level of a transcendental exercise: to the “nth” 
power.’58 This affective ‘alarm’ does not leave the other, more conscious or signifying 
registers of the aesthetic experience unaffected. Affect transmits to the other faculties 
its passages of intensity and this in turn intensifies – ‘colours’ – the experience on the 
                                                
55 O’Sullivan remarks: ‘It is here that the ‘in-between’ nature of art practice again becomes important. 
Art is always situated between the actual and the virtual, in fact we might say operates itself as a kind 
of ‘actualising-machine’.’ O’Sullivan, op. cit., p. 12. 
56 O’Sullivan describes a concept of ritual by referring to the poet Georges Bataille: ‘For Bataille the 
practice of cave painting is specifically ritualistic, involving the creation of a sacred space. […] Here 
art operates as a form of play that takes the participant out of mundane consciousness, hence Bataille’s 
understanding of the Lascaux cave paintings as specifically performative.’ Ibid. p. 47. In his book 
O’Sullivan makes a case for practices as ‘modern rituals that imaginatively and pragmatically switch 
the register.’ [Ibid. p. 50]. In the encounter with contemporary art, ‘sacred’ space and performative 
viewing suggest a projection by the viewer rather than an inscribed content or form of the artwork – 
hence I describe the movement of ‘ritual clearing’ as a spatial response. 
57 Quoted by O’Sullivan, Ibid. p. 42. 
58 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit., p. 176. 
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whole. This kind of connection foregrounds affect as a function of sensibility that 
interacts with understanding; not at the level of emergence, since affect occurs pre-
linguistically, at the substratum of conscious reflection, but in the recursive reflection 
that the subject performs upon itself, which places affect in a discursive rank in 
relation to other qualities of the subject.59 In fact this recursive reflection resonates 
with the double mode of viewing produced by encounters in the contemporary 
sculptural context that I will look into in the second chapter. 
 
I will now juxtapose a dissimilar account of aesthetic constitution in the art encounter 
to the one laid out above. As I already mentioned, Kaja Silverman produces a 
different account of affective activity in World Spectators. Silverman analyzes a way 
of looking where an investment of interest, of ‘care,’60 is mapped onto particular 
objects (and creatures) for every subject. She performs this analysis through a 
phenomenological reading of affect (here it is more in the sense of care, especially 
through Heidegger’s notion of Dasein)61 in conjunction with a psychoanalytic account 
of the viewing subject (Silverman contends ‘[T]o look […] is to care’)62. According to 
this account, vision (and as such, desire) is directed towards objects and creatures not 
only to substitute for a fundamental ‘lack’ (a void at the centre of subjectivity),63 but 
also to allow both subject, and world, to appear and so to be. ‘Appearance’ and 
‘Being’ here are the terms whereby the unconcealment of truth (a-letheia) is the 
condition for the subject to become, both other, as much as his/herself. The collection 
of these objects invested with care forms a ‘libidinal’ vocabulary, which is the imprint 
of subjectivity. Although it does not originate in language (on the contrary, it is the 
                                                
59 Massumi attributes this to the mode of perception, which includes the context of a stimulus: ‘The 
body doesn’t just absorb pulses or discrete stimulations; it infolds contexts, it infolds volitions and 
cognitions that are nothing if not situated. Intensity is asocial, but not presocial – it includes social 
elements but mixes them with elements belonging to other levels of functioning and combines them 
according to different logic. How could this be so? Only if the trace of past actions, including a trace 
of their contexts, were conserved in the brain and in the flesh, but out of mind and out of body 
understood as qualifiable interiorities, active and passive respectively, direct spirit and dumb matter. 
Only if past actions and contexts were conserved and repeated, autonomically reactivated but not 
accomplished; begun but not completed.’ Massumi, op. cit., p. 30. 
60 Silverman notes: ‘“Care” is a Heideggerian concept, which figures centrally in Being and Time. I 
will be inflecting it here in some quite un-Heideggerian ways.’ Silverman, op. cit., p. 154 (in note 55). 
61 In Silverman’s words: ‘Dasein is Heidegger’s word for what I call the subject. […] Dasein signifies 
“existence” in everyday German, but this is not how Heidegger is using it. He means us to hear the 
literal meaning which that everyday meaning usually conceals: “there-being,” or – to translate this into 
more idiomatic English, “being-there”.’ Ibid. p. 31. 
62 Ibid. p. 73. 
63 Ibid. p. 28. 
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effect of being born into language as a primary ‘loss of Being’), this response 
becomes a ‘language of desire’ that we speak with every meaningful encounter – or, 
when we address the world in an affective way: 
 
To look is to embed an image within a constantly shifting matrix of 
unconscious memories, which can render a culturally insignificant object 
libidinally resonant, or a culturally significant object worthless. When a 
new perception is brought into the vicinity of those memories which 
matter most to us at an unconscious level, it too is “lit up” or irradiated, 
regardless of its status within normative representation. Excluded from 
that privileged field, value will drain out of it.64 
 
The way Silverman describes new perceptions as brought ‘in the vicinity of those 
memories which matter most to us at an unconscious level’ reflects the way 
O’Sullivan and Massumi describe the unconscious mapping of the affects and the 
constant recursive movement that brings the traces of past encounters – and the trace 
of their context – in connection with new encounters. Theirs, however, is a quite 
distinct approach: their line of thought that runs through Spinoza and Bergson to 
Deleuze and Guattari emphasizes affect as the pre-linguistic, pre-personal intensity, 
passage, force; Silverman’s thought, on the other hand, with its anatomy of vision – 
the drive to see – as intimately related to a loss at the centre of Being (thus, the effect 
of being in language already), is dealing with a different structure of the subject, a 
level of psychic processes that is already enmeshed in meaning. But this discrepancy 
of levels whereupon each line of thought focuses does not eclipse the striking analogy 
in what they reveal by dissecting the viewing subject: a-signifying registers condition 
and manifest on signifying ones, just as unconscious, charged libidinal memories map 
on conscious memories and actions. 
 
In fact what Silverman describes as the act of seeing is the viewer’s vision that affects 
the encountered object – a condition where a ‘subject’ (enmeshed in language) 
becomes (itself) through affected vision. The libidinal ‘charge’ – released by the 
subject, mapped on the object – transforms both. Aesthetic appearance becomes a 
threshold for transformation; it is in this sense that the different accounts juxtaposed 
here resonate – in how they both point to a subject produced by an encounter with a 
work of art. Liminal responses blend in with more ‘cultured’ elements in the art 
                                                
64 Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World, Routledge, 1996, p. 3. 
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encounter, both producing affective charge that bounces back on the encounter as 
recursive feedback loop.65 
 
Accordingly, what is also a point of convergence between these trajectories of thought 
is their mutual understanding of the aesthetic experience as a testing ground for these 
functions and the role of the work of art as opening up opportunities for both affects 
and memories to emerge: 
 
One cannot characterize this motility of the look as “agency,” since it 
resists our conscious attempts to direct it. Here again, we need the 
assistance of aesthetic texts, which can intervene where we cannot. Such 
texts abound in visual and rhetorical images which, even before being 
physically worked over, have the formal and libidinal properties of highly 
charged unconscious memories. They are consequently capable of moving 
immediately to a privileged site within the unconscious. At the same time, 
they are available to conscious scrutiny and interrogation.66 
 
In this extract from The Threshold of the Visible World Silverman illustrates how a 
work of art can be a direct experience of affect as much as a conscious reflection. The 
move from affective charge to conscious reflection, as alternating, oscillating states of 
the viewer, is a modality of aesthetic experience that appears in both takes – 
Silverman’s psychoanalytic account and the aesthetics of affect proposed by Deleuze 
and Guattari. Interestingly, the images that ‘have the formal and libidinal properties of 
highly charged unconscious memories’ resemble a floating, pre-personal intensity that 
can resonate with different subjects – the ‘pure memory’ that Henri Bergson described 
as a-personal; what flows into every such moment of disclosing encounter is another 
resonance between these different genealogies of thought. Silverman’s texts are 
radical in the way she describes the subject’s attention that turns to the object of 
vision and invests it with the libidinal charge of an unconscious memory, and the 
altering agency that this gaze effects. The objects are lit up, irradiated, as if our desire 
is projected upon them.67  
                                                
65 For a definition of the autopoietic feedback loop see Glossary p. 140. 
66 Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World, op. cit., p. 4. 
67 ‘It is not by responding to the formal parameters of another being at the level of our own objectivity 
that we communicate with it; were we ever to succeed in synchronizing ourselves in this way with 
another creature or thing, the result would be a monologue, not a dialogue. We communicate with the 
world only when we enable its forms to signify – only when we provide the meaning they lack. I say 
“lack” because phenomenal forms are not simply meaningless signs; they are also signs in search of 
significance. But it is in fact through an abundance rather than a deficit that phenomenal forms address 
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In her essay ‘What if Art Desires to be Interpreted? Remodelling Interpretation after 
the ‘Encounter-Event’’68 Griselda Pollock explores Bracha Ettinger’s concept of the 
‘matrixial borderspace’;69 Ettinger’s thesis offers an account of an early subject 
condition that is fundamentally different to the predominant psychoanalytic ‘Oedipal’ 
structure, positing an aesthetic memory of spatial co-existence within difference. 
Pollock discusses the radical Ettingerian matrixial aesthetic theory as a primary 
experience of spatial co-poiesis that allows us to experience difference, 
transformation and becoming, and therefore not only key to understanding the 
aesthetic encounter, but also a generic experience of difference within subjectivity. In 
exploring ideas of interpretation and the ‘collaborative’ dimension of art through the 
Ettingerian ‘encounter-event,’ Pollock remarks: ‘Many strings are woven across time 
and space in the event-encounter with which all parties are resonating as well as 
working to bend affective vibration towards communicable understanding.’70 She thus 
sees a co-creative potential in the art encounter that interweaves the subjective with 
the common.71 Although it is not possible to expand on Pollock’s essay here, it is 
important that she poses the following question: ‘Why do we turn away from the 
earlier models of cultural analysis, and why does contemporary art itself seem more 
susceptible to affective encounter instead of ideological communication?,’72 which 
she addresses by positing an inter-subjective (trans-subjective in this case), co-poetic 
encountering of otherness. 
                                                                                                                                       
us. They are “pregnant” with a beauty to which only a very special kind of human signification can 
give birth. And only by becoming “ourselves” can we provide that signification.’ Silverman, World 
Spectators, op. cit., p. 143. 
68 Griselda Pollock, ‘What if Art Desires to be Interpreted? Remodelling Interpretation after the 
‘Encounter-Event’,’ presented at the conference Interpretation, Theory & the Encounter at Tate Britain 
on 9 July 2010, accessed in May 2012 at 
 http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/what-if-art-desires-be-interpreted-
remodelling-interpretation     
69 Bracha Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace, University of Minnesota Press, 2006. Pollock explains: 
‘Ettinger imagines a different set of potentialities seeded into human subjectivity by the paradox of 
unknowable difference at the very core of co-emerging subjectivities: difference and co-affection are 
indissoluble partners in the formation of this dimension or potentiality in human subjectivity which she 
names matrixial, which is later subordinated to the post-natal and phallic conditions of subject/object 
relations, without ever being entirely knocked out.’ Pollock, op. cit., (accessed online). 
70 Ibid. (accessed online). 
71 There is a resonance here with Jean Luc Nancy’s philosophy. In a foreword to ‘Our World,’ an 
interview with Nancy by Peter Hallward, Emma Cambell writes: ‘Being is always already “in 
common” in so far as neither singularity nor finitude has an ontological status independent of its 
presentation or exposure to others.’ Angelaki Journal of the theoretical humanities, Volume 8, Number 
2, August 2003, p. 44. 
72 Pollock, op. cit., (accessed online). 
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We can thus imagine artistic practice as aiming to create precisely this ‘bending of 
affective vibration towards communicable understanding’ that Pollock describes – as 
aiming to stage the scene for this transformation. In view of these thoughts, a first 
level of interaction between a practice of staging and the moment of the encounter can 
be approached: the staging of presentation in art is also a staging of suddenness – a 
distinctive temporal modality bound to aesthetic appearance and affective 
emergence.73 As such aesthetic appearance engenders affective resonances throughout 
the aesthetic event.  
 
 
4. The project: (the methodology) 
 
‘The poetic image is a sudden salience on the surface of the psyche, the lesser 
psychological causes of which have not been sufficiently investigated.’74 In the 
opening of The Poetics of Space, Gaston Bachelard alludes to more than a metaphor. 
What binds sculpture with affect is the effect of a relief: a sculpting of affect.  
 
As I have already argued, the practice of staging the encounter is an embedded 
methodology in situating a work of art in a space. In my practice I investigate this 
staging through a further remove (as if to stage the staging) in order to observe and 
explore its modalities, its effect on the viewer as a methodological feature of the work 
and its implications, as a spatial strategy, for the practice of sculpture and installation. 
 
In the third chapter of this text I describe the line of practice that I have developed in 
this project, along with some previous works that I see as fundamental origins to this 
research. During this development, several ‘visual’ models have informed my 
methodology: I see some of my works as construction sites; these are sites where 
things appear and mutate – where an invisible volition takes form. Another recurring 
                                                
73 Describing Nietzsche’s phenomenology of appearance based on Greek tragedy, Karl Heinz Bohrer 
writes: ‘The nature of appearance as phenomenon is the temporal structure of its suddenness and is 
indicated by the repeated expressions relating to the concepts of seeing and sight. It becomes clear that 
what Nietzsche means is not the submersion of the seeing subject in the contemplation of eternal ideas 
or essences, but the predominance of what is actually perceived at the moment. The object seen in that 
way replaces what it represents.’ Bohrer, op. cit., p. 118. 
74 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, Beacon Press, 1992, p. xv.  
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element is the encounter with a manufactured landscape. I will describe this 
encounter through the figures of the nature tourist and the re-enactor. In a series of 
video works and in several performances and installations I have used these roles and 
personas as storytelling as well as pictorial devices, together with an assemblage of 
imageries into staged spaces. In other cases I have staged my work as a museum 
display. All these models set up a series of encounters; the role of each will be studied 
as this text unfolds. 
 
By staging the encounter I orchestrate objects, moving image and live action into a 
mise en scène. Sculptural objects are organized into scenes (as in Path, Waxworks and 
0 to 3) or in site-specific encounters (as in Wax Effigy).75 In composing these 
assemblages my intention is for the work to engineer an interplay of affects and 
presentations. At times the work resembles an ever-changing object; the horizon of an 
encounter is yet another encounter. Things are made of other things, gradually 
becoming composed, leaving gaps of meaning, which become filled with images. 
Given that the response from the viewer to these constructed entities is both 
uncontrollable as much as impossible to map out thoroughly, this project does not 
purport to prove something in this sense. Rather, the work is a rehearsal for an 
encounter that seeks to ‘target’ affect and to prompt a communicative pattern 
organised around the affective stimulation. 
 
The affective charge transforms the object of perception; here, Kaja Silverman’s 
insight that I have quoted above is useful as it describes a landscape of transformed 
vision, of a stimulated sensation that enmeshes subject and object. In the next two 
chapters I will relate this condition to certain cases of works by other visual artists; in 
these works I have sensed a materialized investigation into the inner architecture of 
the aesthetic experience – affect being produced and activated into a critical discourse 
within the context of the experience itself. In encountering these works I have felt an 
uncanny certainty that the artist who produced them had a deep knowing of the nature 
of affective receptivity produced by encounters, and subsequently how to address it; 
that they could trigger and stimulate affect with ease – pull its strings as it were – and 
set the autopoietic agency of the subject as produced by the encounter in action. To go 
                                                
75 See Appendix Part 3, p. 125, for a photographic documentation of these works. 
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back to my story from Art College, it seems that it is a ‘language’ of affect – again, a 
sculpting of affect – that visual artists can potentially ‘speak’ fluently (and ‘mould’ 
encounters); it is their plastic material. This particular ‘knowing’ is materialized in 
staging the encounter of the viewer with the work. My speculation is that this 
encounter becomes a rewarding experience when it triggers back on the viewer a 
reflection on the production of the experience itself, those instances that have elicited 
a particular response, which will continue to echo in a series of reverberations. This 
exposure of the production of the experience,76 as it happens, allows a view of its 
whole spectrum at once, keyed on the object that first triggered it: a view of a place 
where phenomena emerge; an awareness of the act of seeing; a spectral sensation, as 
if simultaneously in and outside of the viewing subject; the reflection elicits endless 
appearances. What is restored within the work of art is the faculty of entering the 
world through the image. 
 
The implication between staging and presentation, in the context of the aesthetic 
appearance and the mode in which it creates affective fields, is catalytic; I believe 
that a practice that aims to evolve its possibilities towards more connective types of 
aesthetic experience cannot neglect these crucial, central functions. 
 
  
5. Synkinesis (Notes on Yorgos Heimonas’ Translator’s Introduction to Euripides’ 
Medea)77 
 
Yorgos Heimonas’ introduction to his translation of Euripides’ Medea illuminates the 
forces at play within tragedy, offering an insight into the function of Katharsis. He 
performs an anatomy of ancient Greek drama – an ‘anatomy’ par excellence as 
Heimonas had trained as a doctor and later specialized in Psychiatry and 
                                                
76 ‘Exposure’ is an important term in this research, delineating key conditions of an activated 
spectatorship. It is an aesthetic function present throughout modernism – the Brechtian theatre being a 
prime example; the contemporary work of art is driven by the intention to expose itself (as mechanism, 
material, construction) and the mechanisms of the viewer as perceiving subject. The idea of 
‘theatricality,’ which I will explore in the next chapter, is relevant in this context: ‘The concept of 
theatricality has had its place in this model-building [: of interdisciplinary study], most often as an 
essential quality of heightened communication […] connoting the conscious arrangement of behaviour 
and effect.’ In Tracy C. Davis and Thomas Postlewait, Theatricality, Cambridge University Press, 
2004, p. 33. Also see Glossary for a definition of ‘theatricality,’ p. 142.  
77 See my translation of the Greek text in Appendix, Part 1, pp. 112-118. 
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Neuroglossology in Paris; he has done extensive research on the condition of aphasia 
and the faculty of speech. In his anatomy of the drama of Medea he virtually gazes 
into the ‘crevices’78 between the visible and the invisible, the conscious and the 
primordial; he offers a view of how its functions are operating. He reflects on how this 
medium can move the viewer to such depth: his account points to the primordial 
mourning that tragic speech echoes as the force that stirs the viewer’s repository of 
formless emotion, synkinesis.79 Heimonas speaks of the stratification of the viewer’s 
psychism (the qualities or structures of the psyche) and how these layers respond to 
the forces at play in tragedy by resonating with them in depth. He is sifting through 
these layers and unpicking the registers that alert this synkinesis, unravelling the 
affects and emotions that the medium of tragedy stirs and puts in function. Heimonas 
stresses the capability of the medium to affect the viewer with the remarkable ease 
and at the same depth that music so naturally reaches. 
 
At this point a passage I have already cited from Kaja Silverman’s The Threshold of 
the Visible World springs to mind: ‘Such [aesthetic] texts abound in visual and 
rhetorical images which, even before being physically worked over, have the formal 
and libidinal properties of highly charged unconscious memories. They are 
consequently capable of moving immediately to a privileged site within the 
unconscious.’ 80  
 
The ancient Greek tragic drama stages an encounter with the viewer. It is the effect of 
a milieu, in this case the drama stage, engulfing the audience and impacting on their 
senses, a medium, this tragic logos, resonating profoundly and stirring the viewers’ 
emotion (in this case total emotion, synkinesis) and memory, and a condition, which 
overwhelms them and through this state, the represented events are seen in a new 
light, a new filter, but also lived with the hero.81 Through the events narrated in the 
dramatic myth and enacted before the viewer on stage, a tale about the finite history 
                                                
78 Ibid. p. 112. 
79 See the Terminology Index for the translation, Part 1, p. 119. The connection between synkinesis and 
emotion is visible in the etymology of the terms, respectively syn+kinesis and e+motion. The previous 
reference to ‘The Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Experience’ in p. 10, Note 30, also reveals the 
connection of synkinesis with a sympathetic response, triggered by ‘pathos’ or passion. 
80 Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World, op. cit., p. 4.  
81 I lay stress on this identification effect in my account of the ancient Indian drama Kutiyattam (see the 
next passage). 
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of the human being appears, bare and merciless. A raw material emanates from the 
charge of the poignant words that weave its story; this rhythm taps into the viewer’s 
raw, total emotion. Submerged in these events that resonate an uncannily distant 
memory, the viewer becomes subjected to his/her own visceral forces, becoming 
witness to a primordial urge that emerges embodied, empowered, released, stirred by 
this distant memory. With its vibration the logos of tragedy disturbs a primitive layer 
of emotion – bound to the wake of consciousness – alerting the inexplicable, crude 
reality of the psyche. Forces of terror, fear, passion and vitality emerge and outpour 
on the viewer’s senses, throwing the subject of this lived encounter into the pulsating 
vein of its own core.82 It is the subject’s own body conditioning itself that renders this 
moment of vital being unconditional; this is the root of the ecstatic.  
 
The archaic medium re-enacts a material that stems from a prehistoric spatial 
condition of the human subject. The logos of tragedy pries open this space which is at 
the root of being, its ‘dark precursor.’83 It negotiates these two sides – the visible, 
rational, and the underlying, formless, raw material. The medium enacts this 
negotiation in the viewer; Heimonas claims that tragic speech awakens synkinesis 
because its vitality is bound up with mourning. Tragic speech taps into a deep schism 
that stigmatizes the human psyche; he describes it as the separation from the koinon, 
the common being, that creates this everlasting wound. In philosophy this schism has 
acquired various meanings – birth into language, separation from the mother; 
Heimonas locates it in the birth of death, the ontological rupture that seals the being 
with sorrow. This sorrow is the ‘natural emotion of existence,’ in his words. 
  
In using Heimonas’ text I am sketching a different account of a subject produced by 
an encounter with a work of art to the one given by the aesthetics of affect that I 
previously described. I am juxtaposing these different accounts in order to tease out a 
                                                
82 Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty was organized around these qualities: ‘Like the plague, theatre 
is a powerful appeal through illustration to those powers which return the mind to the origins of its 
inner struggles. […] It unravels conflicts, liberates powers, releases potential and if these and the 
powers are dark, this is not the fault of the plague or theatre, but life.’ Artaud, op. cit., p. 20-21. 
83 Although Simon O’Sullivan’s reference to affects in Deleuze as ‘the ‘dark precursors’ of our 
conceptual system’ [O’Sullivan, op. cit., p. 42.] relates to an entirely different approach to the one I 
illustrate here, I borrow this phrase to emphasize a manifestation before knowledge – or rooted at the 
wake of consciousness – that is immanent for a subject produced by an encounter with a work of art. In 
addition, ‘precursor’ manifests the particular temporality conveyed by the encounter: a manifestation 
of an unknowable origin that can still morph into a fragment of sensation or a force. 
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common element in an aesthetic of visceral-ness: the a-signifying registers embodied 
in the scene of the art encounter trigger an autopoietic transformation, and the art 
encounter produces in the viewer a twofold, oscillating state between affective 
becoming and conscious reflection. In a sense Heimonas’ is an anti-hermeneutic 
analysis as well, the resonance of tragic logos being the ‘pretext’ that ‘midwifes’ 
emotion; the fact that it is speech that becomes this ‘lever’ offers a quite diverse 
account of affective manifestation to the one taking place in the encounter with visual 
art. The charge of the visceral sensation in the experience of tragic drama is diffuse 
and conditions the audience’s experience of the drama – as in a loop of emotion, from 
the body back to the text – and this prioritizes sensation over knowledge. 
 
Heimonas points out that the diachronic appeal of tragedy on its audience is a 
question of the functions at play within it, in the sourcing of total emotion from the 
viewing subject – an affective alarm that performs an unprecedented dip into 
elementary vitality – and in the movement of katharsis that ensues. Katharsis happens 
at the apex of this moment; when these forces (which the artistic medium will help 
channel out) are activated and then tamed. In the experience of the spectator, only this 
event of measure can reconcile the human being as accounted in tragedy with its 
visceral forces. Measure signals danger, Heimonas says, it acts as the tight balance 
that can withhold this uncontrollable material; and he gives us another clue: synkinesis 
has no purpose; it is nature uncontained, that manifests but will not explain itself. And 
this becomes a parable for culture: measure (and rational thought) cannot contain 
human nature, but withholds a balance by protecting humanity from its brutal sore 
core – an uncontainable finitude. Art stages the bend to see this core that exposes the 
human being; an aesthetic event is to become witness to the inexplicable pulsation 
that cannot be dealt with;84 it can only be translated.85 
                                                
84 Julia Kristeva spoke of primal pulsations in her account of the abject: ‘Abjection preserves what 
existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be—maintaining that night in which the outline of the 
signified thing vanishes and where only the imponderable affect is carried out.’ Julia Kristeva, Powers 
of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Columbia University Press, 1984, p. 14. 
85 Again, I am setting up a dialogue of different approaches; here I am alluding to Jacques Rancière 
and the Brecht/Artaud polarity as expressed in his essay The Emancipated Spectator. Ranciere sets up a 
dialogue between these two prevailing trends in theatrical practice, only to conclude the ‘debate’ by 
positing the spectator’s activated presence as one of translation of what is encountered into their own 
idiom. I am juxtaposing these views to present happenings for the viewer, which sometimes blend 
experiences and as such overcome polarities assumed by different theories. Positions are not mutually 
exclusive – as is manifest, for example, in O’Sullivan’s selective use of ‘ritual.’ 
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In creating a stage for the viewer to encounter their visceral forces – their prehistoric 
legacy of cruelty – the archaic medium reshapes this abjection in a ritual of 
communion; it is singing a song about the tale of the human – only through a song can 
this bloodstained material be tolerated. This is a dimension of art that reaches back 
into memory, to haul out, with the lever of synkinesis, a magma of fear, splitting, to 
present it to us alive, pulsating. Within this fundamental encounter, a negotiation 
takes place between formless, violent forces from a primordial layer of consciousness 
with the forms by means of which the superstructures of our culture regulate our way 
of being – an encounter between nature and culture. But the potential for the subject 
to embody these forces that are latent in the art encounter is a promise that links the 
past and the future of art – and Heimonas elsewhere says that art owes this vindication 
to the human being because ‘someone [something] has to owe this’ to the human 
being.86 
 
Revisiting the ancient texts of Greek tragedy, one is confronted with a sudden 
realization – a basic condition around the aesthetic; it is a question of function that 
this medium fulfils in its viewer in the encounter that it stages (a quite literal idea of 
artistic ‘medium’). What we discern is a resonance between the archaic and the 
present moment, which links functional aspects of the artistic medium as conceived 
and exemplified in the ancient Greek drama, and the possibilities of the contemporary 
participatory space of art in a post-medium condition. 
 
 
6. Kutiyattam – an encounter 
 
In the winter of 2006/7 I spent three months in India and Nepal for a field research 
project.87 The greater part of this journey was spent visiting temples and other sites of 
sculptural interest, exploring the dimension and reception of sculptural space in a non-
                                                
86 From an unpublished text by Yorgos Heimonas titled ‘The Biography of my Vision,’ reproduced in 
‘Lexi’ Magazine, accessed in June 2012 at 
 http://genesis.ee.auth.gr/dimakis/lexi/163/4.html  
87 ‘Encounters with Sculptural Space: Temple Architecture and Performing Arts of India,’ field 
research funded by the Hellenic Republic Scholarship Foundation (IKY), November 2006 – February 
2007. 
 30 
western cultural and philosophical tradition. At this point I want to turn to a different 
experience from another part of this trip, which has fuelled my research ever since.  
 
In January 2007, while travelling through India, I spent a few weeks in the state of 
Kerala in the South. For a long time I had been intrigued to watch its famous theatre 
performance, offspring of the ancient Sanskrit tradition. Some genres of Sanskrit 
theatre were originally performed inside temples – a number of them still are – while 
others have evolved into more secular theatre styles over the last centuries. In the city 
of Cochin, one of the largest cities of Kerala and a traveller’s hub, where several 
events are regularly organised to introduce the local theatrical tradition to a wider 
audience, one can watch some of these genres, especially Kathakali (probably the 
most well-known local dance-drama) performed live.  
 
Soon I realized that the majority of the live performances in Cochin were staged as a 
kind of local tourist attraction; apart from a vivid, exotic spectacle, they did not offer 
any particular insight into the character or nature of the drama. They were no doubt 
spectacular, as most of these genres (and Kathakali quite famously) are performed 
with actors dressed in ornate voluminous costumes, brightly coloured and laden with 
a multitude of traditional decorations and accessories, their faces covered in bright, 
mask-like coloured makeup. But beyond the sheer visual spectacle, the storytelling 
and narrative actions seemed too crudely enacted – as if overwhelmed under the 
visual effects.  
 
Already before reaching Cochin I had a first experience of the theatrical legacy of 
Kerala in the northern district of Kannur, famous for its Theyyam performances. 
Theyyam is particular for being the only surviving genre stemming from Sanskrit 
drama that is not performed on a stage. These performances take place in front of 
shrines inside temples, and they too are richly costumed. However, rather than 
theatrical happenings, they are expressly ritual. I watched a Theyyam performance in 
the Parassinikadavu Temple near Kannur. Theyyam performances start before dawn; 
from the actual location inside the temple, to the congregation (which was solely 
composed of worshippers and locals), my experience was indeed one of religious 
ritual rather than theatrical acting. Although different to Kathakali, and witnessed in 
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its original milieu, this was not a sight that inspired reverence or authenticity; rather it 
felt like a peculiar, heterogeneous amalgamation of characters and spaces.  
 
After further research into the opportunities to watch Sanskrit theatre, I was informed 
about the Natana Kairali Centre in Irinjalakuda – a place quite far off the tourist trail. 
The Natana Kairali Centre is a drama school that ‘teaches, researches and performs 
traditional performing arts’ and has worked extensively to revive the Sanskrit drama 
Kutiyattam.88 I was fortunate to happen upon the festival held there annually, in early 
January; every evening a different performance was staged, as part of a series of plays 
depicting tales from the Ramayana.89 As part of the festival – and also due to a visit 
from a group of Butoh dancers from Japan as part of a performing arts exchange 
programme – there were also day events, demonstrations of the day-to-day training 
and vocal exercises by the actors of the Centre. These demonstrations offered a rare 
opportunity to witness the rehearsals – also a rare view because of the bare 
appearance of the performers without ornament and costumes. But my first encounter 
was a proper performance, the evening I arrived.  
 
The Kutiyattam play has a special stage, the Koothambalam.90 In the Natana Kairali 
Centre this was a tent-like structure with a wooden roof, like a covered outdoor 
stage,91 with thick fabric curtains all around. There were chairs for the audience and 
many of the viewers, including children, also sat on the floor. There were very few 
objects on the stage – a wooden stool, a tall traditional oil lamp with a thin long leg,92 
something like a tin bucket containing a kind of fuel or raw material and a few 
musical instruments – no other backdrops or props. The only lighting on the stage was 
                                                
88 The description comes from a website describing the Natana Kairali Centre, accessed in February 
2012: http://web.mac.com/ludwigpesch/Natanakairali_new/Natanakairali.html. Also from this website: 
‘Kutiyattam is the oldest surviving Sanskrit Theatre Tradition of India. It has a highly stylized and 
complex theatre language replete with traditional hand gestures, facial expressions and highly symbolic 
movements and choreographic patterns. Recently Unesco declared Kutiyattam as a Masterpiece of the 
Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity.’ From 
 http://web.mac.com/ludwigpesch/Natanakairali_new/Heritage.html (accessed in February 2012). Also 
see the Appendix, Part 2, page 123, for a further description. 
89 The Ramayana is one of the ancient Sanskrit epics, from approximately the 5th to 4th century BC. 
90 See Kapila Venu’s explanatory text in the Appendix, p. 123, for a further description. 
91 I have already mentioned the etymology of the Greek word for ‘stage,’ skené, σκηνή (= scene), 
which literally means ‘tent.’ See p. 4 of the present text. 
92 ‘…[t]he placing of an oil lamp on stage during the performance, symbolizing a divine presence.’ 
From the video Kutiyattam, Sanskrit Theatre, UNESCO: Representative List of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage of Humanity – 2008, accessed in November 2011: 
 http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&RL=00010 
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given by the oil lamp, and although dim, its glow gave warm hues to the surrounding 




Picture No. 1: ‘Holding the Yavanika in a Kutiyattam performance at the 
Ammannur Chachu Chakyar Smaraka Gurukulam.’ (Courtesy of the Natana 
Kairali Centre.) 
 
That evening the play opened with music; four male percussionists and two female 
cymbalists were on stage, at the back and on the side; their drum beats and chimes 
introduced a steady rhythmic pattern. Another man and a boy – a young student of the 
school – stood at the centre of the stage, holding up a rectangular fabric like a curtain, 
behind which a Kutiyattam performer took position. When the curtain dropped an 
elaborately ornamented actress appeared: she was fixed, knees bent outward, one arm 
stretched out, the other folded in; this was the opening posture. She started to move 
slowly, brought the stool behind the oil lamp, and sat down. Then the storytelling 
began; it was all performed with body motions, the gestures of the hands, the 
movements of the eyeballs, a host of facial expressions – an endless inventory – 
speechless. The percussion rhythm dictated tone, intensity and emotion, through an 
ongoing, gradually changing pattern. The performer’s flexible movements and thin, 
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fluttering fingers produced stylized kinetic patterns, drawing every event and 
occurrence narrated in corporeal movement. Every gesture signified images, actions 
and situations. There was a mathematical precision to everything performed, which 
gave a minimal feel; objects were described with signs, shapes and sizes, so that soon 
you could translate gestures, facial expressions and positions in words: sword, king, 
war, death. In all this abstraction the richness of gestures and expressions seemed to 
produce an abundant vocabulary, loud and eloquent. The richness of ornament on the 
performer’s body and costume came in stark contrast with the absence of objects and 
props, most strikingly even, with the absence of speech; yet you felt as if this contrast 
reinforced the intensity with which those described things and states came alive in the 
imagination. And not only states and things: you could see shifts from one role to 
another – heroes, gods and humans – narrated through this one body. The only other 
presence that accompanied this embodied action was that of the musicians, framing 
the performed action and partaking in its unfolding: the musicians watch the 
performer closely, they dictate the happenings with their music and together they take 
us through the narration. 
 
I already said ‘embodied action’ but here I have to stress this even more: the sight, the 
experience of that night was the most complete embodiment I ever beheld. The total 
identity of performer and performed action – the role – was astounding. Not only the 
mastering of the actions performed, in a state of supreme concentration, but also the 
sense of incarnation of the represented deity by the actor gave out an almost divine 
presence and merging. Unexpectedly, without any previous idea or preconception 
over what I was about to see, I found myself, in the course of the play, thinking that I 
was literally looking at gods storytelling their ancient tale.  
 
There is something sublime about this degree of embodiment that made this feeling 
plausible; here I do not think of embodiment in the context of contemporary theatrical 
practices, but precisely in terms of the strictly structured, formulaic ancient drama that 
Kutiyattam is, so formal, dense and strict, that it is even more extraordinary how its 
mastery takes off and reaches such absolute presence. I am inclined to think that it is 
precisely the formulaic boundaries of the discipline that allow a violent amount of 





      Picture No. 2: ‘Aparna Nagiar performing Nangiar Koothu (Performance at the 
Ammannur Chachu Chakyar Smaraka Gurukulam).’ (Courtesy of the Natana 
Kairali Centre.) 
  
On the other hand I felt that this performance could not have taken place in a more 
ideal environment: the discipline is taught in this school, painstakingly, in the same 
region and country where it has seamlessly been performed since antiquity; it is still, 
literally, in its birthplace. And this made the experience of the play all the more 
genuine, resonant, and ecstatic. 
 
In the essay ‘What does it mean to “become the character”?’, Richard Schechner 
describes: 
 
In all such precise psychophysical moments, the “character” is being 
created – not in the personality of the actor but as an embodied and 
projected/energized/living form between actor and audience. These Asian 
forms assume no “suspension of disbelief,” rather the actor and spectator 
co-create the figure embodied in the actor as “other.” The “power of 
presence” manifest in this stage other, while embodied in this particular 
actor in this particular moment, is not limited to that ego. That dynamic 
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figure exists between audience and actor, transcending both, pointing 
beyond itself.93   
 
This is already a model for an art encounter. 
 
At this point in his text Schechner inserts this footnote: ‘The creation of the figure 
between audience and actor is a foundation of the rasa aesthetic theory of India […].’ 
Consequently, while browsing the Internet for information on the ‘rasa’ theory, I 
came across an entry on ‘Indian Aesthetics’: ‘Of particular concern to Indian drama 
and literature are the term 'bhAva' or the state of mind and rasa (Sanskrit lit. 'juice' 
or 'essence') referring generally to the emotional flavors/essence crafted into the work 
by the writer and relished by a 'sensitive spectator' or sahṛdaya or one with positive 
taste and mind. Rasas are created by bhavas.’94 On the same page there was a 
photograph of a Kutiyattam actor. This link shows the centrality of this drama in the 
materialization of this theory – or the root of this theory in the drama, which the 
theory illustrates; for one thing, it is a unique equivalence, an analogy, of a theory 
with a practice. It is a theory that follows a practice. The viewer witnesses the essence 
of this ancient theory in Kutiyattam.  
 
The quoted passage from Schechner above coincides with my experience of the 
Kutiyattam drama. During the play I could almost sense a linking force between actor 
and audience, like a palpable channel; at this point the words of Yorgos Heimonas 
come to my mind: ‘the “solid body” of tragedy.’95 Schechner’s analysis points to the 
key to this medium’s power: the convergent happening of actor and spectator co-
creating the lived form. The dense experience of the spectator is the testimony to this 
creative medium at play; and the agency of actor and spectator is meeting in the being 
that they sculpt together. This interface became an inspiration for my research on the 
                                                
93 Richard Schechner, Willa Appel, By Means of Performance: Intercultural Studies of Theatre and 
Ritual, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.144.  
94 At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_aesthetics accessed in November 2011. Also: ‘A rasa […] 
denotes an essential mental state and is the dominant emotional theme of a work of art or the primary 
feeling that is evoked in the person that views, reads or hears such a work,’ in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rasa_%28aesthetics%29 accessed in November 2011. 
95 Yorgos Heimonas, op. cit., p. 112. At this point I have to note that, although I witnessed the 
Kutiyattam drama many years before reading Heimonas’ analysis of Greek tragedy, on watching the 
footage that I had made from the performance at Natana Kairali Centre again I could sense this 
‘holothymic cataclysm of consciousness’ from total emotion (synkinesis) that he describes (Ibid. p. 
113) and observe how it affected my experience. I draw the assumption that this is a genuine feature 
not only of Greek tragedy, but other genres of ancient drama as well.  
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space of sculpture. I was able to see how this mapping of affective essence – just as 
crucially as the ‘state of mind’ – is also a key element in the encounter of a viewer 
with a work of art. After all, this paradigm comes from an encounter within a three-
dimensional space as well. And in this paradigm too the dimension of in-between-ness 
– art as medium – is quintessential. 
 
Schechner also writes about ‘the affective dimension of Asian performance’: ‘[…] it is 
in words used as sound and incantation invoking visual imagery by acoustic stress, 
rhyme, melody, and repetition, rather than literary communication, by which the 
power to make present the absent is invoked in stage practice.’96 This is a key point: 
the power of evoking worlds is a function of the creative medium that does not 
represent, rather pulls out from the repository of (pure) memory and (total) emotion 
that which cleanses (kathairei) the viewer–co-creator.  
 
One of the main performers of the Kutiyattam drama in Natana Kairali Centre, actress 
Kapila Venu, explains the origin, form and principles of Kutiyattam in her essay 
‘Kutiyattam – The theatre form.’97 It is remarkable that in Kutiyattam, the spectator – 
the subject produced by this encounter – is described as ‘one of good heart.’ This is 
revealing of the relationship that this embodied action builds, forging an ethico-
aesthetic condition that is allusive of the Deleuzoguattarian project. It also relates to 
the ‘state of mind’ principle of Indian aesthetics, pointing to its essential agency in 
this creative encounter.  
 
What Kapila Venu describes as the intersection of ‘folk, ritual and martial arts’98 in 
the formation of the classical Sanskrit theatre reflects on the kinesiology of 
Kutiyattam. A few weeks after I attended the performances in the Natana Kairali 
Centre I visited the CVN Kalari at Trivandrum, a traditional school for the ancient 
South Indian martial art of Kalaripayattu, to watch a training session. Kalaripayattu is 
an intricate, choreographic martial art with a long tradition across South India. The 
training of Kalaripayattu takes place at dawn – as in every physical and spiritual 
exercise in India – as the hours before and after dawn is when the practice is held to 
                                                
96 Schechner, op. cit., p. 145. Just to clarify at this point, not all Kutiyattam plays are without speech 
like the one I have been describing here. 
97 See Appendix, Part 3, p. 123. 
98 Ibid. p. 123. 
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be most beneficial. The Kalari – the traditional, earthen ground arena where the 
training takes place – is a specially built space, a few feet below the ground level, 
where the group of trainees undergo a yearlong, intense training to master the art. I 
noticed a continuity between the postures, patterns and rhythmic movements of 
Kalaripayattu and Kutiyattam, which revealed an advanced level of mastery and 
control in both cases, but also how, through the mastery of the practice the trained 
actor or athlete gains access to a higher level of concentration, which is crucial in all 
these areas of physical and spiritual exercise. 
 
What is also lucidly illustrated in Kapila Venu’s description is the instrumental role of 
music in the performance of Kutiyattam: the music follows closely, sets in motion the 
whole action and triggers the ‘total emotion’ as it follows an unmediated route into 
the audience’s affect. On another occasion too I have witnessed the potent agency of 
music as part of a happening: in the ritual of ‘Anastenaria,’ the fire walking ritual,99 
which I visited in North-east Greece.100 There, the music was propelling the action 
throughout; its constant, feverish beat brought the participants in ecstasy, a state of 
trance, in which they performed the ritual. 
 
There is one more occurrence that I would like to cite here before I close my 
description of the ancient Sanskrit drama Kutiyattam. As I mentioned above, at the 
time when I visited the Natana Kairali Centre during the Kutiyattam festival of 
January 2007, a team of Japanese Butoh dancers were attending the festival as part of 
a performing arts exchange. I later found out that this was the team of Japanese 
performer Min Tanaka, who was collaborating with the Natana Kairali Centre, and 
who gave a compelling performance of Butoh at the Centre a few days later.101 Min 
Tanaka is a legendary figure in Japanese dance and performance and has a long record 
                                                
99 This somewhat outcast ancient ritual (due to its shaky relation to mainstream Orthodox religion in 
the Balkan area, under whose cause it is disguised) is said to have roots in Dionysian ceremonies. The 
continued existence of the ritual is a contentious subject; yet its performance, which takes place on 
fixed dates of the year in remote communities, is a fascinating happening and draws international 
attention and cultural research. The music performed in the ‘Anastenaria’ is a cultural legacy in its own 
right. 
100 This visit was organised by the 2nd Sculpture Studio of the Athens School of Fine Arts (Professor G. 
Lappas) in May 2002. 
101 See the relevant article from The Hindu Times, accessed in February 2012: 
 http://www.hindu.com/fr/2007/01/12/stories/2007011200580200.htm  
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in innovative and inter-cultural projects, as for instance his ‘Body Weather’ project.102 
I discovered that he had collaborated with Félix Guattari in a number of projects: 
among others, he had performed in Guattari’s ‘La Borde’ Clinic in Paris, and they co-
authored the book ‘Zen Fire and Light Speed’, which was published in Japan in 1985. 
Suddenly I could see a connecting thread running through all these disciplines and 
cultures, joining practices103 on the basis of a different investigation of the physical 
experience of art: a different mapping of the body, expanded fields of action and a 
practical approach merging subjects in the common ground of co-created experience. 






                                                
102 ‘Tanaka has evolved the traditional, slow-moving Japanese dance form of Butoh into a new method 
intended to connect dancers deeply to the space and landscape around them. Like Butoh, Body Weather 
often depicts cycles of birth, death and renewal, but unlike its predecessor, the primary focus is on the 
intersections of the dancers' bodies and the environments they inhabit. Each body is conceived as 
constantly changing, like the weather, in complex relationship to its surroundings, as "physical 
geographical details [are] experienced with intimacy, like an extension of the body"’ [quoting Tanaka]. 
From http://www.slowlab.net/body%20weather%20farm.html accessed in February 2012. 
103 As the blog ‘AntiOedipus’ describes: ‘In Butoh there are already a number of features pointing to 
the Body Without Organs (a.o. multicenteredness, ongoing metamorphosis, equal valuation of all parts 
of the body, exploration of the ‘ugly, dark and unknown’ faculties of human expression). A tangible 
connection is the collaboration between Min Tanaka and Félix Guattari that resulted in the publishing 
of a book (in Japanese, 1985) and in several performances of Min Tanaka at Guattari’s clinic ‘La 
Borde’ around the same time.’ 




-SETTING THE STAGE- 
 
 
In this chapter I will look into the issues at stake regarding staging as a modality of 
contemporary sculpture. Through a literature survey I will identify some of the 
arguments around which staging, theatricality and objecthood are situated in the 
current discourse. I will initially trace the line of the expanded field of sculpture that 
runs parallel with Michael Fried’s 1967 essay Art and Objecthood;104 the question of 
theatricality posed by Fried concerning the viewer’s relation to the object raises 
questions of theatricality as a quality of the object, by now configured in different 
terms in recent sculptural practice. In the first part of the chapter I draw distinctions 
between different perceptions of staging and theatricality in sculpture and installation 
art – the latter performed through a reading of Claire Bishop’s Installation Art;105 
central to these distinctions is the viewer’s experience of the work as object and 
him/herself as subject in the space of the work – as a shift both in the status of the 
object and the self-awareness of the subject. In the second and third parts of the 
chapter I will explore the lines of force mapped in the space of the work by the 
performative agencies of objects. What is critical in these agencies is an expanded 
sense of sculpture that is operating through renegotiated ideas of medium and 
objecthood; as such a sculptural agency that is gestural and intrinsic to the object 
moulds the scene of the encounter in a relational system that acts as a rehearsal of 
social space.106 In the last essay of the chapter I will relate this condition to ideas of 
props and architectures set out by Andrea Phillips and Jan Verwoert at The 
Showroom Conference in 2007;107 these formations of recent sculpture compose 
spaces that reclaim a critical sense of political autonomy. I will argue that this 
function poses staging as an agency that empowers objects, spaces, and viewers. 
                                                
104 Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
105 Claire Bishop, Installation Art, Tate Publishing, 2005. 
106 Relational Aesthetics is a term coined by Nicolas Bourriaud in his homonymous book (Relational 
Aesthetics, Les Presses Du Reel, 1988). Although I will comment on Bourriaud’s text, my use of 
‘relational’ here will signify ‘relations’ (set up in the space of the work) as well as relations with 
spheres outside the work.  
107 Props, Events, Encounters: The Performance of New Sculpture, The Showroom 4th Annual 
Conference: Saturday 26 May 2007. 
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1. Encountering objecthood 
 
In the introduction to Installation Art (2005) Claire Bishop describes the ubiquitous 
use of the term ‘installation’ in any arrangement or setup of an art exhibition, be it 
‘installation art’ or the ‘installation of art.’108 She explains: ‘What both terms have in 
common is a desire to heighten the viewer's awareness of how objects are positioned 
(installed) in a space, and of our bodily response to this.’109 
 
The terms of this sentence reflect Bishop’s phenomenological construction of the 
spatial encounter with three-dimensional art. These coordinates of the viewer’s 
experience are strikingly similar to the ones Michael Fried posed as ‘theatrical’ in his 
essay Art and Objecthood in relation to minimalist art (which he calls ‘literalist’): 
‘literalist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with, it is concerned with the 
actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist work.’110 Fried’s 
argument posited a polarity between art as absorptive, instantaneous confrontation 
and objecthood as theatrical interaction. The critical difference between what Fried 
characterizes as theatricality and what Bishop identifies through installation art is in 
the subject/object relations that they respectively tease out. Fried writes:  
 
[W]hat replaces the object – what does the same job of distancing or 
isolating the beholder, of making him a subject […] is the explicitness, 
that is to say, the sheer persistence, with which the experience presents 
itself as directed at him from outside (on the turnpike from outside the 
car) that simultaneously makes him a subject – makes him subject – and 
establishes the experience itself as something like that of an object, or 
rather, of objecthood.111  
 
In this passage Fried parallels Tony Smith’s description of his ride on the New Jersey 
Turnpike with the experience of ‘literalist’ art in the manner in which they both 
‘distance’ the beholder and how they are ‘directed at him.’ He also describes Smith’s 
experience as ‘something like that of an object, or rather, of objecthood;’ what Fried 
does here with the object is to transpose objecthood into a state of in-between-ness 
                                                
108 Bishop, op. cit., p. 6. 
109 Ibid. p. 6. 
110 Fried, op. cit., p. 153.  
111 Ibid. p. 159. 
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between experience and object – an idea that I will pick up later on in this chapter as a 
shift from art as object to the in-between-ness of an encounter. Fried points out this 
shift and calls for alertness towards it; by conflating Smith’s experience on the 
Turnpike with one of an object, he accentuates his argument on the theatricality of 
Minimalism, where it is a situation that configures objecthood.112 
 
As for the subject, Fried identifies the simultaneous state of the subject of the viewer 
(Tony Smith in his car on the Turnpike), which simultaneously makes him a subject 
and makes him subject. He thus sees the paradoxically twofold situation whereby a 
viewer becomes subject to and subject of an experience. Claire Bishop in her 
conclusion to Installation Art further defines this simultaneous condition of the 
subject to be both ‘viewer and model.’ She cites Dan Graham’s remarks about the 
minimal and environmental/perceptual art of the 1960s113 where ‘the isolated 
spectator’s “subjective” consciousness-in-itself replaces the art object to be 
perceived-for-itself; his/her perception is the product of the art. Thus, instead of 
eliminating the physically present art object, environmental art’s meditative approach 
creates a secondary, veiled object: the viewer’s consciousness as a subject.’114 Bishop 
consequently asks: ‘[d]oes the viewer’s consciousness become the subject/object, or 
the subject matter?’115 She then argues that in installation art the subject becomes 
simultaneously centred and decentred; by being the perceiving subject, and as such 
centered viewer, and at the same time by experiencing a decentring of subjectivity in 
the way the encounter is staged in installation art, an overlapping occurs that places 
the subject in both states. This double consciousness echoes Fried’s simultaneous 
states of the subject – a convergent point in their otherwise very different approaches. 
What this doubling also reflects is the condition of self-seeing awareness that is latent 
                                                
112 ‘Everything counts – not as part of the object, but as part of the situation in which its objecthood is 
established and on which that objecthood at least partly depends’ (Ibid. p. 155). At the same time, Fried 
seems to offer two different accounts whereby the ‘situation’ of objecthood involves the beholder – one 
which is ‘distancing’ (what he describes regarding Tony Smith’s experience), and one which is 
inclusive when he cites Robert Morris: ‘Morris makes this explicit. Whereas in previous art “what is to 
be had from the work is located strictly within [it],” the experience of literalist art is of an object in a 
situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the beholder’ (Ibid. p. 153). This contradiction in 
Fried’s definition of theatricality in objecthood further complicates his temperamental reading of Tony 
Smith’s experience, which he dubs as ‘theatre’ (Ibid. p. 159). 
113 Graham refers to ‘“[M]inimal” art as well as environmental/perceptual art (of the kind built by such 
artists as Robert Irwin or Maria Nordman).’ Dan Graham, Two-Way Mirror Power: Selected Writings 
by Dan Graham on His Art, MIT Press, 1999, p. 156. 
114 Bishop, op. cit. p. 131. 
115 Ibid. p. 131. 
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in the spatial encounter – the seeing oneself seeing of an activated spectatorship116 – 
which, as I will argue, is the gift of staging in art. 
 
This spatial encounter stresses the place of the viewer within the space of the work – 
this space can be thought of as a dynamic receptacle – as the physical relation of the 
viewing subject to the work, or space, that admits him/her. In fact one of the most 
stimulating aspects of this pronounced turn of attention of the whole structure of the 
work of art to the viewing subject and his/her experience, is the investment on the 
idea of the body as model for aesthetic experience.117 Bishop’s book analyzes the 
implications of installation art both as model for an aesthetic experience and as an 
attempt to materialize, in art, a model for the subject advanced by the theoretical 
discourse of the second half of the 20th century (namely post-structuralism, 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis). On the other hand, the terms of the subject in 
Bishop’s formulation of installation art – the ‘awareness of the positioning of objects 
in space’ and the ‘bodily response to them’ – fully incorporate contemporary 
curatorial strategies practiced worldwide. The art gallery or museum offers itself as a 
testing ground for these coordinates – a receptacle for the receptacle, as it were – in an 
attempt at a democratic milieu for the art encounter; but the open admittance, in 
recent decades, of this predominantly large-scale medium in institutions worldwide is 
symptomatic of a post-war socioeconomic development that saw a redefinition of the 
art museum as ambitious architectural project in both size and investment – an art 
project in itself and a marketable point of attraction for wide-ranging audiences. Not 
only did the new establishment need spacious (and ‘spectacular’) works in order to be 
                                                
116 What I propose here in connection to staging as artistic practice promotes (engineers) a state of 
awareness of the production of experience during an encounter with a work of art. The double 
perceptual condition of ‘seeing yourself seeing’ is central to Olafur Eliasson’s work, who writes in 
extent about the engineering of this position (see Glossary p. 141). I discuss his work in the next 
chapter. Eliasson says: ‘[m]ost institutions forget to let the spectators see themselves seeing’ (quoted by 
Bishop, op. cit., p. 77). There is a productive tension between a state of immersion and one of 
inspection in his work, as this generates a reflection of the viewer upon the affected body (the 
transformation) and the interaction between perception and response (the mode of perception as auto-
affection). Eliasson’s work is a token of how the subjective position of centredness does not ban a 
critical attitude. 
117 Deleuze suggests this idea as Spinozist: ‘What does Spinoza mean when he invites us to take the 
body as model? It is a matter of showing that the body surpasses the knowledge that we have of it, and 
that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have of it.’ In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 
City Light Books, 1988, p. 18, quoted by O’Sullivan, op cit. p. 38. This idea of the ‘model’ could be 
seen in relation to the Kantian concept of ‘schema’ or the idea of an ‘affective a priori’ that Dufrenne 
articulates in the Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Experience, op. cit., pp. 441-462. 
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filled, but also its enveloping spaces (an architectural proposition throughout) 
promoted a porous, osmotic relationship between the two receptacles.118 
 
Donald Preziosi in his essay Palpable and Mute as a Globed Fruit119 dissects the 
problematic that this situation entails. Preziosi asks ‘how encountering itself might be 
usefully theorised, more effectively staged, and by implication managed for diverse 
audiences’ and suggests how ‘encountering may be plausibly understood as a 
particular kind of interpretative activity.’ In view of these thoughts, the agency of any 
‘framing device’ in an expanded sense – any staging of an encounter – becomes part 
of the context of the object encountered. ‘If museums are in fact occasions for staging 
encounters with artefacts or phenomena using a wide variety of means, methods and 
materials, where both what is staged and the staging itself are productive of 
knowledge, then a case may also be made that there is little in a museum that is not 
potentially interpretative whether by design or appropriation.’ After an extensive 
survey of how institutions adopt and mimic the inherent ambivalence of art itself 
(between what is intended and what is received) Preziosi concludes: ‘The point is that 
the encounter with objects is always ambivalently ‘aesthetic’ or ‘religious’, the 
modern distinction between the two being less a question of content and more a 
matter of how agency is framed relative to what is being experienced or sensed.’120 
 
With the exposure of the ways in which any ‘added’ context affects the presentation 
and reception of art (to the point where it transforms it politically or ideologically), 
Preziosi calls for alertness with regard to the inevitable agency of framing: the 
encounter staged within an art institution adds an even greater degree of ambiguity in 
the reception of the work than the one inevitably existing due to the uncontrollable 
relation between intention and reception of the work. Apart from the interference on 
                                                
118 Rosalind Krauss describes this condition of ‘late capitalist’ museums in her visit at the Musée d’Art 
Moderne de la Ville de Paris in 1990. While the curator Suzanne Pagé guided her around the 
refurbished galleries, Krauss was struck by the ‘disembodied glow’ of various works by Dan Flavin 
coming from adjacent spaces. She remarks: ‘We are having this experience, then, not in front of what 
could be called the art, but in the midst of an oddly grandiloquent yet empty space of which the 
museum itself, as a building, is somehow the object.’ Quoted by Alex Landrum and Ed Whittaker in 
Nonsite to Celebration Park: Essays on Art and the Politics of Space, edited by Alex Landrum and 
Edward Whittaker, Antony Rowe Publishing Services, 2008, p. 8. 
119 Presented at the ‘Interpretation, Theory and the Encounter’ conference at Tate Britain on 9 July 
2010, accessed in March 2012 at 
 http://www.tate.org.uk/research/tateresearch/tatepapers/11spring/preziosi.shtm  
120 Ibid. (accessed online). 
 44 
each work that Preziosi points out, this extra ‘staging’ alters the experience of works 
by re-contextualizing them. Installation art, to some degree, may be able to minimize 
any explicit spatial interference by the identity, at times, of the space of the work with 
the space of the room where it is exhibited in galleries and museums (when there is 
virtually no room for any different physical context to intrude). Nevertheless, the very 
adoption of installation art by museums and art institutions points to another, more 
complicit idea of appropriation that has to do with the playful, immersive or 
interactive character of a great deal of such work that has brought popularity to 
museums as spaces of a (previously absent) degree of entertainment combined with a 
democratic idea of participation.121 This is already suggested at the outset of Claire 
Bishop’s study, where she argues that installation art became the ‘institutionally 
approved art form par excellence of the 1990s’;122 due to its physical and 
psychological particularities, among others its scale, it embraces the viewer in space 
(an enclosure reminiscent of pre-natal embrace) and offers a durational or often 
participatory experience with the rewarding dimension of the viewer becoming the 
center of the piece.123  
 
If one succeeds to screen out institutional interventions and added contextual layers 
symptomatic of the display of installation art, certain key attributes manifest: this 
paradigm – where theatricality is the ‘norm’ and specific spatial coordinates resonate 
with relational types of encounters – invariably involves a staging. This arrangement 
of objects in space, at first maligned as theatrical, has by now become a widespread 
practice, an intrinsic feature of installation art and the installation of art equally. This 
is so not only because the viewer’s experience is dependent on this staging, in this 
particular configuration, but also that apart from the decentred subject, this model of 
encounter posits a decentred object as well; as if the weight of the agency of the artist 
had shifted, crystallizing not in the object as such but on the encounter of the work 
with the viewer, staged and engineered (drawn and sculpted). The existence or the 
                                                
121 The question of democracy at the forefront of the artistic avant-garde since the 1960s put forward 
ideas of open cultural access, perceptual self-determination and the disruption of power structures. An 
equal amount of debate contests the extent to which we perceive the current western political system as 
democratic – exemplified in the title of the first Platform of the Documenta 11 in 2002 – Democracy 
Unrealized (resulting in a publication edited by Stefano Boeri, Susanne Ghez, Ute Meta Bauer and 
Mark Nash by Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2002). 
122 Bishop, op. cit., p. 8. 
123 Bishop refers to Julie Reiss and her book From Margin to Center: The Spaces of Installation Art, 
MIT Press, 1999 in relation to the idea of centrality of the viewer in installation art. 
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arrangement of objects (even the presentation of the object) is mapped in the space of 
installation as the medium, the means to involve the viewing subject in a joint 
materialization of the encounter. For example; Mona Hatoum’s Homebound 
installation from 2000, in which steel kitchen utensils connected to electrical wires 
become electrified by the current; here the situation rather than the objects themselves 
are the nexus of the encounter. 
 
This decentred place of the object is quite different to the idea of the dematerialized 
object in the conceptual art of the 1960s and 1970s. That moment and consequent 
widespread movement, which inflicted a blow both to the established status of the 
object of art and the space that accommodated that particular object of art, as both 
political activism and institutional critique, transposed the work of art from object to 
several types of gestures, systems, or practices that deconstructed any ‘material’ form 
by which an object was bound.124 A crucial difference between the dematerialized 
(and fundamentally anti-aesthetic) object and the decentred object of installation art is 
that conceptual art gave an unprecedented role to language, as either spoken or 
written text-based elements, as part of the visual or structural forms of its 
production.125 A radical cross-fertilization compared to the norms of mainstream art at 
the time, this linguistic turn augmented an already looming phenomenon, namely: the 
tendency to read art literally, as text but also as a literal reading of its objects; but 
also, that the network of references that come with linguistic signification impairs the 
corporeal. This cross-fertilization would not have been a negative phenomenon per se, 
given the concurrent radical theories of linguistics, psychoanalysis, feminism and 
post-structuralism, which in fact gave birth to the ‘decentred subject,’ introducing 
critical theory into the discourse of art. 126 But it appears, in retrospect, to have 
weakened an already thin connection of visual art to its very nucleus, the body, 
aesthesis, and the corporeal experience as fundamental (and radical) encounter with 
the world in favour of a more linguistically centred, ‘eloquent’ expression that was 
partly a reaction against the imperatives of formalist aesthetics.  
                                                
124 Concurrently, in 1967, the group of minimalist artists that Michael Fried comments on in his essay 
were trying to break free from the idea of ‘art’ itself, but were ending up in the object. 
125 Examples are Alighiero Boetti’s postal projects, or his Classification of the thousand longest rivers 
in the world, 1977, and Laurence Wiener’s text-based projects.  
126 Julia Kristeva wrote extensively on the fragmentation of the subject; her psychoanalytic theory of 
the ‘chora’ in Revolution in Poetic Language brought to light visceral processes that emerge in 
linguistic expression and disturb the preconception of a unified subject. 
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However, the notion of a ‘decentred object’ that I previously suggested is not entirely 
accurate either; I am not referring here to those works where literally no single object 
or group of objects forms a focal point or where an enveloping space receives the 
viewer, nor to those environments or assemblages where the objects are part of a 
bigger picture or situation (as in Mona Hatoum’s aforementioned work). What I am 
thinking of is a spatial work of a decided sculptural status, a unique object (as in 
Giuseppe Penone’s Trees or Wolfgang Laib’s pollen works) that, despite its 
distinctive and compelling aesthetic presence, its affective appeal, its beauty, still, 
paradoxically, is not an end in itself – or in the words of Robert Morris ‘[t]he object 
has not become less important, but less self-important.’127 How do we account for the 
irreversible shift from art as object to art as encounter? Perhaps this comes out of the 
predicament of the modern subject and the much-lamented denigration of authentic 
experience that a pervasive state of mediation has inflicted on our senses. Or as if our 
downfall as subjects from a symbolic ‘centre’ (or from the state of a unified whole) 
has forever affected the status of the object too, and nothing will convince us of its 
unity or self-containment either – no matter how sublime. Through a gradual 
transformation the object of art has altered from an object of cult status to an 
autonomous object and subsequently to a medium that enables the co-creation of a 
situation (in installation art). This shift has paradoxically thrust the object back in 
time to the functional status of an in-between medium in a process; as such, it has 
allowed a residue of ritual to re-emerge – a ritual devoid of myth, belief, or ceremony 
– as the space where we connect and transform, an art encounter as scene of affective 
becoming.  
 
In what I have just described as a possible ‘return’ of the work of art to the status of 
the medium – which could be understood as our own tuning into its transitional and 
transmissive nature – I discern a similarity to the intermediary function and in-
between place of the work of art in several Eastern traditions (and the corresponding 
theorization of its aesthetic status);128 this agency of the work incites affect in the 
viewer (sometimes in an almost visceral reaction) and conducts the material that it 
                                                
127 Quoted by Fried, op. cit., p. 154. 
128 As I have previously noted, the classical Indian aesthetic theory of the Rasas is a compelling 
account of this condition.  
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represents between them (since this material is mostly figurative).129 The intricately 
sculpted Indian temples, for example, where the phenomenally carved courtyards 
receive the visitor in a space so intensely dense that it almost has a palpable effect on 
the viewer’s body; still it does not, in its overwhelming material dimension, seem to 
demand attention as a work of art – maybe because it plays its role so well that one 
need not seek its ontology in more than what it achieves (as transformation, 
movement, and affect). Here lies a critical point: that any symbol of stasis, any 
ontological fixity, any object as object (or representation of an idea) will not perform 
as art anymore – perhaps because it is precisely a performance130 that it is asked to be, 
a means to affect; while any transitional zone, any embodied affect that is a state of 
becoming for the viewer is what art has come to stand for. 
 
Simon O’Sullivan in ‘Writing on Art (Case Study: The Buddhist Puja),’ seeks an 
alternative notion of art as ‘a shared project of deterritorialization.’ In the ritual 
practice of the puja he finds such a model and notes:  
 
The puja is then a zone of transformation. An aesthetic zone in which 
discrete boundaries between subjects, and between subjects and objects 
are blurred. […] And so we can understand the puja, like all art, as 
operating on different registers. It contains moments of figuration – of 
representation – but this is not its point (there are always those who will 
interpret dreams just as there will always be those who figure art as text). 
These moments are also access nodes into/onto something else (the molar 
aggregates that mask the molecular (the realm of affects)).131 
 
O’Sullivan suggests that a ‘project of deterritorialization’ in art is where no 
‘anchoring point’ will stabilize the practice (whether that is the object, the figuration, 
the language or the form). This provides insight into the in-between-ness of the work 
of art as medium despite its intrinsic symbolic function (as image or figuration). 
Likewise, an art encounter that is keyed on the object as medium and entry point does 
not essentially become consumed or fixed in the object qua object or its attributes; on 
                                                
129 I referred to this process of ‘affected vision’ in the previous chapter in reference to Kaja Silverman. 
130 With ‘performance’ here I do not imply ‘performance art,’ but an agency mapped on the space of 
the work that sets the viewer in action, and – as I have repeated regarding the ‘double mode’ of 
viewing – becomes perceived as such (becomes a mode of address or a tension from object to viewer 
and vice versa). For a further discussion see the following passages and for a definition of terms see the 
Glossary. 
131 Simon O’Sullivan, ‘Writing on Art (Case Study: The Buddhist Puja)’ in Parallax, 2001, vol. 7, no. 
4, 115–121. 
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the contrary, the object becomes a springboard and thrusts the viewer/participant 
towards various, dispersed centers of sensation and affect. 
 
 
2. ‘An aesthetic zone’ (On The World as a Stage)  
 
The exhibition The World as a Stage at the Tate Modern in 2008 brought together a 
selection of artists working across a range of media with a particular interest in 
performance, theatricality, stage sets and live interaction. In the exhibition catalogue, 
curator Catherine Wood’s essay Art Meets Theatre: The Middle Zone132 provides an 
insightful account of why a dialogue between theatre and visual art has such currency 
in artistic practices today. The title of the essay describes the modalities of this cross-
pollination: the middle, as the in-between, and the zone as a conception of the 
spatiotemporal dimension in which much of this body of work is materialised.  
 
Wood gives a historical account of the marked resistance expressed by the champions 
of modernist values against the idea of theatricality in visual art, epitomized in 
Michael Fried’s essay Art and Objecthood, but also evident in Bertolt Brecht’s 
warning of a state of degradation as a result of the fusion of disciplines.133 She 
outlines a genealogy of refutations against theatre’s pictoriality, narrativity and figural 
representation; however, she astutely observes the intrinsic theatricality of the gallery 
environment, the white cube, which ‘represses the theatrical nature of its staging of a 
neutral blankness as a backdrop for art.’134 In addition, she highlights the pervasive 
condition of performance and spectatorial relations within contemporary life while 
pointing to features of theatre that resonate with a re-formulated conception of the art 
object: ‘As a conceptual notion, theatre contains an extreme capacity for dispersal 
and portability.’135 It appears that several aspects of theatre – and performativity as a 
general condition – strike a chord with the sensibility and the type of space that visual 
art increasingly shapes: the social milieu that is enacted in spatial encounters, the 
                                                
132 Catherine Wood, ‘Art Meets Theatre: The Middle Zone’, in The World As A Stage, Catherine Wood 
and Jessica Morgan, Tate Publishing, 2007, pp. 18-25. 
133 Ibid. p. 24. 
134 Ibid. p. 19. Wood cites Brian O’Doherty’s Inside the White Cube, an article in Artforum in 1976, 
which analysed the spectatorial conditions of the gallery environment. A subsequent survey on the 
spectatorial terms of the museum is Tony Bennett’s The Birth of the Museum, Routledge, 1995. 
135 Wood, op. cit., p. 19. 
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relational dimension, the viewer as embodied presence. There is a tendency towards a 
fluid, open-ended relation between the object of art and the viewing subject to which 
the performative dimension becomes instrumental: a shift of attention from the 
material status of the object to the events that the work engenders in the viewing 
subject.  
 
However, this capacious influence, which contributed to artists’ needs, over time, to 
dematerialize the art object, has already been extensively negotiated and configured in 
the artistic production of the recent decades – and heavily debated as well.136 Yet 
what I believe to be an astute contribution of Wood’s essay is not so much the insight 
into what the performative turn brings to the sculptural object, but her detection of the 
‘sculptural quality of this total situation’ where ‘the actor, the object, the mise-en-
scène and the spectator’ all coexist.137 Rather than focussing on the theatrical status of 
the sculptural object the essay highlights the sculptural quality featured in the co-
existence of objects and live agents in a space, challenging our perception of this 
versatile situation and pointing to the fact that our perception is actually the site where 
these relations are construed. In effect, this is not a one-sided agency; there is a 
diffusion of aesthetic comportment that essentially blurs these boundaries, 
supplemented by an allusion to the spatial dimension of social exchange.138  
 
In Wood’s text, the performative dimension of the object as an expanded approach to 
art making is explained in several ways: ‘Though the artwork itself might include 
discrete objects or ‘pictures’, its representational field is always an expanded one. 
This expanded field is founded upon, or implies, an understanding of the ritualised 
                                                
136 Apart from a host of writings and articles in direct response to Michael Fried’s polemic, as for 
example Robert Smithson’s ‘Letter to the Editors’ in 1967 (in Robert Smithson: The Collected 
Writings, University of California Press, 1996, pp. 66-67), there has been prolific literature on this 
topic and its misconceptions. For example, see Shannon Jackson’s article Theatre…Again in Art Lies 
Journal, http://www.artlies.org/article.php?id=1682&issue=60&s=1 where she critiques the misuse of 
the term ‘theatricality,’ and her analysis in Social Works, op. cit., pp. 17-20. 
137 Wood, op. cit., p. 23. 
138 Shannon Jackson, for example, offers a view of the experimentations blending visual and theatrical 
disciplines: ‘“Postdramatic theatre” is Hans-Thies Lehmann’s roomy term for a brand of 
experimentation that resists cathartic narrative, that deconstructs canonical texts, that replaces dramatic 
characters with sculptural figures, that moves outside of a proscenium space, and that approaches 
politics from a post-Brechtian stance that re-imagines rather than rejects the signature forms of the 
culture industry.’ In Social Works, op. cit., p. 2. A video work by collaborative artist duo Elmgreen & 
Dragset titled Drama Queens from 2008 is a poignant take on the scenic presence of sculpture. 
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relationships between people that lend objects or images significance.’139 Towards 
the end of her essay Wood quotes the work of anthropologist David Graeber on the 
‘fetish’ in African tribal cultures, the significance of which lies in ‘the emphasis 
within those communities on the social contract or oath that was signified by the 
object over and above the inherent value of the object itself.’140 Graeber argued that 
European traders in the sixteenth century failed to grasp this ‘ascription of value,’ 
obsessed as they were with material commodities and wealth; the status of the object 
in those cultures had to be perceived differently, and it appeared arbitrary to the 
unfamiliar eye:  
 
Graeber believes that his revised understanding of the position of the 
object’s status within social relations points towards a productive 
understanding of the locus of creativity that ‘is not an aspect of the object 
at all’, but ‘a dimension of action’141 […] It was as though everything 
existed in the middle zone which the Europeans were trying to evacuate; 
everything was social – nothing fixed, therefore everything was both 
material and social simultaneously.142 
 
These ideas resonate with several aspects of contemporary art, Wood observes, 
through a renewed ‘understanding of culture as a contingent and communal process 
of enactment,’ as she conclusively notes.143 Ideas of enactment and communion are 
mapped on the space of the work as a human dimension that increasingly gains in 
importance in artistic practices and manifests both as aesthetic affect and as an 
embodied encounter for the viewer; the space of the work thus becomes an expansive 
stage. Such a conceptualisation reflects the transitional status of the art object and the 
‘transaction’ that art becomes, a shift well documented in several theses on 
contemporary sculpture.144  
 
                                                
139 Wood, op. cit., p. 18. 
140 Ibid. p. 24.  
141 Wood quotes David Graeber from ‘Fetishism as Social Creativity, or Fetishes Are Gods in the 
Process of Construction’, in Anthropological Theory, vol. 5, 2005, p. 425. 
142 Wood, op. cit., p. 24. 
143 Ibid. p. 25. 
144 Recent publications where these ideas are examined include Anne Ellegood’s Vitamin 3-D New 
Perspectives in Sculpture and Installation, Phaidon Press, 2009; Richard Flood, Laura Hoptman and 
Massimiliano Gioni’s Unmonumental – the Object in the 21st Century, Phaidon Press, 2007; and 
Johanna Burton and Anne Ellegood’s The Uncertainty of Objects and Ideas: Recent Sculpture, 
Hirshhorn Museum & Sculpture Garden, 2007 (the last two titles are the catalogues from the respective 
exhibitions). 
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On a theatrical stage, objects become signifiers; as props, or scenic elements, they 
demonstrate their intended role, they have a palpable verbal agency. Perhaps this is 
what renders some examples of new sculpture ostensibly theatrical, this ‘loud’ 
eloquence, this gestural address that almost becomes an act (I am thinking here of 
examples from the work of Martin Boyce and Tom Burr, or even more explicitly 
Mike Kelley’s emblematic Day is Done multi-media installation at the Gagosian 
Gallery in 2005). However, sculpture has absorbed and transubstantiated this 
performativity, this gestural approach and mode of address in such a way that it has 
become a part of its structure – ‘part of an artistic experience economy,’ as Pil and 
Galia Kollectiv have observed,145 or ‘simply its current ‘state of being’.’146 What we 
experience is not an unadulterated theatrical language or structure, but a new 
objecthood that interferes with our everyday spaces and relations.147  
 
A common denominator between sculpture and theatre is the spatiotemporal 
interaction with an audience; the durational character of this presence and the 
spectatorial relations that emerge intersect these two disciplines. The temporal 
dimension of the sculptural encounter involves a movement in space – an almost 
intrinsically performative relation – partially ‘choreographed’ by the spatial 
coordinates of the work or installation, and the surrounding architecture.148 This 
physicality invites responses and registers that often bifurcate: where the viewing 
subject is phenomenologically aware of his/her encounter with an object or 
installation (and the distinctive affects that this encounter engenders) but also 
critically aware of the heterogeneous spheres of discourse inscribed in the aggregation 
of objects in spaces (a particular ‘blend’ of the aesthetic and conceptual character of 
contemporary artworks, as I will later describe). While the object addresses us in a 
raw, fundamental corporeal encounter (even the heavily staged, composite object or 
                                                
145 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, Can Objects Perform?: Agency and Thingliness in Contemporary Sculpture 
and Installation, accessed online in March 2012 at 
 http://www.kollectiv.co.uk/Object%20Orientations.html  
146 Anne Ellegood quotes Johanna Burton in Vitamin 3-D, op. cit., p. 6. 
147 In fact one is tempted to think that, were it not for an emphasis on certain critical texts, such an 
accentuated parallel between the two disciplines would not have moulded our perception of certain 
artistic movements (with Minimalism as a prime example, with Fried’s accusation of ‘theatricality’ 
which overshadowed its pronounced influence from phenomenology).  
148 In his book On the Total Installation, Ilya Kabakov writes: ‘[…] we will speak about the “dramatic” 
direction of the viewer as he moves through the installation, relying, it seems to us, on some general 
laws of perception of a person who has wound up in a “place unfamiliar to him”, even more so “inside 
a work of art”. We shall attempt to examine in order those “levers” which this “drama” puts into action, 
what it utilizes.’ Ilya Kabakov, On the Total Installation, Cantz Verlag, 1995, p. 311.  
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multi-media installation), its staging, its intentional configurations and spawning 
ramifications engage us in reflections and considerations that span across incongruous 
spheres of discourse and affective constitutions, re-enacting social situations, 
experiencing the political ‘clearing’ of non-functional space or, conversely, an 
institutionally burdened viewing context. But the effect of this bifurcation – the 
distinctively combined aesthetic and conceptual character of the work of art – rounds 
up not in split awareness but in composition, in a double view of our affected 
corporeality and heightened awareness of the scenarios at play. This distinctively 
dispersed spatial experience enacts a spectral projection of subjectivity that fuses 
performance and spectatorship.  
 
The paradigm that such spatial encounters bring about marks a shift from the ‘ideal’ 
and static viewpoint of modernist aesthetics to a multiple, decentred situation with 
heterogeneous registers that requires the viewer’s presence not as a vague and 
indeterminate physical interaction but as trigger or rehearsal of what the viewing 
subject brings into the work. A conception of the work as stage marks a development 
in the space of the work from fixed picture, disembodied ‘eye’ and autonomous object 
to a spatiotemporal field of movement, of encounter and performative149 mapping that 
converges the agencies of artistic practice with those of an engaged, enacting viewing 
subject. 
 
The work as stage for an engaged viewer evokes questions of activity and passivity in 
spectatorship; Wood remarks: ‘In this sense, the work renegotiates not only the status 
of the art object but also the image plane as a site of activity, in opposition to Guy 
Debord’s characterisation of the capitalist ‘spectacle’ as ‘alienating screen.’150 This 
renegotiation echoes discussions on art as a democratic platform for participation.151 
                                                
149 In my repeated use of the terms ‘performance’ and ‘performative’ I do not attempt to set up an 
opposition of performance as a singular occurrence, and performative as repetition of behavioural 
pattern, but rather make use of the term ‘performative’ as what James Loxley describes ‘the rather 
general quality something might have by virtue of being a performance.’ James Loxley, Performativity, 
Routledge, 2006, p. 140. See also Glossary, p. 141. 
150 Wood, op. cit., p. 19. 
151 Although ‘participation’ is a heavily contested term in current art criticism, as a pseudo-political and 
regularly unrealized dimension of diverse artistic practices, there is an important amount of work where 
a spatial or conceptual setup for participation is achieved. Examples include the work of art collective 
Gelitin, Tomas Saraceno and Alfredo Jaar; this participation is literal, for example, in some of Jeremy 
Deller’s collaborative projects, which are based on material gathered from various communities or 
social groups and exhibited in the gallery or museum as installation works. Olafur Eliasson says: ‘I 
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Jacques Rancière’s essay The Emancipated Spectator explores the issue of ‘activated 
spectatorship.’152 Rancière presented the two main influences of contemporary theatre 
– Bertolt Brecht’s dialectical theatre and Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty – as 
two different directions towards the end of ‘activating the viewer,’ a pursuit at the 
heart of theatrical debates throughout modernism.153 But Rancière’s essay overcomes 
the ‘debate’ between the two positions by ‘challeng[ing] the opposition between 
viewing and acting’ and by positing the spectator’s interpretative activity as an active 
role, a translation into a new ‘idiom’: ‘[…] who develop their own translation in 
order to appropriate the ‘story’ and make it their own story. An emancipated 
community is a community of narrators and translators.’154  
 
The work as stage proposes a different reception and a different core notion of the 
artwork;155 Wood claims that ‘for the object, it means testing its status as an 
encounter against its facticity as a discrete ‘thing.’156 The object acts upon the viewer 
as a trigger for motion and affective connectivity; its time and space extend to the 
experiencing subject with continuity.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
think what we’re dealing with is what I sometimes call “looped participation,” or participation where 
there is an evaluation of itself as participation. Participating is no problem – going into a shop and 
buying something is a kind of participation – but it doesn’t usually involve evaluation. I think this is the 
potential of cultural activity. […] you can model participation and introduce evaluation as an active 
element in the participation.’ In Hans Ulrich Obrist, The Conversation Series, Walther König Verlag, 
2008, p. 47. 
152 Janques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, Verso Books, 2009. 
153 Rancière writes: ‘Theatre accuses itself of rendering spectators passive and thereby betraying its 
essence as community action. It consequently assigns itself the mission of reversing its effects and 
expiating its sins by restoring to spectators ownership of their consciousness and their activity. The 
theatrical stage and performance thus become a vanishing mediation between the evil of spectacle and 
the virtue of true theatre. They intend to teach their spectators ways of ceasing to be spectators and 
becoming agents of a collective practice. According to the Brechtian paradigm, theatrical mediation 
makes them conscious of the social situation that gives rise to it and desirous of acting in order to 
transform it. According to Artaud’s logic, it makes them abandon their position as spectators: rather 
than being placed in front of a spectacle, they are surrounded by the performance, drawn into the circle 
of action that restores their collective energy. In both cases, theatre is presented as a mediation striving 
for its own abolition.’ Ibid. p. 7-8. Elsewhere Rancière notes about the two opposing conceptions that 
‘the practice and the theory of a reformed theatre have often combined them.’ Ibid. p. 4. 
154 Ibid. p. 22.  
155 With ‘work of art’ or ‘artwork’ I describe a condition for expanded sculpture as it develops (see 
also Glossary, p. 142). 
156 Wood, op. cit., p. 20. 
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As has been argued elsewhere,157 this is partly a result of the legacy of performance 
art still resonant in the space of sculpture today, and as Wood notes, telling of ‘the 
extent to which a sense of ‘theatricality’ has, in recent practice, become invested in 
the perception of the art viewer over and above being a quality of the object itself; a 
self-reflexive mode carried beyond the parameters of the gallery environment in 
which it was initiated.’158 Again, these are the terms of a situation that invites or 
incites a politicized spectatorship, an alternative objecthood, and a pervasive 
relationality. In fact Wood cites RoseLee Goldberg’s analysis of performance and the 
innovation it brought for objects too, how ‘it feeds into transitional moments in the 
development of new painterly or sculptural forms and styles.’159 This ‘feed’ facilitates 
a changing perception of the forces at play in the space of sculpture, which shifts 
attention from the object as the aesthetic focus of the encounter to the affects 
conveyed across the space of the work as aesthetic events; this shift of attention is 
often phrased as what art does rather than what it is, and although oversimplifying, 
such a statement echoes the shortcomings of an ontological study regarding the 
contingent nature of art, by switching the register from overtly formal (or ideological) 
strategies to manifestations of change and affectuality.  
 
As Martin Herbert observed in his article on The World as a Stage, ‘[p]erformativity 
within art has lately been attended by a modulated definition of theatre – toward 
putting the viewer "on stage",’ and he describes the overall project as typical of ‘the 
present sea change in reception.’160 Herbert also refers to ‘A Theater without 
Theater’, a voluminous exhibition concurrently hosted in the Museu Berardo de 
Lisboa in 2007, which explored the grafting of visual art and theatre throughout the 
twentieth and early twenty-first century. The interaction between the two genres, 
intensified in the early twentieth century by the Constructivists and the Bauhaus, re-
emerged in visual art in the 1960s;161 it later became a staple of postmodernism, 
providing some of the most challenging debates that enabled an understanding of the 
                                                
157 See for example Jan Verwoert, Make the prop talk – on putting performance back into sculpture, 
The Showroom Annual 2006/7, p. 30, which I discuss in the following chapters. 
158 Wood, op. cit., p. 20. 
159 Ibid. p. 23. 
160 Martin Herbert, The World as Stage, Artforum, March 2008, accessed online in May 2012 at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0268/is_7_46/ai_n31390521/pg_2/?tag=content;col1  
161 Rosalind Krauss describes Robert Morris’ 1961 (untitled) performance with a column standing on a 
stage in ‘Mechanical Ballets: light, motion, theatre,’ in Passages in Modern Sculpture, op. cit., pp. 201-
203. 
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impasses of formalism, or its lack of correspondence to a changing awareness of the 
viewing subject. The temporal dimension of the aesthetic experience, the specifically 
corporeal interaction of the viewer with the work of art as space and situation – as 
productive encounter – would become a testing ground for the work’s force, and its 
connection to life; these dimensions became a political necessity in art.  
 
Although critical of the demands that ‘interactive’ works often pose to viewers – 
which either undermine their freedom of action or seem to imitate a consumerist 
culture of game-play and divertissement and which, he argues, needs to be 
reconsidered by artists today – Herbert concludes his double review by claiming that 
the interest in revisiting such a frequently discussed correlation is that ‘theatricality in 
art is a voicing of cultural disquiet’.162 It seems clear that the state of ambivalent 
uncertainty that permeates contemporary life has irreversibly sealed the work of art 
with a dramatic act. 
 
 
3. Performative Objects 
 
Issues of a reconfigured objecthood are examined in Pil and Galia Kollectiv’s essay 
Can Objects Perform?: Agency and Thingliness in Contemporary Sculpture and 
Installation,163 which they presented at the Henry Moore Institute as part of the 
‘Sculpture and Performance’ conference in 2010. In their essay Pil and Galia 
Kollectiv raise questions around ‘thingliness’ and objecthood as forces at play within 
these practices; their distinction between ‘things’ and ‘objects’ is primarily made in 
connection to their socially referential context as agents within art installations. As 
such they document our changing encounter with art and reflect a wider discourse 
concerning the political agency of things and objects in our lives.  
 
A turning point for sculpture was ‘the staging of an experience for the viewer as 
performer,’164 contested by Michael Fried’s essay Art and Objecthood in 1967, as Pil 
and Galia note. What Fried saw in Minimalism – as in the work of Robert Morris and 
                                                
162 Herbert, op. cit. (accessed online). 
163 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit., (accessed online). 
164 Ibid. (accessed online). 
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Donald Judd – was a change of paradigm in how the viewer encountered the work of 
art, which was bound to trigger numerous changes in both the reception of art and the 
work’s status as an object; it signalled a change in what the ‘authentic’ moment of the 
art experience was, its dependencies, its locus and its duration that superseded the 
‘instantaneous’ and transcendent nature that the work of art had traditionally been 
perceived as expressing.165 This was part of a wider and gradual change that affected 
both the time and the space of the sculptural object, and which Rosalind Krauss 
described as the transition into postmodernism in her 1979 essay Sculpture in the 
Expanded Field.166  
 
However, Pil and Galia point to the fact that Fried’s ‘[a]rgument has since been 
inverted by artists and art writers invested in the idea of sculptures as props forming 
part of an artistic experience economy.’167 As the authors note, this economy of 
experience was manifest in the art of the 1990s with ‘relational aesthetics’ (the term 
coined by Nicolas Bourriaud in his homonymous book), where the space of art 
became a place of convivial communion or a framework for human activity; but they 
subsequently remark: ‘More recently, however, there has been a turn away from 
relationality to ‘object-oriented’ art, where objects are seen to stage their own 
theatrical experiences, performing themselves without requiring the activation of a 
viewer’s body.’168 The authors associate the turn to an ‘object-oriented’ art with 
emerging philosophical theories such as ‘object-oriented ontology’ and the 
‘Speculative Realism’ movement.169 These theories explore the inherent creativity of 
matter and the role of nonhuman agents, converging scientific with philosophical 
investigations in order to suggest an alternative model for thought – exemplified in 
Bruno Latour’s theoretical work. In addition these investigations map the political 
conveyances that matter negotiates over a global economy.  
 
                                                
165 Grant Kester describes this change of paradigm from a critical and historical perspective in his 
Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art, University of California Press, 
2004, pp 46-49 and 50-81. 
166 Rosalind Krauss, Sculpture in the Expanded Field, October magazine, spring 1979, p. 30-44. 
167 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit., (accessed online).  
168 Ibid. (accessed online). Here is a far-reaching argument that not only grapples with recent 
sculpture’s object-oriented turn but also indirectly insinuates the failures of the partly exhausted and 
partly politically unstable project of ‘viewer participation’ in a considerable amount of art of the recent 
decades. 
169 Numerous recent publications attest to this trend, such as Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (Duke 
University Press, 2009) that proposes a concept of ‘vital materiality’. 
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This growing interest in the agencies of objects is increasingly manifest in the space 
of recent sculpture, where an abundant objecthood, an appearance of assemblage and 
a perplexing juxtaposition of matter propose a syntax articulated by objects and their 
inscribed stories. In this context Pil and Galia describe Rachel Harrison’s Huffy 
Howler from 2004 and the composite sculptural work of Cathy Wilkes and Isa 
Genzken. This emphasized objecthood differs substantially from a modernist 
antecedent where a ‘truth to materials’ entrenched an autonomous space for the 
aesthetic object. Instead this present condition, according to Pil and Galia, is ‘defining 
a sculptural anti-aesthetic that asks us to consider the changing nature of our 
relationship to objects.’170 This changing relationship is telling of the political 
implication of objects across various spheres of life and their gradual extinction in 
favour of virtual transactions, which bestows on them a renewed, though altered, 
value. These frictions are mapped in art,171 where objects are recast outside a 
functional use, or a global exchange of capital. In addition this turn reflects a 
precarious tension between countless immaterial transactions and the reliance on 
material product, on objects and their economies. A changing perception effected by 
these discrepancies is mapped on the factual apprehension of matter and objects; in 
fact, there could not be more distance between the inherent ‘logic’ of modernist 
aesthetics and the post-apocalyptic landscape of contemporary sculpture: these 
arrangements speak of a pervasive uncertainty, they document an anxiety, their 
awkwardness echoing the social reality of individual political disability.172 
 
‘[…] The proliferation of the scanty art objects described above, situated somewhere 
between theatrical props waiting to be activated and material phenomena closed to 
human access, is both a consequence of and a reaction to these developments,’173 the 
authors note. These works’ circumscribed dialectic between the virtual realm of 
                                                
170 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit. (accessed online). 
171 This condition is well articulated by Alex Landrum and Ed Whittaker: ‘Spatial by availability and 
boundary, works of art are also sites that represent economic and historical transformations to become 
the gathering places of individuals and their relations to objects. In this sense, the sites of artworks are 
also the sites of politics.’ Landrum and Whittaker, op. cit., p. 1. 
172 The idea of uncertainty in new sculpture, reverberating a wider discourse concerning the status of 
the art object, was addressed in Johanna Burton and Anne Ellegood’s The Uncertainty of Objects and 
Ideas, the catalogue to the respective exhibition at the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, 
Washington, DC, in 2006. The idea of disability echoes Jan Verwoert’s remarks on Isa Gentzken’s 
2006 Secession installation (which was untitled), ‘a promise of redemption connected to a state of 
incapacity.’ In Verwoert, op. cit., p. 33. 
173 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit. (accessed online). 
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global connectivity and material objecthood echoes Peter Osborne’s analysis of the 
‘post-conceptual’ phase of the work of art, which converges its intrinsic aesthetic 
dimension (‘an ineliminable – but radically insufficient – aesthetic dimension’)174 
with the conceptual and distributed character of its materializations (where art tends 
toward a condition of ‘architecturalization’).175 The issue at stake here is this 
dialogue between the object as matter and the prevailing conceptual character of the 
work – not least, as Pil and Galia argue, because a dematerialized art object is no 
longer inassimilable by the global market, and thus no longer acting as a form of 
resistance against the commodification and marketization of art; instead, the new 
object configurations in sculpture aim to subvert the subordination of matter to a logic 
of incessant production, distribution and consumption.  
 
In Osborne’s essay, art absorbs forms of social spatiality in its ontology; Pil and Galia 
Kollectiv point out that ‘it is exactly its potential for staging a social situation that 
makes contemporary artists interested in sculptural installations. At the same time, as 
a prop, the object does more than delineate an architecturally determined space, a 
stage’ (my emphasis).176 In fact, as a prop, the object straddles two modes of being 
(the ‘partial’ status that Andrea Phillips’ essay ‘Prop-Objects’ describes)177 that allow 
it to signify narratives and external discourses rearranged in an aesthetic experience 
economy while the space of the work becomes an arena that converges an imagination 
of matter in space and its rehearsal as critique or possibility.178 
 
These configurations are often conceived or framed as a ‘return to theatricality’179 and 
as such evoke the discourse of viewer-as-performer and his/her self-aware presence 
that Michael Fried disparaged in Minimalist art. However, if theatricality were taken 
to be a property of the object, there are two aspects in the type of spatial arrangement 
                                                
174 Peter Osborne, ‘Where is the Work of Art? Contemporary Art, Spatialisation and Urban Form’, in 
Landrum and Whittaker, op. cit., p 15. Osborne’s essay is cited by Pil and Galia Kollectiv. 
175 Ibid. p 13. ‘Architecturalization’ in Osborne’s essay is not so much a type of spatial form (though 
Osborne argues that art is essentially influenced by the general framework of urban form) but a 
distribution of materializations that art imitates from architecture (the relation between plan and 
building, for instance). 
176 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit. (accessed online). 
177 Phillips, op. cit., pp. 26-29. 
178 Jessica Morgan and Catherine Wood have made a similar suggestion in the introduction to The 
World as a Stage, where they frame the exhibition as ‘offering the dramatised and staged as a potential 
critique, rehearsal or analysis of our search for an understanding of our place and position in the 
world.’ Morgan and Wood, op. cit., p. 7.  
179 Pil and Galia quote Jan Verwoert from Make the Prop talk, op. cit. (accessed online). 
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that new sculpture demonstrates that oppose this reading (much as there are numerous 
artists who endorse or invert this criticism).180 The first of these elements concerns the 
agency of the object in this spatial confrontation, what Pil and Galia described as 
‘[…] performing themselves without requiring the activation of a viewer’s body’ (as 
quoted above). This self-performance alludes to a distinctive quality of the encounter 
with an object, a quality of physical address conveyed as enactment and affecting the 
viewer into a state of motion propelled by affect (the link to ‘emotion’ is visible 
here).181 As Johanna Burton observes in ‘The Uncertainty of Objects and Ideas,’ 
‘Fried’s dismay about anthropomorphism was levied as a critique, but I’ve always 
found it to describe well the productive tension produced in the space between a 
three-dimensional thing (it need not be a cube) and a three-dimensional viewer.’182 
The ‘tension’ that Burton identifies does not necessarily imply or follow an actual 
movement of the viewer in the space of the work – the implications of which Fried 
distrusted. Rather, it triggers a virtual enactment, an orchestration of affects and 
cognitive operations that certain sculptural objects or entities instigate in the viewer in 
a more extrovert (or ‘dramaturgic’) mode while other objects exert this tension in a 
more self-contained, ‘static’ mode. In short, ‘theatricality’ as adopted by recent 
sculpture (for want of a specifically ‘sculptural’ terminology, as it appears) describes 
a comportment or tension of the object rather than a typology of response or 
movement by the viewer. 
 
The second aspect of recent sculptural configurations poses ‘theatricality’ as a quality 
of the sculptural object (for want of a ‘sculptural’ term as I described above) in terms 
which are different to the status of a prop or a scenographic asset on a stage.183 Jan 
Verwoert in his essay ‘Make the Prop talk’ argued that ‘[s]culpture […] becomes a 
vehicle, through which concepts of ‘relationality’ taken from performance or 
                                                
180 For instance, Anne Ellegood wrote in her essay ‘Motley Efforts – Sculpture’s Ever-Expanding 
Field’: ‘The ‘stage presence’ that Michael Fried so maligned in his widely read and analyzed critique 
of Minimalism of 1967, ‘Art and Objecthood’, is no longer necessarily a contemplative engagement 
with time and space but one that wears its flamboyant theatricality with aplomb.’ In Ellegood, Vitamin 
3-D, op. cit., p. 9. 
181 As I have previously noted the etymology of ‘synkinesis’, the Greek term for emotion has a 
common root, pointing to a ‘setting-in-motion’ (from ‘syn’=together and ‘kinesis’=movement).  
182 Burton and Ellegood, The Uncertainty of Objects and Ideas, op. cit., p. 16. Johanna Burton’s 
observation is cited by Trevor Smith in his essay ‘Sculpture – a minor place’ in Flood, Hoptman and 
Gioni, op. cit., p. 185. 
183 Even the ‘prop-object’ analysed by Andrea Phillips is an ‘actor’ in a wider ‘stage’ – a political 
arena. Phillips, op. cit., pp. 26-29. 
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installation art, can be reformulated.’184 This reformulation, conceived as a new or 
expanded dimension of sculpture, allows a renewed understanding of the ‘relational’ 
pattern of address that the art object moulds. Following David Graeber’s claims on the 
social consensus represented by the cultural significance of objects,185 I would argue 
that several dimensions of the performative role of the sculptural object have been 
overlooked or misinterpreted; due to an insufficient phraseology in locating artistic 
agency, and a misdirected attention towards a disciplinary delineation of spectatorial 
relations, art criticism overstated the case for theatricality – a misleading term 
altogether186 – when such forces are mapped that reveal an embodied, enacted 
response that converges object and viewer. 
 
In Pil and Galia’s essay this reformulated platform for sculpture reveals the trouble 
with the overt claim for physical interactivity that certain works set up for their 
audience. In museum spaces such gestures are ‘so wholly subsumed in a touristic 
experience economy’187 that any radical potential they once contained is now tamed, 
and part of a cultural industry with the pretence of democratic participation. To this 
the authors counter: ‘[A] new language of objects is therefore called upon to think 
their presence without relying on the vicissitudes of ours. Thus, Fried’s theatrical 
objecthood finds itself in the strange company of Heidegger’s thingliness.’188 Latour’s 
theory, they point out, argues for an alternative approach to objects to that established 
by correlationism (or their ontological dependence on the perceiving mind), one that 
turns to the relations between objects and their mutual processes.189 Consequently, the 
authors argue that Latour’s theory outruns Heidegger’s mapping of human agency on 
things, ‘an ethical, and hence human, position of caring and protecting’ with its 
                                                
184 Verwoert, op. cit., p. 30. 
185 David Graeber as quoted in Wood, op. cit., p. 24. 
186 See Shannon Jackson’s article Theatre…Again, where she illustrates the erroneous assumptions 
around theatricality. As she notes: ‘I find myself encountering all varieties of experimental work that 
seem to be reusing the fundamental registers of theatre—duration, embodiment, spectacle, ensemble, 
text, sound, gesture, situated space, reenactment of an elusive original—and find, once again, that 
“theatre” is still often the thing that such works actively seek not to be.’ Accessed online in May 2012 
at http://www.artlies.org/article.php?id=1682&issue=60&s=1  
187 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit. (accessed online). 
188 Ibid. (accessed online). 
189 Latour writes: ‘ [n]o science of the social can even begin if the question of who and what 
participates in the action is not first of all thoroughly explored, even though it might mean letting 
elements in which, for lack of a better term, we would call non-humans.’ Bruno Latour, Reassembling 
the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 71.  
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proposition of ‘a kind of realism to counter post-modern relativism.’190 This new 
understanding of objects assigns agency to both human and nonhuman agents, and 
offers an insight into the proliferation of ‘material arrangements’ in sculpture and 
installation, where a dialogue between objects and materials seems to fabricate its 
own spawning circuit of associations in which the viewer is not only a partial 
spectator but is not even the organising ‘eye’ that grasps the work as a whole – 
bespeaking ‘the intelligence of matter,’ as Rachel Jones suggested in her essay 
‘Making Matters.’ She thus describes ‘[t]he capacity of matter to give form – to 
spaces and relations as well as new becomings.’191 
 
All these associations are configured by objects, but within a staging determined by 
artistic practice, a staging somehow eclipsed by the radical propositions of object-
oriented theory. As Griselda Pollock has observed, ‘I am engaged or fascinated or 
affected only in so far as something happens inter-subjectively for which the 
mediation is at once material and virtual. This may be misrecognised by investing the 
screen or carrier with human attributes, suggesting, as is the current fashion in some 
areas of object theory, that objects do things to us.’192 In fact Pil and Galia Kollectiv 
problematize the application of object-oriented ontology in art, which, far from 
rehearsing the validity of the theoretical paradigm itself, exposes a humanist 
projection of properties and comportments to matter by both artists and spectators 
(and which, I would think, inflects a distant echo of Fried’s critique of 
‘anthropomorphism’ with yet another vindicating hue). They frame their essay with a 
warning against ‘a generalized, universalizing humanism that disables political 
action’ that an unconditional endorsement of the discourse of the ‘creativity of matter’ 
risks, which, on the other hand ‘undermines the potential for anti-humanist critique 
latent in object-oriented philosophy.’193 
 
The ineradicably ‘human context,’ as they observe, is visible in the way contemporary 
art is framed within art institutions – and in the questionable degree to which such 
                                                
190 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit. (accessed online). 
191 Rachel Jones, ‘Making Matters,’ an essay for the ‘Material Intelligence’ exhibition at Kettle’s Yard 
in 2009, accessed in March 2012 at 
 http://www.kettlesyard.co.uk/exhibitions/mi_catalogue/essay_jones.html. This article is cited in Pil 
and Galia Kollectiv’s essay. 
192 Pollock, op. cit. (accessed online). 
193 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, op. cit. (accessed online). 
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fragile, hybridized versions of object assemblages would be ‘recognizable’ as art 
objects outside these spaces. Such observations as those made by Pil and Galia 
Kollectiv stress the intentional nature of such configurations and our perception of 
them as such and point, once again, to the cultural contract over the art object as 
‘medium,’194 which, as raconteur of a virulent humanism or as autonomous zone of 
unfathomable ‘difference,’ insists on pushing us to the limits of our ideologies and our 




4. Props and architectures 
 
At this point I would like to turn to a speculation on the object of sculpture as a ‘prop’ 
and a consideration of the changing spatialization of the work of art, as these ideas are 
explored in a group of essays, which I will respond to here. 
 
The Showroom’s 2007 conference ‘Props, Events, Encounters: The Performance of 
New Sculpture’195 brought together insightful views on the new directions of 
sculptural practice in recent years. The conference sought ‘to examine the emergence 
of forms in contemporary art in which objects are imbued with a theatrical status, but 
which avoid a return to Michael Fried's famous distaste for theatricality in minimalist 
sculpture.’196 Instead, key to grasping these objects’ performative agency is an 
approach that contextualizes them as a new, hybrid genre into which sculpture 
mutates in order to render its heterogeneous constellations of ‘mute’ stuff politically 
insubordinate and socially resonant. 
                                                
194 In a Keyword Glossary reference article on ‘objecthood’ from the University of Chicago website, 
Tony Gibart writes on Raymond Williams: ‘Williams tries to reveal the attempt to partition off art 
objects from other produced objects as a response by the middle class to the alienation of labor. 
Therefore, there is nothing intrinsic in the object or in the experience of it that distinguishes it from the 
other objects produced in society. Rather it is a set of social practices that define and declare the object 
art.’ Accessed online in April 2012 at http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/objecthood.htm  
195 Props, Events, Encounters: The Performance of New Sculpture, The Showroom 4th Annual 
Conference: Saturday 26 May 2007. The title of the conference ‘takes its cue from Mike Kelley's 
description of the inherent structure at work in the objects that he uses in his performances. He ascribes 
to these objects a self-governing ordering system that is enacted as they appear in his work, a system 
that differentiates between objects that stay in the background, contextualising objects and those that 
will be active within the performance itself.’ From the Showroom website, accessed in March 2012: 
http://archive.theshowroom.org/despatch.cgi?art/conference/2007  
196 Ibid. (accessed online). 
 63 
 
These two dimensions were explored in the papers presented by Andrea Phillips and 
Jan Verwoert as part of the event; both authors examined elements of performance 
active within newly configured forms of sculpture and installation and the kind of 
encounter that these objects or spaces stage for the viewer. Phillips’ essay ‘Prop-
objects’197 articulates an idea of the contemporary sculptural object as a prop;198 her 
argument suggests ‘a shift in contemporary art away from the production of discrete, 
autonomous objects, and towards firstly the production of objects that function 
instead as props, and secondly the positioning of these props in a certain type of 
architectural environment.’199 Phillips describes the dual nature of the prop-object as 
a ‘partial’ quality that does not contain itself in either the conventional idea of the 
theatrical prop or the autonomous art object; instead, ‘there is, as such, a certain type 
of staging that retains some form of modernist sculptural definition either through 
design or default.’200 In this intermediate role the prop-object aspires to a social and 
political interaction;  
 
Now it is a Brechtian theatre that we see in contemporary prop-objects, 
one in which we are asked to look crudely, dialectically. A basket of fish, 
a wooden leg, a cigar, a rag doll, a crown, a rifle – in Epic theatre these 
objects function to help tell the story and to remind the audience that the 
actors, the narrative, the action, are part of an everyday political life that 
they might have a hand in formulating. These are not magical or 
transformative objects but instead what Bertolt Brecht called gestural or 
quotable items intended to be identified by the viewer as just that.201  
 
The parallel that Phillips draws between ‘prop-objects’ in contemporary art and the 
‘gestural’ or ‘quotable’ objects in Brecht’s Epic theatre highlights a tendency within 
recent sculptural practices to organize objects into spatial arrangements that, apart 
from forming their own internal systems of reference or a dialectical relationship with 
                                                
197 Phillips, op. cit., pp. 26-29. 
198 Phillips explains: ‘Most traditionally we can think of props in two ways: firstly as the objects used 
to aid the telling of a story or set of actions in theatre, and secondly as those objects that help hold up or 
support something else.’ She also points to ideas of transportability and property signified by a prop. 
Ibid. p. 26. 
199 Ibid. p. 26. 
200 Ibid. p. 26. 
201 Ibid. p. 27. In Bertolt Brecht’s theatrical innovations (originally under ‘Epic Theatre’ and later as 
‘Dialectical Theatre’), a principle of ‘distancing’ the audience through radical changes in acting 
techniques and stage design aimed to raise an awareness of the actions performed before them without 
producing illusion; this methodology was epitomised by the gestus, the gesture as physical gesture or 
as attitude.  
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the architectural and institutional contexts that accommodate them, also act in relation 
to wider external frameworks, social moments where they can be projected on, which 
are ‘quoted’ in the objects they are assembled from, in their ‘gestural’ formal 
organization and the type of ‘distributed’ spatiality they create and inhabit.202 As such 
they form connections between the potentiality of the non-functional, experimental 
scene of art and the referents that they as objects bear (often imported as unmodified 
everyday things). This social reference and mundane worldly presence grafts the self-
governing system of the spatial dimension of art with political and relational contexts, 
bastardising the autonomous status of art objects with dependency, referential 
functionality, and the whole ‘secular’ medley that our aesthetic ‘formatting’ of the last 
centuries has cautiously segregated from the realm of art.203 Nevertheless, the prop-
objects of contemporary art that Phillips describes, apart from acting as ‘partial’ 
props, also only partially transpose themselves to the public realm; this is a deliberate 
strategy, Phillips argues.  
 
At the same time, Phillips dissociates the condition of the object-as-prop from 
Rosalind Krauss’ description of the sculptural prop in ‘Mechanical Ballets: light, 
motion, theater’204 or Fried’s criticism of theatricality, because the manner in which 
the prop-object now acts has a distinctly new pitch:  
 
What is new is the impetus behind what I see as a novel political claim for 
the prop and its architecture. Rather than carrying with them the 
contradiction of what Krauss calls the difference between the synthetic 
and the operational, when placed in view in the gallery or museum, these 
objects seek to synthesise such a contradiction under the name of an urge 
to equalise experience.205  
 
Here the prop-object supersedes such distinctions between ‘synthetic’ and 
‘operational’, which from a formalist viewpoint would unsettle the purity of the 
                                                
202 I am thinking here of such artists as Sam Durant, who is described by Sara Reisman as 
‘transforming activist gestures into sculptural objects (and vice versa)’ in Flood, Hoptman and Gioni, 
op. cit., p. 60.   
203 Phillips refers to the modernist fascination with objects and everyday things for their ‘importance in 
themselves and often for themselves’ and ‘their own sense of organising logic’, which appealed to the 
modernist aesthetic. Contrary to the condition of the ‘prop-object’ that Phillips suggests in her essay, 
these features seem to reinforce rather than dissolve autonomy. Phillips, op cit., p. 27. 
204 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Mechanical Ballets: light, motion, theater’, in Passages in Modern Sculpture, op. 
cit., pp. 201-242. 
205 Phillips, op cit., p. 27. 
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aesthetic medium; the operational mode of the prop-object is embedded in its 
repurposed objecthood as such, accompanied by an irreversible disillusionment that 
maps performative agencies in the spatial relations among objects and between 
objects and viewers, which, in extent, echo the wider scene of public space. Phillips 
contends,  
 
These actualising and processual capacities of new prop-objects attest to 
the immersive and performative tendencies of contemporary global art (by 
which I mean simply art that is made in order to circulate around the 
globe), in which, in a new formulation, the wish is to produce spaces and 
times that allude to a certain form of (quasi-) democratic potential.206 
 
On the one hand, this strategy that prop-objects exemplify is voicing the familiar call 
for the connection of art and life that performative practices sought to establish; the 
‘equalising experience’ that Phillips describes as the impetus behind these new 
configurations in sculpture alludes to those unifying, virtual structures distributed 
around the world as a generic ‘global language’ based on commodity products, 
typified architectural environments and the universalized language of technology. At 
once attentive to the modes of communication established by a worldwide circulation 
of information networks and products, and responsive to the disguised patronizing of 
these ostensibly equalising environments, the space of sculpture seeks to unsettle 
these structures with its ‘non-functional’ presence and to leave things open (hence the 
‘partial’ interference with public space). The modus operandi that enables this 
unsettling is its indeterminate, double role as prop-object that enacts social space in its 
own premises while retaining a ‘core’ sculptural dimension that prevents its 
absorption in a space of production or style.207 Phillips argues that the condition of 
contemporary sculpture acquiring a prop-like quality also indicates a desire to create, 
within the actual/virtual space of art as receptacle for the viewer, a possibility to 
produce ‘modes of living’ projected on a de-localised, global plane, and the prop is a 
new scenography to this imagination.208 
 
                                                
206 Ibid. p. 27. 
207 Ina Blom describes the site of “style” as ‘the social site that opens onto the political significance of 
the relation between aesthetic appearances and personal becoming.’ Ina Blom, On the Style Site - Art, 
Sociality, and Media Culture, Sternberg Press, 2007, p. 190. 
208 Phillips, op cit., p. 26. 
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Prop-objects are mediations that are not an end in themselves – they do not acquire an 
aesthetic ‘monopoly’ in the art encounter as such; their role is not to act as the 
representational object of theatre (a ‘stand-in’) but to divert attention from their 
objecthood and to produce links to wider assemblages – whether affective, social or 
performative. In this sense, they disturb our ways of seeing the object but remain 
present in the encounter rather than dematerialize or become indexical signs.209 They 
are symptomatic of the shift that I have described from art as object to art as 
encounter. At this point I would like to briefly intersect a few points made by 
Shannon Jackson in her book Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics; 
Jackson associates the term ‘prop’ as far back as Plato’s parable of the cave from the 
Republic, as ‘a reminder of the fundamental role of aesthetic support.’210 In her 
analysis of the role and dimension of ‘aesthetic support’ she traces the aesthetic 
determinations of nineteenth-century idealism as positing that:  
 
[a]rt achieved its greatness to the degree that its representations 
transcended its material substrate, rising above its raw material and its 
social apparatus of production. This is one way of casting an early 
aesthetic opposition between “autonomy” and “heteronomy.”211 
 
It is the in-between-ness of prop-objects that escapes systematization or any 
classification even within an artistic industry – they elude a ‘status.’ Phillips describes 
the unfixed, partial status of prop-objects as a form of resistance against the 
corruption that cultural forms sustain when they are framed within the circulation 
networks of the market; she stresses how works of art are increasingly framed by 
curatorial practices and contextualised into the scene of the international art exhibition 
                                                
209 In a conversation with Hans Ulrich Obrist, Olafur Eliasson says: ‘Currently, artists are obsessed 
with dematerializing, recontextualizing, or reevaluating the object. I’m referring to the whole 
disappearance of the object and everything now being based on relations – the quasi-object. That’s not 
a problem in itself, but unfortunately museums are moving in the wrong direction. Their approach to it 
remains highly conservative: they’re trying to institutionalize the object – and not just the object’s 
physical qualities, but the experience of it.’ In Obrist, op. cit., p. 75. The ‘quasi-object’ that Eliasson 
posits is useful in the context discussed here.    
210 Jackson says: ‘The use of the word “prop” is particularly resonant for me, as it anticipates the visual 
art term for pictorial support as well as the theatrical term for the human object world. There is a 
temporal commitment implied in this holding and this bearing, an “enduring” that will be ongoing. 
Interestingly, this enduring is also tolerant and resigned; in fact, a tolerating resignation might well be 
what it means to offer enduring support. To support is to hold up “without opposition or resistance,” 
implying a kind of promise to bear however unbearable the task becomes. By 1686, more definitions 
and associations start to augment the social character of the supporting act, ongoing acts whose 
descriptions use the gerund verb form.’ Jackson, op cit., p. 30. 
211 Ibid. p. 31. 
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market. She sees the shift to the prop-object as a reaction against the predominance of 
the ‘curatorial’ in art and the adjustment of art into the context of its international 
circulation in large-scale exhibitions. Both frameworks stage particular works in 
variable locations, making them movable items in the arena of the international art 
market and into a ‘picture’ of a unified ‘global art’ – and to this extent I would think 
that the ‘curatorial’ also denotes the artist’s ‘placement’ of their own ‘idiom’ in the 
wider platform of this international scene. All this testifies to another kind of 
restriction to the object’s autonomy, as the restricted possibility to experience it 
independently of the framing devices that engulf it or the value criteria that price it. 
 
In contradistinction to the ideas articulated in Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational 
Aesthetics, the aesthetic of the prop-object, although at first sight ‘bound’ to 
objecthood and classical issues of ‘reception,’ paradoxically allows more 
interpretative freedom; this is due to a problem within relational aesthetics (or at least, 
as formulated by Bourriaud) of ‘prescribed’ coordinates and interaction by ‘judging 
artworks on the basis of the inter-human relations which they represent, produce or 
prompt.’212 Rather than a co-creation of space or relations this paradigm seems to 
represent an imperative, which, in practice, reproduces (rather than re-models) a re-
enactment of social behaviour and thus impairs (if not patronizes) encounters. As 
Claire Bishop has argued in her essay ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’ (in 
relation to Umberto Eco’s conception of the ‘open work’): 
 
[i]t is Eco’s contention that every work of art is potentially “open,” since 
it may produce an unlimited range of possible readings; it is simply the 
achievement of contemporary art, music, and literature to have 
foregrounded this fact. Bourriaud misinterprets these arguments by 
applying them to a specific type of work (those that require literal 
interaction) and thereby redirects the argument back to artistic 
intentionality rather than issues of reception.213 
 
In Jan Verwoert’s essay from the same conference, ‘Make the prop talk – on putting 
performance back into sculpture’, Verwoert articulates a return to the medium of 
sculpture, a sculpture that is now informed by this ‘resistant partiality’ that Phillips 
proposed, a sculpture that renegotiates a certain ‘economy of experience’:  
                                                
212 Bourriaud, op. cit., p. 112. 
213 Claire Bishop, Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics, October Magazine (Fall 2004), p. 62. 
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The reason why I would suggest that it is necessary to renegotiate the 
criteria for thinking about medium-specific work is because such work 
incorporates a specific moment of ‘resistant partiality’, by generating its 
own temporality, its own memory, and therefore an economy of 
experience that is significantly different from the economy of experience 
imposed on us through the current conditions of labour. At the same time, 
however, I would insist that it is impossible to go back to the ideas and 
categories that were used traditionally to describe medium-specific 
work.214 
 
Verwoert describes the conditions whereby this new economy of experience is 
structured as:  
 
[w]ork […] made by people who are returning to the medium of sculpture 
using criteria developed in conceptual practices, performance or 
installation art. As these criteria are applied to sculpture, it becomes a 
vehicle, through which concepts of ‘relationality’ taken from performance 
or installation art, can be reformulated. In some cases it seems as if these 
concepts can even be formulated in a more intense and condensed way in 
sculpture through both abstraction and work using specific materials than 
has been possible in certain forms of relational aesthetics.215 
 
Verwoert describes a new conception of sculpture – in a post-medium, post-
conceptual condition216 – informed by the experience generated in performance and 
installation art, a ‘condensed’ relational agency; why the sculptural object – past its 
demise and refutation in the 1960s and 70s – should re-emerge as the means through 
which such a performance would be played out (and as means not only to renegotiate 
performance by and large but objecthood as well) is attributed to the fluid, versatile 
status of contemporary sculpture which redefines its legacy of autonomy with new 
terms, while negotiating its form as a dispersed, architecturalised network of relations 
and delocalised practices that both employ and boycott the language of global capital. 
These relations are ‘played out’ in a hybrid type of performative object or sculptural 
performance that does not represent relations as much as enact spatial experiments. 
 
                                                
214 Verwoert, op. cit., p. 30. 
215 Ibid. p. 30. 
216 As mentioned in footnote No. 6, the ‘post-medium condition’ was coined by Rosalind Krauss. The 
‘post-conceptual’ phase of the work of art is articulated in Peter Osborne’s essay ‘Where is the Work of 
Art?’ in Landrum and Whittaker, op. cit., pp. 13-29. 
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Both essays provide an insight into a new expression of performativity in the space of 
sculpture. These ideas shed light on conditions and changes that have been felt 
intensely in the art production of the last five decades or more; not only that ideas and 
experiences from performance have irrevocably entered the space of sculpture, but the 
contemporary sculptural object (the peculiar assemblage of ready-mades, sculpted 
matter, industrial material, technologies and text) has increasingly come to signify 
roles and directions mapped in the space between viewer and object, demanding 
actions and attitudes (political identities), inviting strategically invented responses 
(neither purely aesthetic nor strictly conceptual), neither entirely located in the space 
nor in the object (and thus partly disabling the responsive pattern of materiality and 
phenomenological corporeality) but instead inhabiting a virtual space that grafts 
objecthood with relationality and thus presents a hybrid that attends to the diverse 
times and spaces, the scenes of dispersed contemporary subjectivity. 
 
This sculptural space where performance, relationality and aesthetics have become 
inextricably entwined is perplexing for both art criticism and the viewing subject. It 
presents a challenge; the evaluation of what an object does to its audience and by 
extension to the world that it addresses and in what ways it addresses and affects its 
viewers – these ways being the agent of change in artistic practice. That the relation 
between the work of art and its viewer is in constant renegotiation is not only a 
historical reality but also attested by a modified sensuous experience. I am arguing the 
case for contemporary sculpture that ‘performs’ in terms that transcend theatre, or 
indeed the condition that Michael Fried warned against in his essay Art and 
Objecthood, which threatened the autonomy of the work of art and its instantaneous 
(and transcendent) reception. The performance embedded in new sculpture is a 
condition of expansion, such as a historical phase in its development, one in which the 
object of sculpture absorbs a social environment and critiques certain modes of 
spectatorship – and thus imitates the dominant structures and modes of being that 
permeate contemporary life.  
  
In this context Peter Osborne’s analysis of the post-conceptual phase of the work of 
art is illuminating. Firstly, Osborne posits that the ‘spatial specificity’ of 
contemporary art is invariably dependent on contemporary urban form (as the 
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phenomenon of contemporary art itself is ‘constitutively urban’);217 Then he suggests 
that its spatialization is conditioned by three mediating practices: architecturalisation, 
textualisation and transnationalisation.218 These three mediating practices are 
indicative of art’s ‘contemporaneity’ – understood as ‘its capacity to articulate, reflect 
upon and transfigure new forms of social experience’;219 they are indicative of the 
post-conceptual condition of art.220 It is especially art’s architecturalization, however, 
that Osborne stresses in relation to its post-conceptual phase (with architecture as a 
‘signifier of the social’).221 Architecture exemplifies a distinctive kind of distributed 
materialization (as in the relation between plan and building) that contemporary art 
morphs into, specified as the ability of individual artworks to span across spaces, 
practices and material forms (as in the distribution of a single ‘project’ across 
sketches, photographs, documentation, video etc. or variable installations of all or 
combinations of the previous material). This condition illustrates contemporary art’s 
intrinsically conceptual dimension but also offers insight into an embedded dialectic 
between aesthetic and conceptual aspects of the work.222 In these architectural 
determinations Osborne sees a convergent moment: ‘They raise the possibility of 
‘post-autonomous’ works, or at least, a post-autonomous functioning: works that 
would partake in the dialectic of autonomy – that is, in the dialectic of art and anti-art 
within the work – in such a way as to mediate it reflectively with the contradictory 
social functions of art space, to determinate practical as well as artistic effect.’223 
 
                                                
217 Ibid. p. 13. 
218 Ibid. p. 13. 
219 Ibid. p. 14. 
220 ‘Contemporary art is ‘post’-conceptual to the extent that it registers the historical experience of 
Conceptual art, as a self-conscious movement, as the experience of the impossibility/fallacy of the 
absolutisation of anti-aesthetic, in conjunction with a recognition of an ineliminably conceptual aspect 
to all art.’ Ibid. p. 15. 
221 ‘The term ‘architecture’ is distributed across conception and materialisation, in the traditional 
senses. […] More generally, architecture stands for a material organisation of social space in the 
present at both conceptual and practical levels. Post-minimalist contemporary art (from ‘object’ to 
‘field’) aspires to a free formation of social space in this dual imaginary and actual sense. We can see 
the consequences of this ambiguous architectural spatial form for the ontology of the artwork when we 
look at the place of architecturalisation in the history of contemporary art. […] a form of artistic 
spatiality beyond, yet nonetheless still tied to, ‘objects’.’ Ibid. p. 19. Osborne characterizes art’s 
relation to architecture as ‘appropriative.’  
222 Osborne’s analysis relates Robert Smithson’s concept of the ‘Nonsite’ (see below) to this dialectic: 
‘The specifically spatial aspect of this dialectic of the aesthetic and conceptual was conceived by 
Robert Smithson, forty years ago, as a dialectic of site and non-site.’ Ibid. p. 15. 
223 Osborne writes: ‘[…] architectural aspects of contemporary art problematise artistic autonomy 
insofar as, on Theodor W. Adorno’s account at least, powerlessness is the price of autonomy.’ Ibid. p. 
18.  
 71 
The spatial dimension of contemporary artistic production is explored throughout 
Nonsite to Celebration Park: Essays on Art and the Politics of Space, a collection of 
essays edited by Alex Landrum and Ed Whittaker. The title of the book denotes an 
understanding of the spatial condition of art today as the productive zone between 
Robert Smithson’s concept of the ‘Nonsite,’ as a quality of virtual transversal of 
representational or social spaces that still resonates across artistic disciplines today224 
and Pierre Huyghe, whose Streamside Day video and kinetic installation at the Van 
Abbe Museum in 2004 deployed the topos of the ‘Celebration Park’ – a domestic 
development in the outskirts of New York. In their introduction to the book the 
editors note: ‘Huyghe […] is also, like Smithson, concerned with the psychology of 
space. The difference is that Huyghe understands the business of ‘immersion’ as a 
total, democratic kind of space and consequently the way that contemporary art 
spaces are constructed and ‘work’ as affective environments.’225 
 
Staging and the construction of ‘affective environments’ are currently explored in a 
number of exhibitions, which address sculpture as productive of a certain kind of 
empowered space.226 In Various Stages, an exhibition organized by the Kunsthaus 
Dresden in 2012, a statement reads: ‘[T]he exhibition investigates the stage both as an 
independent sculptural form as well as a place of interaction in which the audience is 
an integral part. Since every artistic expression is performative in its gesture, an 
artwork necessarily creates receptive and affective relations.’227 
                                                
224 In Nonsite to Celebration Park the ‘Nonsite’ is described as ‘the place that is not itself.’ As 
described in Landrum and Whittaker’s introduction, ‘Robert Smithson considered Nonsites as certain 
sectors of territory that mapped the land-space of the de-natured post industrialised landscape of New 
Jersey.’ Ibid. p. 3. 
225 Ibid. p. 6. This latter observation echoes Phillips’ characterization of ‘the immersive and 
performative tendencies of contemporary global art’ (Phillips, op. cit., p. 27). 
226 For example the Affective Turns? Exhibition at Pepin Moore Gallery in Los Angeles (March/April 
2012) organised by Phil Chang. Chang writes: ‘[…] affect […] occupies a crucial point in the 
inextricable relationship between art and politics. As a noun, affect inhabits the site of the 
psychological subject (emotions); as a verb, affect refers to effect (actions). Most importantly, as the 
critic Stephen Shaviro argues, affect is useful in how it functions as a matter of “manner” rather than 
essence, concerning itself not with what something is but how it is, or, more exactly, how a thing 
affects and is affected by other things, and hence raising the question of the relation between what it is 
and what it does.’ From the gallery website, accessed in May 2012 at 
 http://www.pepinmoore.com/PM/AffectiveTurnsPR.html  
227 Various Stages – Bedingte Bühnen (3 August–14 October 2012), accessed in May 2012 at 
 http://www.e-flux.com/announcements/terms-of-exhibiting-producing-and-performing-a-three-part-
exhibition-series/. ‘Performative,’ in this context and as previously described, expresses both the 
performed action of viewing as much as the tension from the object, but this oscillation between 
performance (as singular event) and performative (as repetition) tends to become absorbed in 
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In this last sentence the key relations at play within contemporary sculpture come out. 
The performative expression that is intrinsic in the placing of objects in space and in 
the way they are directed at the viewer creates artworks as scenes and encounters. As 
zones of in-between-ness, as agents of an insubordinate materiality, or as autonomous 
stages for democratic rehearsal, these scenes of encounter involve the viewing subject 
in a joint speculation on novel spatial, affective and social relations. This distinctively 
sculptural performativity recasts a sense of expanded objecthood – and departs from 
the conventional designation of ‘theatricality’ – as an actively discursive medium that 
admits the subject in its stage. A corporeal and spectatorial self-awareness enables a 
convergence of political and affective consciousness – insofar as the political starts in 
the way we sense things.228 This condition is mapped in the simultaneous states of 
centeredness and de-centeredness – as exemplified in the ventures of installation art, 
where a conflation of subject positions supersedes rational models of the subject and 











                                                                                                                                       
referencing social space, where a distinction between conditions of performance and performativity are 
often conflated. 
228 This phrase comes from an accompanying statement for my performance Case-Study: the Nature 
Partisan, which I will outline in the next chapter. 
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The material of art is the legacy of inhumanity. All artists want to cure this 
demonic legacy. But because they are not healers and at the same time because 
they want, while working on the wound, to announce to their viewers and to 
themselves their act, they become confused, they are distracted, the cure of the 
demonic legacy slips away from them, and we end up being but absent-minded 
stretcher-bearers.229 
 




                                                
229 From an interview with Professor George Lappas in Artnews newspaper on April 30th 2010 (my 









In this chapter I will present a series of projects that I realized as part of my research 
into the dimension of staging in sculpture.230 I will initially outline certain points of 
origin that led to consequent stages of my research project in order to trace a 
genealogy of practice. In a passage through interrelated areas of interest, I investigate 
conditions of spectatorship in a set of experimentations; a performative encounter 
with nature inserts questions of role and enactment into an area traditionally linked 
with aesthetics, grafting the aesthetic with the performative. In the fifth and sixth 
essays of the chapter I will analyze an element of re-enactment in certain practices 
that resonates with ideas of repetition and the enactment of memory – as well as a 
restorative, phenomenological re-appearance that I will elaborate in the seventh essay. 
I relate the idea of re-enactment to Brian Massumi’s concept of reenaction that is 
active in perception and affect, and the concept of the restorative to Leo Bersani’s 
combined reading of Melanie Klein and Marcel Proust. Parallel to this I will describe 
my encounters with a number of works by other artists, in particular Olafur Eliasson 
and James Coleman, which informed my research by offering materialized examples 
of staged encounters. In the last essay of the chapter I describe my encounter with 
James Coleman’s work I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S., where an emergence of memory is triggered 
through the encounter with the work. This latter work is exemplary in the affective 
resonances that it creates as staging, mode of operation and imagery. 
 
 
1. The Raining Room 
 
In the autumn of 2000, I began a degree in sculpture at the studio of George Lappas in 
the Athens School of Fine Arts. The practice in the studio was carried out through a 
series of group presentations where the students and tutors convened to discuss new 
work. In the intervals between each presentation the process would each time be 
                                                
230 Due to the limited space available in this thesis a complementary documentation of other works is 
appended at the end of this volume. 
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triggered by an exercise, a proposition or sentence that posed a situation that the 
students grappled with to produce new work and which stimulated particular states of 
mind. These cycles of exercises ran for the whole duration of the degree; although the 
students where not confined to them for their projects, they offered a prolific platform 
to create work and present it to the group whose creative attention was concurrently 
focused on the same challenge. The ensuing gatherings provided a productive point of 
intersubjective cross-fertilization for our practice and enabled a particular, affirmative 
process, which, far from excluding criticism, generated an accelerated evolution and 
allowed different methodologies to resonate. This process yielded a discipline. 
 
Examples of these exercises are: the equivalence, the street corner, the threshold and 
the reservoir, forms of possession, and the one I will speak of here, the Being. 
 
The Being was one of the first exercises that I took part in while attending the studio. 
My response to it at the time was spurred by a latent preoccupation, in the course of 
my art education,231 about the way (the relevance, the complexity, the resonance, the 
accuracy) in which artistic practice moulds images, objects and states that portray a 
condition. By ‘portraying’ I did not think of representation as a universal ‘image’ of 
the human being, rather a genuine encounter with humanity’s need to ‘represent’ 
(interpret, transubstantiate, understand) its own coordinates from a remove 
constructed by art. This need, this urge and the documentation of this performance 
generated affective resonances. Staging an art encounter offers the viewer a platform 
for an interaction between a specular overview (that includes the viewing subject) and 
affected sensation (that produces the subject, and loops back to affected vision).  
  
From this almost anthropological viewpoint on the ontology of art, I thought of the 
human being and its need to create a place, a space in which to be; the primary 
condition that emerged in my thoughts was the connection to nature, a point of 
reference that was also latent in my practice. I thought of the activity of composing 
our environment, a continuous operation of creating one’s own surroundings232 
                                                
231 See also the description of the ‘language’ problem in the essay ‘A metaphor and a gap’ in the first 
chapter. 
232 I later came across this notion, which emerged from my work at the time, in the writings of Olafur 
Eliasson, with whose work I felt a structural affinity. I will describe his practice in the fourth essay of 
this chapter.  
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through which we adjust the world to our needs and domesticate it. These resulting 
customised ‘personal spaces’ had an aesthetic dimension of a personal experience; I 
imagined their subject as a viewer of his/herself, as a self-spectator of a self-made 
world.233 
  
The piece that I made was called Raining Room; it was a dark cabin, 2.5 meters tall 
and 1.3 by 1.3 meters wide, containing a seat for one viewer. The ceiling of the cabin 
was covered by a screen, on which a video was projected through an angled mirror 
affixed on top of the structure. The viewer would sit and watch the moving image 
above his/her head; green drops falling on the ceiling, expanding and disappearing on 
a bright white surface, in a continuous loop of a virtual, mute rain. 
 
         
 
Pictures No. 4 and 5: Raining Room and Raining Room (close-up), 2003,234 Video 
projection, steel frame, mirror, fabric, screen, seat, dimensions 2,5m x 1,3m x 1,3m. 
 
Raining Room was my first installation work with the topic of nature and its ad hoc 
re-arrangement. What it triggered in my practice was a configuration, or rather, an 
imagination of the work as the outcome of an invisible action, or desire, on the part of 
                                                
233 This description of my own process while working with this particular exercise reflects the way in 
which the exercises functioned as a trigger, rather than a subject: from an abstract notion one would 
turn towards a personal repository and draw ideas and approaches that were far from being implied or 
instructed. In what I describe here some of these thoughts preceded and some followed the actual work 
that I produced; although I lay out these thoughts for their record value in tracing back the early 
questions of my research, the concern which permeated these questions was more about the apparition 
of the poetic image and therefore, was only met with the work itself.  
234 I made the first version of Raining Room in 2001 and a more technically advanced version in 2003 
as part of my degree show.  The photographs come from this latter installation. 
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the viewer (the Being). This piece was a turning point within the course of my work; 
its artificial nature and the enclosure as a space for the viewer gave rise to ideas about 
the impact of these spatial conditions on the viewer. Thinking of it in retrospect, it 
alluded to the personal space that the aesthetic experience builds; and here I locate 
why it was a springboard for my work and later research: it functioned on both the 
spatial and the symbolic level – the actual and the virtual – and staged within this 
intersection an encounter between nature and culture. As I continue with my 
description I will endeavour to identify the implications of this condition. 
 
 
2. A few origins 
 
A picture of my father looking out over a landscape in the mountains; it was taken in 
the early 1970’s in north-west Greece where he worked at the time, and where he 
regularly went hiking in the pristine nature of Epirus. He developed this black and 
white photograph himself. In doing so he allowed a little less light on his own figure, 
maybe by holding his finger between the lamp and the emulsified paper; the result 
was a faint aura around his body. He gazes into the valley that spreads underneath 
him, his face turned away.  
 
This image, among others that he produced at the time, stayed with me as a faint 
memory from childhood. When I happened to see it again years later I suddenly 
recognized that it was something about the turned-away gaze that had made an 
impression on me. This was not a usual type of image from a family album in the 
Seventies; nor was it typical hiker’s portraiture. Somehow I could sense the staging 
behind this picture – doubting that he was accompanied on these hikes and that he 
would turn away from the photographer – how he would place the camera on a stone 





Picture No. 6: Dad Wandering, digitally edited black & white photograph, (courtesy 
of Evangelos Pasidis).235 
  
I looked into the photographic genre of outdoor self-portraiture in extent since then. In 
such pictures the staging is innocent; it reclaims something elevated in an ad hoc 
manner. Presence, experience and art are all portrayed here. It originates, no doubt, in 
romantic portraiture;236 through photography it becomes a testimony to an experience, 
more than an image from a landscape or a trip. It becomes a gesture within a 
colloquial language of modernity. When compared to the painterly representation of 
the sublime experience of nature, laden with historical and socio-political meanings, 
this plain, unassuming photographic practice seems to reclaim a human moment.  
 
I travelled to the same area in January 2005. During this journey I made a series of 
photographs and videos toying with the figure of the Nature Tourist, as subject of 
portraiture amid props and objects outdoors. This footage was a documentation of 
various experimentations combining landscape, objects and the viewer/performer. It 
                                                
235 The tint on the photograph is my intervention; I used this image as press material for my 
performance Case-Study: the Nature Partisan in Austria in 2005.  
236 This type of portraiture is characteristic of A K Dolven’s work. Andrea Schlieker describes: ‘The 
image of a figure turning its back on the viewer and facing a natural spectacle is of course a topos made 
familiar by the German Romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich […] for the celebration of the – in 
Friedrich’s case a deeply religious but also mystical – fusion between man and sublime nature.’ Andrea 
Schlieker, A K Dolven: Moving Mountain, Bergen Kunsthall, 2004, p. 11.  
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featured scenes of domestic surroundings cropping up on a river bank; a table and 
chair on a road side with a view on snow-capped mountains; drinking tea with 
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Pictures No. 7 and 8: Voidomatis Scene, digital photograph, 2005, and Critique in 
Canyon, digital photograph, 2005. 
 
In Critique in Canyon, one of the pictures in the series, the viewer depicted in the 
landscape has turned her face away from the majestic scenery. The experience of 
nature is now the object of staging, in terms of place (the Vikos Gorge where this is 
set is one of the most awe-inspiring sceneries in the country), and means (the viewer 
is reading the ‘manual’ of the sublime, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement). 
Serving as footnotes to my research, these experimentations examined the place of the 
spectator in a contemporary experience of nature. The nature-tourist photographs 
accentuate the moment of survey that maps the self-reflexivity of spectatorship; 
through an arrangement of objects contrived in the landscape a three-dimensional 
element interferes in the iconology of this genre with spatial claims, demanding a 
collapse of its two-dimensionality. 
 
This was my first research trip, initially triggered by the plan to visit and document 
the Pavlos Vrellis Greek History Museum in Ioannina – another distant visual 
memory from my childhood.237 Created by the sculptor Pavlos Vrellis, the museum 
represents scenes of Greek history in wax. It is arranged as a passage through themes 
– around 37 compositions containing 150 wax effigies – portraying famous characters 
from antiquity to the 20th century, with an emphasis on the Greek revolution in the 
19th century – a particular inspiration to Vrellis, who privately built and crafted the 
museum.238 I was drawn by the blunt artificiality of these scenes, their acute 
grotesqueness and extreme theatrical manufacturing, a staging so contrived that it 
became a contemporary Gesamtkunstwerk – a total work of art. At first this leg of the 
trip seemed to be antipodal to the post-romantic nature-tourist iconology of the 
landscape photographs. But it turned out that they are thematically interrelated: at the 
heart of the Vrellis project was a true belief in the convincing appearance of these 
scenes, although the result of a blatant mise-en-scene; in the nature tourist pictures, 
                                                
237 The first museum, which I had visited as a child, was destroyed by fire. The museum was re-opened 
in its present location in Bizani, 7km south of the city of Ioannina in northwest Greece. The first 
museum was founded in 1983. 
238 Astonishingly, this massive project is almost entirely the work of the artist himself. Not only the 
contents of the Museum but literally the building, in all the manual work it involved, was the labour of 
Vrellis himself. Even the materials contained in the scenes (tree branches, plantation) were brought 
from the actual locations depicted. I have drawn this information from the website of the Museum: 
http://www.vrellis.org/  
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the experience of nature was engineered – its immersive, physical quality only 




Picture No. 9: Ali Pasa Slaughter (detail), from the Pavlos Vrellis Wax Museum, 
digital photograph, 2005. 
 
At that time I was beginning my research project, and this museum proved to be a 
unique case study of staged encounters. The building was converted into a 
labyrinthine network of spaces, where the visitors would ascend and descend dark 
paths and corridors that would take them through scenes – battles, slaughters, 
ambushes – in half-lit chambers and cave-like environments. In fact Vrellis treated 
this large stone building like one unified three-dimensional space, creating a route in 
its interior, winding the disoriented viewers through the course of Greek history. 
These tableaux, where real objects and wax effigies muddle the impression between 
real and artificial, are decidedly grotesque; yet I noticed that the majority of the 
visitors was enthralled by the scenes and behaved in a reverent way, whispering as 
they walked around the compound. 
 
Wax figures and museums (wax sculpture in general) were later to play a particular 
role in my research. But at that time my interest had turned towards the subject of the 
aesthetic of nature. While delving into its literary background, I was looking at works 
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of contemporary photography, video and sculpture that evolved the iconology of 
landscape painting and the ideas behind it, as for example in the work of Mariele 
Neudecker and A K Dolven. There was a quest for the sublime that these new 
practices remodelled, but from a double vantage point: the sensibility is re-configured 
within a mechanism of exposure that does not exclude (or rather, it cannot exclude) 
the awareness of spectatorship. As such these works advance the experience of double 
survey intrinsic within this position. 
 
With this speculation I would like to touch upon the performative element in the 
encounter with landscape implied in these contemporary practices. In the next passage 
I will explore this element by recounting one of my projects, which I realized a few 
months after the Epirus trip. 
 
 
3. Case - Study: the Nature Partisan 
 
In the spring of 2005 I was invited to create a performance piece for the Toihaus 
Theater in Salzburg, Austria. My piece was going to be one of a series of 
performances created by visual artists: the idea was conceived by Arthur Zgubic, the 
stage designer of Toihaus Theater, who curated a series of performances every year 
where he invited visual artists to produce a performance piece for the theatre. His 
interest was in how visual artists would deal with the challenge of creating a live 
performance; this gave them the opportunity to set up a scene, grapple with the 
theatrical space and make live work (or at times, work that would be enacted in the 
presence of the audience.) 
 
That year, Zgubic had planned a series with the title ‘The Partisans of the 
Biedermeier.’239 Most of the artists that he commissioned were broadly engaged with 
performance, as in video work and choreography. When I first discussed my work 
with Arthur I expressed my interest in an analysis of spectatorship through the topic 
of nature. The concept for the series that he curated – the Biedermeier – marked the 
middle-class sensibility of central Europe in the first half of the 19th century; the 
                                                
239 ‘The Partisans of the Biedermeier’: a series of performances with visual artists; Curator: Arthur 
Zgubic; Production: Toihaus - Theater am Mirabellplatz, Salzburg/Austria.  
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reference was of a highly stylized and, in a way, aestheticized lifestyle. It seemed like 
a perfect match with the image of the romantic spectator of nature. 
 
The aesthetic sensibility towards nature had been a longstanding preoccupation in my 
practice: as a portrait of a human condition (as in Raining Room) to the challenge of 
the sublime and notions of role, presence and subjectivity. I was drawn to 
performance as a medium in which to explore these issues and this platform seemed a 
fertile ground; the place itself as a landscape – the location of the city in the setting of 
the nearby Alps – offered a fitting backdrop for the project. I was already thinking in 
two modes: the space of the theatre, the stage and the spatial coordinates of the black 
box, and the openness of nature in a most vivid presentation. 
 
I was intrigued by the way that the Austrians related to their landscape. I could sense 
a particular perception of locality and the environment as defined by the specificity of 
the mountain landscape and terms of height, distance and view; there was a TV 
weather forecast programme early in the morning with a 360º view from a camera 
rotating on a mountain top; there was a kind of spherical view, sometimes a vertical 
view. The temperature was mapped by altitude rather than map-width coordinates. 
This spatial mapping was a novel experience, especially since it was a pictorial 
representation that was stereotypically combined with this mountain-culture. I was 
coming from a country almost encircled by the sea, yet the illustrations in children’s 
books would feature the Alpine landscape as the icon of utmost natural beauty; the 
pristine valleys and snow-capped mountains with their idyllic chalets, the plains and 
forests of central Europe dominated a generic definition of landscape. These were 
powerful visual associations; did this scenery offer itself as a ‘formula,’ a prototype, 
or was it a socio-political, historical authority that made this landscape an icon?  
 
I spoke to people from the area about their relationship to nature – among them, a 
mountain climber and an architect. In the environs of Salzburg there were areas that 
attested to a cultural construction of nature. Aigen Park was one example; in this 
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suburb of Salzburg there is a park dating from the 18th century, a landscaped area with 




                              Picture 10: Aigen Interview, video still, 2005. 
 
During the three weeks that I spent in the area I travelled around the city exploring the 
environment and various mountain locations, and made extensive documentation from 
these outings. This provided valuable visual material for the project as it was shaping. 
The theatre was a construction site: I could use the equipment, collaborate with the 
technicians and the film editing team, have music made by the theatre musician, 
garments made by the costume designer; the space was a versatile platform. Above 
all, working together with the actors to negotiate the happenings and plan the actions 
of the performance was key to crystallizing the project and co-creating their roles.   
  
I decided to reproduce the outdoor viewing indoors. Large framed screens were 
placed on two adjacent sides of the stage, on the left and back side, at a distance of 
                                                
240 It is said that in this cave many intellectuals and artists of 18th century Salzburg formed gatherings, 
W. A. Mozart being one of them. Aigen interview was filmed in this cave.  
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less than a meter from the walls; using six wide-angle projectors, a panoramic 
landscape was projected on the screens. These back-projections were fitted so as to 
create a continuous image of a scenery; this was a hybrid landscape, which I had 
digitally edited into a seamless strip, combining postcard-type scenic landscapes 
together with a scene of a bleak volcanic smoke. Opposite the stage, on the side where 
the entrance was, three oblong light transparencies depicted a waterfall, a sunset and a 
seascape. On the fourth side, at the right of the stage, there was a large suspended 
screen with a video projection; another, round screen, was hanging above the right 
corner of the stage. Various props were scattered around the space – among others a 
translucent, backlit tent with a forest-printed fabric, camping gear and gardening tools 




Picture 11: Partisans – Blue Screen, video still, from Case-Study: the Nature 
Partisan, 2005. 
 
A triple cinema-style seat, elevated on a plinth, was the starting point of the 
performance. The audience who came in found the three actors seating there, 
watching themselves on the video screen watching the landscape: the video was an 
edit combining animated images of colour-saturated landscapes, footage shot around 
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Salzburg, clips from the TV weather forecast programme and the figures of the 
performers shot on blue screen, pasted on the moving image. Live and on screen, they 
were nature spectators, with local-style costumes denoting peculiar roles, in an in-
between positioning between documented (and mutated) landscape and themselves as 
audience: this was the first tableau.  
 
The audience came into this scene and scattered all around, trying to locate the action 
and the spots of interest. As soon as the actors started to move, several actions began 
to alternate: a role-play with three personas that alluded to a domesticated nature-
tourist experience, orchestrated as an indoor ‘outdoor viewing’ modified into a DIY 
landscape. These ‘events’ took place with the aid of natural ‘ingredients’ (soil, tree 
branches, grass): a mountain-climbing action on a makeshift earth pile, a promenade 
around the scenery looking at the view, the wrapping of one of the performers into a 
bundle with grass and twigs, disabling him from his role. The actions were propelled 
by the music and interrupted by citations. The music (created by Herbert Pascher after 
discussing the piece together) was a mixture of electronic music with alpine folk 
tunes. Its changing rhythms signalled changes of chapters and accelerations. The 
citations were extracts from books, describing natural elements or sceneries: a letter 
from Franz Schubert to his brother, a sentence from a play by Chekhov, extracts from 
Jules Supervielle’s poems read from ‘The Poetics of Space.’ For a few seconds a 
video extract from the ‘Wizard of Oz’ appeared on the round screen above the stage – 
where Dorothy invokes ‘there is no place like home.’ The actions went on for around 
20 minutes; the performance culminated in a call for everyone, all ‘nature lovers,’ to 
sit down around a tablecloth spread on the floor of the space and have a picnic. As 
this happened the audience and actors joined in a convivial atmosphere, in the middle 
of the surrounding projected panorama; this continued well into the evening. This 
final tableau was a moment that framed an image and sealed the piece. It became the 







Pictures 12 and 13: An die Ecke and Picnic im Toihaus, video stills, from Case-
Study: the Nature Partisan, performance, duration 20 min. Toihaus Theater Salzburg, 
17 May 2005. 
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This project introduced useful tools into my research. The personas it devised, the 
relations and juxtapositions it portrayed, the assemblage of elements and modes of 
representation – within, outside, live, documented – of actors and objects made up an 
inventory of references, a network of scenes. It staged a mirror that reflected the 
subject through nature, and the subject reflected a role; and that in turn was a 
representation that strove to mutate. The social aspect of the milieu then shed a new 
light to the whole thing, breaking the illusion. During and after these 3 weeks when I 
produced Case-Study: the Nature Partisan, a stage was set for a dialogue into 
questions and research areas that emerged through the practice. To this day I view it 
as a fundamental part of my research, not least because it condensed thoughts and 
experiences that triggered new relations in my practice. It became a rhizome, a 
reference, a map and a methodology. 
 
 
4. Creating one’s surroundings 
 
But a new mode of direct action is emerging, the rebirth of a democratic mode 
and style, where everyone can create his personal environment out of 
impersonal subsystems, whether they are new or old, modern or antique.241 
 
Ad hoc (=made for this purpose) is a way to come up with specific solutions 
corresponding to specific needs. The need of spatial self-determination is one of them, 
the need of creating one’s own surroundings. An alternative arrangement of space can 
be devised out of existing material, which also serves as a liberating practice, as it 
functions outside of the mainstream socio–economic order of the production of 
spaces. There is a proliferation of practices in contemporary artistic production that 
seem to take after this ad hoc principle, often encountered in the constructed 
environment of three-dimensional installation or as documented in video works.242 
The work of art as an ad hoc configuration addresses several functions; the need to 
                                                
241 Charles Jencks, Nathan Silver, Adhocism, the case for improvisation, Secker & Warburg, London, 
1972, p. 15. 
242 For example, the 5th Berlin Biennal of 2008 presented a number of such works, such as Ania 
Molska’s double screen video P=W:t (power), W=F*s (work) of 2007/8 and Kateřina Šedá’s 
installation as part of her project Over and Over of 2008, in Skulpturenpark Berlin Zentrum. 
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shape the world in general and social space in particular, to deconstruct and re-arrange 
it according to one’s needs – visual, spatial or affective – drives different spatial 
practices.243 De-territorializing and re-territorializing at the same time, this 
configuration of space becomes a creative language for the maker, and a rehearsal of 
an emancipatory space for the viewer.244  
 
The connection created between the viewer and the space of the work of art is an area 
of pronounced interest for the Danish-Icelandic artist Olafur Eliasson. His installation 
works often address the viewer with their title, which encourages them to own what is 
happening in the work: ‘Your chance encounter,’ ‘Your Sun Machine,’ among 
others.245 This tactic predisposes the viewer towards the personal, corporeal, 
phenomenological experience of the work as his/her own product. Eliasson’s work is 
centred on the viewer’s perception; engaging the viewer with phenomena-producer 
sites, which reconstruct natural phenomena, he creates encounters that stimulate the 
body in an intensely affective way and at the same time reveal the way the works 
manipulate this sensation. There is no ‘nature versus culture’ pseudo-dilemma in his 
work, for he very transparently shows what his compositions are made of and how 
they operate, leaving the production of illusion for the viewer to experience as a 
whole.246 The staging of the encounter is thus exposed and becomes a functional part 
of the experience.  
 
In this sense Eliasson’s Weather Project was an exemplary work; the installation that 
the artist created in the Turbine Hall of Tate Modern in 2003 had a remarkable impact 
                                                
243 This ad hoc activity spans outside the remit of mainstream art – an example being what is generally 
called ‘outsider art.’ 
244 The work of Brazilian theatre director Augusto Boal exemplifies this pursuit: ‘Theatre of the 
Oppressed creates spaces of liberty where people can free their memories, emotions, imaginations, 
thinking of their past, in the present, and where they can invent their future instead of waiting for it.’ 
The statement by Boal is quoted in Jan Cohen-Cruz and Mady Schutzman. A Boal Companion – 
Dialogues on theatre and cultural politics, Routledge, 2006, p. 125. 
245 ‘Usually, they [the titles] are accompanied by a possessive pronoun – your – that places agency with 
the (collective) user, who is cast as actor and protagonist in shaping the engagement, performance, 
negotiation, or, as in this case, the spatio-temporal encounter with the physical world instigated by 
Eliasson’s interventions.’ Eve Blau, ‘The Third Project,’ in Olafur Eliasson: Your Chance Encounter, 
Lars Müller Publishers, 2010, p. 99. 
246 Of particular interest are his ideas on the ‘immune system’ that art is involved in. As Eliasson 
writes: ‘When a ‘virus’ such as the commodification of our senses attacks us, and the developing 
identity of the city’s life are challenged, the immune system is (or should be) active in restoring a 
plausible dialogue involving some sense of resistance.’ In Susan May, Olafur Eliasson, The Weather 
Project, Tate Publishing, London, 2003, p.137. 
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on its viewers, quite notably in the way they physically interacted with it. My own 
encounter with the huge, semi-circular shape, which reflected on the mirror surface 
that covered the ceiling of the hall, thus producing the image of an artificial sun, was 
the most direct and most transparent artificial nature that I had ever beheld. Its 
mechanics – the mechanics of an aesthetic experience – were so staged and exposed, 
at the same time creating a compelling, sublime effect, that they reached a level of 
methodological perfection. The impact of the artificial weather conditions, which 
urged the audience to ‘sunbathe’ lying on the ice-cold cement floor or to stand on the 
mezzanine-level balcony and ‘watch the sunset’ was achieved with an economy of 
means. 
 
The artificiality of this construction being able to create an authentic impact on the 
senses – a feeling of the sublime – makes it a study of spectatorship par excellence. 
Susan May in her essay ‘Meteorologica’ writes:  
 
[y]et the implication of transcendent experience at the core of the tradition 
is disrupted in his work by a deliberate exposure of the apparatus 
delivering this phenomenal matter. The clear evidence of pumps, piping 
and lamps purposely draws attention to a crucial aspect of Eliasson’s 
practice. By making us conscious of the construction so that we perceive 
the staging behind the representation, he also makes us conscious of the 
act of perception, of being caught in the moment of awareness.247 
 
Eliasson’s methodology of staging the conditions for an ‘authentic encounter’ through 
‘formal devices’248 dissects the viewer’s perception; in the moment of suspension 
between expectation and encounter he interjects distorted imageries of familiar things, 
which simultaneously pull the viewer in and distance him/her. In my encounter with 
the Weather Project, in the first, fleeting seconds that I went through the automatic 
doors on the level of the Turbine Hall, I had a sudden sense of something odd 
                                                
247 Ibid. p. 17. She also remarks: ‘The primacy of the viewer’s body, along with his or her perception, 
position and orientation, has long maintained a critical role in Eliasson’s work. Altering spatial 
conditions enables the artist to play with ideas of reality, truth and representation […] Wind streaming 
through an interior space or rain showers falling inside a gallery accord moments of suspension 
between the expectation of experience and the authentic encounter [my italics]. It is the interstice 
between the instinctual action of perception and the logic of comprehension that fascinates Eliasson. 
Experience is rendered both physiological and psychological in his works through an accentuation of 
the gap between the rational expectation of an occurrence and its correlation with the visceral 
experience of it. […] Yet reality is contingent on the perceiver; it is not a fixed entity but a construct of 
our psyche, which is then projected back to the world through patterns of conduct and exchange with 
our surroundings.’ Ibid. pp. 19-20. 
248 Ibid. p. 23. 
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happening, but in its oddness, familiar; something that unwillingly penetrated my 
senses that I was not able to filter, momentarily. But it was not exactly a disagreeable 
sensation: rather a sense that something was following an automatic path of 
perception over which I did not have control. It was, in other words, a spectatorship 
of perception:249 a reciprocal movement between seeing and being affected, and re-
enacting the affected vision (and sensation) to watch it being produced. Eliasson often 
stresses his fascination with this self-seeing being ‘aesthetically’ produced. Regarding 
the particular coordinates of seeing set up in museums, he remarks:  
 
Exercising the integration of the spectator, or rather, the spectating act 
itself, as part of the museum’s undertaking has shifted the weight from the 
thing experienced to the experience itself. We stage the artefacts, but more 
importantly, we stage the way in which the artefacts are perceived. We 
cultivate nature into landscapes.250  
 
In addition, Eliasson questions not only the act of seeing as culturally mediated, but 
the positions produced for viewers in encounters. In a conversation with Daniel 
Birnbaum, Eliasson says: 
 
Olafur Eliasson: […] In a sense, our spatial history has given us a 
language with which we see, and this language dominates our way of 
seeing. Like you say, the pieces discuss whether it’s possible to be a 
subject, and whether you’re being forced to see in a certain way. 
 
Daniel Birnbaum: At a centre point you can almost get the feeling for a 
moment that it’s not you looking at the artwork. Sometimes the works are 
so subtle that they become an inverted visual experience, and it’s the other 
way round: you’re being seen by the situation. You’re not only a 
productive, phenomenologically active subject, you’re also produced by 
the piece. You become that subject-object, that ambiguous space where, 
as Maurice Merleau-Ponty would say, everything takes place.  
 
Eliasson: I agree; you could even call it a double perspective.251 
 
                                                
249 Speaking about institutions’ ‘[c]ommodification of seeing and even of thinking,’ Eliasson says: 
‘Since my work is very much about the process of seeing and experiencing yourself rather than the 
actual work of art, it’s problematic when your way of seeing is formalized through institutional 
structures – rather than your being encouraged to question your perceptual set-up.’ [In Obrist, op. cit., 
p. 16]. Here, seeing spreads onto the path of perception – a perceptual oscillation – and witnesses the 
subject produced by the encounter. 
250 Madeleine Grynsztejn, Daniel Birnbaum, Michael Speaks, Olafur Eliasson, Phaidon Press, 2002, p. 
127. 
251 Ibid. p. 20. See also Glossary for the ‘self-seeing’ position, p. 141. 
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The double perspective is not only a critical double-seeing but essentially a tension 
produced when the encounter is thus staged that it accords moments of immersion and 
collapse of distance and a reflection upon the coordinates of such a becoming. This 
blend reinforces, I think, the possibility of autopoietic transformation that is imminent 
in sculptural encounters, re-constituting the viewer in the context of this emerging 
awareness. 
 
An artist who has similarly explored the production mechanics of the sublime in her 
work is Mariele Neudecker. Neudecker produces works that test the sensibility of the 
viewer. Her work ‘Over and Over, Again and Again’ is a sculpture in three glass 
cases containing a three-dimensional model of a landscape, alluding to the romantic 
paintings of Caspar David Friedrich. The object is immersed into an artificial mist that 
evokes the scenery of those romantic paintings, creating their equivalent in sculptural 
form, in a miniature scale that toys with ideas of architectural models. The work 
stages the way our senses are seduced, manipulated into seduction by a circuit of 
associations, which invariably points to the viewer’s perception. Neudecker and 
Eliasson are both examples of artists whose strategy of staging an encounter aims to 
expose how our perceptual response to art works; there is a point where a staging of 
experience, a ‘staging of affect,’ becomes obvious to the viewer – and this moves the 
register away from merely ‘distancing techniques’ according to the Brechtian 
paradigm. The ‘double perspective’ that I quote above in Eliasson’s description is a 
moment of auto-affect – of twofold affectivity – produced by encounters.252 
 
The impact of this staged encounter triggers an affective resonance that accompanies 
the gradual awareness of the mechanisms that engineer these effects. The implication 
of natural beauty and the sublime in our affective constitutions crafts the effect of the 
work with a minor degree of emotional charge: these sculptures resemble 
disinterested, technological versions of the psychological landscapes that in older 
epochs consolidated an aesthetic sensibility. The staged encounter opens up a site of 
                                                
252 ‘Auto-affect’ is described by Simon O’Sullivan: ‘[t]his third kind of knowledge, or special kind of 
thought, that arises from the second, and that collapses distances and operates through leaps and 
hiatuses, has also a privileged relation with the first, albeit the first seen with clarity and precision (it is 
if you like ourselves seeing ourselves clearly). The joy produced by this third kind of knowledge is a 
kind of auto-affect (a beatitude).’ O’Sullivan, op. cit., p. 43. 
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negotiation between the visual leverage and its affective by-products and the 
expansive spectatorship that becomes a platform for a self-seeing awareness. 
 
 
5. Virtual Repetition 
 
Repetition and reenaction are aspects of the cognitive and affective constitutions of 
our experience; for Gilles Deleuze, ‘[a]rt […] repeats all the repetitions, by virtue of 
an internal power.’253 In Brian Massumi’s explorations into the biological processes 
of cognition, reenaction is a virtual doubling of an action: ‘In what we call thinking, 
the acting out of the movement is inhibited, resulting in what Bergson calls a 
“nascent action,” or “virtual movement.” […] Action is only half the event: action-
reenaction; rhythm-reverberation; point, virtual counterpoint.’ 254 
 
In art as a site where experience is re-enacted, the act of repeating an experience in 
order to correct it has strong ritual implications. It is a corrective impulse within 
cultural activities – a sublimating drive both in making art and engaging with it. It 
resonates ancient traditions and ceremonies in a function of reparation and exorcism, 
a regulatory, propitiatory call in advance of the occurrence of events. This function 
bifurcated into two distinct spheres: art and religion; there are residues of these 
functions in art. Several contemporary practices, mostly part of a performative game 
culture, reflect this need to re-enact in order to look anew, to play a role in order to 
transcend it and to inhabit a virtual environment in order to own it. This trend 
experiments with immersive experiences, engaging the viewer/participant in activities 
where interactions of role, place and presence transform the space of the practice, or 
game, into an imaginary stage.   
 
                                                
253 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit., p. 365. 
254 Brian Massumi, Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts, The MIT Press, 
2011, pp. 114-115. Massumi describes the concept of ‘reenaction’ through the research of the 
philosopher William James, among others: ‘[M]ore than a hundred years before mirror neurons were 
discovered, James observed that every perception of a movement directly “awakens in some degree the 
actual movement” perceived  (James 1950, 526). “Every possible feeling,” James continues, “produces 
a movement, and that movement is a movement of the entire organism, and of each of its parts” (372). 
“A process set up anywhere reverberates everywhere” (381).’ Ibid. p. 114. 
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The ‘vlogger’ (video blogger)255 is one of these cases. By constructing a virtual 
persona while often remaining physically invisible – concealing identity traits like 
sex, race and age – the vlogger constructs an identity through the medium of the 
moving image and releases it in the open communication of the world wide web. One 
might say that the ‘rhizomatic’ connection that Deleuze and Guattari envisioned, or 
the ‘construction of subjectivity’ that Guattari explored, are both materialized in this 
trend – although in peculiar ways.256 Despite the heterogeneous, trivial and often 
arbitrary material accumulated in this communication super-highway (or maybe, 
precisely because of this heterogeneity), this material horizontally connects virtual 





                                                
255 ‘Vlogs’ (=video weblogs) are websites where people upload entries in video format. ‘Weblog = a 
website on which visitors can record points of interest or information about themselves or other sites.’ 
The definition comes from the Penguin Complete English Dictionary, Penguin, London 2006, p. 1598. 
256 The ‘rhizome’ is a concept employed by Deleuze and Guattari in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 




Pictures 14 and 15: Sacrificing Character Integrity (1 and 2), video stills from 
performance, duration 15 min. From Chimera exhibition at 148B Gallery, London, 
2006. 
 
In a performance titled Sacrificing Character Integrity I used imagery and internet 
dialogues from virtual gaming platforms and in particular from LARP games (Live 
Action Role Playing games),257 a type of live role-play where a team of players 
reenact the actions of the game outdoors, in battles and strategic formations.258 The 
performance took place as part of a group show in a gallery in London. I converted 
the space into a black box, covering it with wallpaper throughout, including all its 
architectural details and protrusions like metal beams, skylight frames and electrical 
fittings, and painted it black. The only areas that I left uncovered were a few 
stencilled ‘holes’ on the wallpaper in the shape of figures – ‘Larpers’ in scenes of 
battle. There were two wax dummies on the floor dressed as role-players. The 
performance took place inside this space; four performers – some dressed in black 
cloaks like role-players – moved around the space in a circular way without 
                                                
257 ‘A role-playing game (RPG) is a type of game in which players assume the roles of characters and 
collaboratively create narratives. Gameplay progresses according to a predetermined system of rules 
and guidelines, within which players may improvise freely. Player choices shape the direction and 
outcome of role-playing games.’ From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role-playing_game, accessed in 
2006. 
258 See the passage ‘The Role Player’ where I describe my experience from witnessing the live game. 
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interacting or making eye contact with each other; they carried printed texts from 
which they cited lines from larping blogs, often overlapping with each other’s voice, 
announcing various principles of the game, reiterating the theme of ‘character 
integrity.’ 
 
The construction of these roles was a means to re-activate pre-existing dialogues and 
patterns of relations from virtual, invisible confrontations and to enact them in a new 
live context. The performance remained stripped of any real game action; what 
remained was the ongoing negotiation and ‘building up’ of the identities, the 
construction of a virtual, improvisational self with its own rules. Its visual residues 





                     Picture 16: Amarnath, video still, duration 3 min., 2007. 
 
Amarnath is a video work where layers of virtual roles interlace with fragmented 
narratives from real events – in this case the ascent to Amarnath cave in Kashmir, a 
pilgrimage in the Himalayas. A voiceover in Greek, the English subtitles and the 
alternation of images function at different speeds, leaving gaps and discontinuities of 
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narrative, as in a virtual roaming from place to place. Wax-modelled mountains are 
projected with videos of real mountains; a sacrificial scene is projected through 
broken pieces of mirror, hovering in space and joining, from time to time, as jigsaw 
pieces into an image; a story of an invisible storyteller haunts disjointed tableaux. 
 
In using imagery and structures from role-playing games, I brought them in relation to 
my project in two ways; the first was to create encounters within a versatile, virtual 
stage that would apply the ad hoc principle that I mentioned earlier, a principle of re-
territorialization. For example, by describing places and actions the figure of the 
storyteller inserts an audience – the players themselves – to the game, with the terms 
of another materiality, those of devising a world in thought. Cyber ‘selves’ is not a 
new phenomenon, but what it propagates is a tremendous amount of negotiation – a 
symptom of this democratic realm of wilful participation to war – as well as an 
exaggerated insistence on the truthfulness of the character; this space is permeated by 
a sculptural plasticity. 
 
The second quality that I employed is re-enactment; this dimension of role-play 
(especially live action role-play) mediates a social phenomenon that exceeds the level 
of a game. As Vanessa Agnew observes in her essay from 2007 ‘History’s Affective 
Turn’: ‘[c]ontemporary reenactment is indicative of history's recent affective turn, i.e. 
of historical representation characterized by conjectural interpretations of the past, 
the collapsing of temporalities and an emphasis on affect, individual experience and 
daily life rather than historical events, structures and processes.’259  
 
Agnew points out that what was thought of in the past as ‘a marginal cultural 
phenomenon’260  is now – for the last ten years, she argues – an object of study, as a 
by-product of what is called the ‘Affective Turn.’261  In fact the educational or 
entertainment activities based on historical reenactment and war scenes meets a 
growing response in various artistic practices: re-enactment as a cultural phenomenon 
speaks of those virtual places where something happens again, and why we need to 
                                                
259 Vanessa Agnew, History’s Affective Turn, published in Rethinking History – The Journal of Theory 
and Practice, Volume 11, Issue 3 September 2007, pp. 299 – 312. 
260 Ibid. p. 299. 
261 On page 14 of the present text I describe the proliferating interest in affect studies. See for example 
Jean Halley’s The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, Duke University Press, 2007. 
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repeat it.262 On the one hand, this virtual act of empowerment stands for a ‘taking 
control of things;’ on the other hand, this practice is a way to compensate for a 
historical evolution of economic conditions, based on ‘good performance,’ which has 
turned all human relations into a reenactment of behaviour, style and comportments of 
others. Sven Lütticken, in his essay ‘An Arena in which to reenact’ observes that 
‘when performative art attempts to fight repetition with repetition, to break open and 
recharge the past by duplicating and interrogating our event culture, it is nonetheless 
part of this very culture.’263 Lütticken observes: 
 
Compared to earlier forms of historicism-in-action, the contemporary 
reenactment puts greater emphasis not only on first-person experience but 
also on the most extreme act of all, namely fighting in a war. For an 
everyday life which has become a constant activity of self-performance 
and thus rather representational, this authentic act of war is substituted 
which is far removed from acting in the sense of play-acting. And yet it is 
still turned into a theatrical happening that seems to transpose the 
pressures of daily life into a form of play.264 
 
In the practice of historical reenactment the player recreates a role within an 
imaginary time and location; yet the real and the represented coordinates remain in 
flux throughout the activity, causing fissures to the collective ‘suspension of 
disbelief.’ Nevertheless these discontinuities become internalized as part of the game, 
a consensus that acts as a self-mending machine; this is an aspect of reenactment that 
produces a portrait of anthropological interest. The role player moves within an 
imaginary space, expressing explicit resistance towards ideological norms by setting 
his/her own rules to be kept. The role player re-enacts, and in so doing, purges the 
action into a new present tense, what Lütticken sees as an effort of ‘bringing back to 
the work of art a ritual, one of democratic participation.’265 In the next passage I will 




                                                
262 Examples of these artists include Omer Fast, Rod Dickinson and Catherine Sullivan, as documented 
in the collection of essays Life, Once More: Forms of Reenactment in Contemporary Art, edited by 
Peggy Phelan, published by Witte de With Museum, Rotterdam in 2005. 
263 Sven Lütticken, op. cit., p. 7. 
264 Ibid. p. 39. 
265 Ibid. p. 33. 
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                    Picture 17: Role Player, digitally edited photograph, 2006. 
 
As part of my research into role-playing practices I contacted a LARPing team, a 
team of live action role players, and asked them to attend one of their games. I 
documented the activities of the day in photographs and video, and at the end of the 
game spoke to some of them about their experience. I compiled the following passage 
from my notes from attending the Guildford Branch LARPing team on the 29th 
October 2006 at Blackwater, Camberley, Hampshire.266 This was the ‘call sheet’ sent 
out from one of the players about the activities of the day: 
 
Guildford branch are running on the 5th weekend (28th / 29th) of October 
this month.  The adventures will have a distinct Halloween flavour to 
them. People generally aim to be at the site for 10:30 in the morning. A 
day consists of two adventures, one in the morning and one in the 
afternoon.  People will be split first thing and one group will monster the 
first adventure and play the second and the other group the opposite. We 
                                                
266 The material that I documented and the quoted text reproduced here are courtesy of the Guildford 
Branch Larping Team. 
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meet in the car park of the Ely pub off the A30 just outside Blackwater. 
Pull up into carpark and we'll be there. 
 
When I arrived at the ‘Ely,’ the car park was empty of people. The action had already 
started at the forest nearby. The way in, I was told, was through a hole in the hedge 
that was bordering the car park. I spotted it and went through, to the other side. 
 
The moment I went through the hole into the forest I was confronted with this scene: 
they were there, a few meters ahead, dressed up, in a tableau of intact realism: a man 
dressed in black, hooded, others dressed up as fully equipped warriors, a prisoner in 
stocks, all frozen in a picture of battle in the woods. This image came up to me like a 
wall of density, an irreducible truth; a feeling of jumping into another time, or as if I 
had myself jumped into the tableau. The sudden change was so striking, like a bodily 
shock, that for a split second I had the feeling that this could well be a scene in 
another time. The wood was quite unchanged; the staging, costumes and performance 
had momentarily convinced me.  
 
The feeling of crossing to another world soon evaporated, and that original moment 
remained the most striking sensation of the whole day. 
 
The second thing that I found striking in the presence of the performers in the wood 
was the way the natural background enveloped the game, blending with it; it revealed 
the flexibility of the landscape to adjust as a backdrop to any time of reenacted human 
history.267 Game credibility seemed sustained by the place, and this made it 
immersive.  
 
There was a Storyteller who was leading the game, which progressed through lengthy 
negotiations on moves and strategies. Each battle was preceded and followed by an 
extensive mapping of ideas and organization. When the battles finally happened, there 
were many deaths, and afterwards, their exorcizing; the Sorcerer, another key role, 
                                                
267 ‘Landscapes are culture before they are nature; constructs of the imagination projected onto wood 
and water and rock. But it should also be acknowledged that once a certain idea of landscape, a myth, a 
vision, establishes itself in an actual place, it has a peculiar way of muddling categories, of making 
metaphors more real than their referents; of becoming, in fact, part of the scenery.’ Simon Schama, 
Landscape and Memory, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, p. 61. 
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performed rituals each time a warrior ‘died.’ He walked several times in circles 
around the lying body, summoning spirits with invocations.  
  
There was an extravagant suspension of disbelief; rules of play included shouting 
‘Time In’ and ‘Time Out’ to signify when the action was part of the game, or time off 
the game in order to negotiate. When they held their fist up they were considered 
invisible and they could run around into the enemies’ campsite. At times they would 
squat in a particular place until there would be a new direction for the action, 
determined by constant planning-ahead and decision-making. These ongoing 
negotiations, which took most of the time between battles, carried on into the evening 
adventure, most of which took place in the forest in the dark. The darkness made the 
battles and the general atmosphere dramatic; the mood of the players, I noticed, was 
very cheerful and energetic throughout the day. It felt like this was their own time.  
 
At the end of the day I interviewed Pete, one of the referees, about his experience of 
having participated in these games and what he thought of this kind of activity. Pete 
thought it very different to play the live game rather than the tabletop version.  He 
said that there were people who thought they were really living in it and could not tell 
the game from reality. Olli, another player, said that the visual aspect of the game is 
not so impressive as the actual experience of playing it.  
 
The whole activity seemed to be a way of taking control, a peculiar combination of 
visualizing what the image of the action should be, and producing it by entering that 
image. It was a statement about creating time; in its amateurism it felt even more 
liberating and democratic. People do bring their character to this game. 
 
 
7. To restore 
 
The priority of subjective moments over objective facts, in the context of 
the aesthetic experience, is a priority of a regulative character. The 
aesthetic experience embodies an alternative model for rationalizing the 
everyday experience, to the extent that the cognitive faculties are 
organized without compulsion or dependence from experiential data.268 
                                                
268 Georgiou, op. cit., p. 126 (my translation). 
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The regulative character of the aesthetic experience in Theodoros Georgiou’s 
formulation points to processes taking place in the ‘psychic hinterland,’269 as he calls 
it, of the individual. Things are set in action and re-enacted as the aesthetic image 
crosses layers of memory and stratifications of affects, performing internal operations 
that manifest as regulative – or redemptive – sensations. 
 
Leo Bersani’s book The Culture of Redemption offers different views on how cultural 
activities can be redemptive. The first chapter, Death and Literary Authority/ the 
Corrective Will explores a restorative function in art and literature by juxtaposing the 
writings of Marcel Proust and Melanie Klein. Bersani begins his essay by proposing: 
‘A crucial assumption in the culture of redemption is that a certain type of repetition 
of experience in art repairs inherently damaged or valueless experience.’270 
 
Melanie Klein’s concept of the ‘restorative phase’271 was an early influence in my 
research project. I first came across her theory in Peter Fuller’s Art and 
Psychoanalysis;272 in the second chapter of his book, titled ‘The Venus and ‘Internal 
Objects’,’ Fuller describes the encounter with the Venus of Milo, which has been a 
subject of cultural analysis for centuries. The question that triggers the essay is the 
testimony of viewers encountering the amputated statue of an inexplicably gratifying 
sensation; Fuller explains this response through Klein’s theory of the ‘restorative 
object,’ whereby the encounter with the severed body of the statue triggers a cycle of 
reflections involving a destruction and a remake. According to the Kleinian theory, 
the process of the ‘remake’ functions through cultural sublimations, which 
symbolically restore the damaged image of subjects or objects that one once identified 
with;273 relations of desire in infancy and consequent destructive impulses towards 
                                                
269 Ibid. p. 127. 
270 Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption, Harvard University Press, 1990, p. 1. 
271 In Klein’s theory this process in child development grows out of ‘[…] feelings of guilt which arouse 
strong tendencies in the child to make good the imaginary damage it has done to its objects.’ Melanie 
Klein, Love, guilt and reparation: and other works 1921-1945, Virago Press, 1988, p. 254. 
272 Peter Fuller, Art and Psychoanalysis, Hogarth Press, 1988, pp. 71-129. 
273 In the essay ‘Restitution and Sublimation,’ Klein writes (in Footnote No. 3): ‘In my ‘Infantile 
Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse’ (1929) I have maintained 
that the person’s sense of guilt and desire to restore the damaged object are a universal and 
fundamental factor in the development of his sublimations.’ Klein, op. cit., p. 254.   
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these desired parts introduce object relations, which mould a pattern in the young 
subject’s relationship with the world.274 
 
There is an implication of death in these internal processes, the ‘damaged experience’ 
or destruction, to which the ‘remaking’ of art is instrumental. Bersani’s example in 
order to illustrate the restitution of experience through art, Proust’s novel ‘In Search 
of Lost Time,’ is key. Certain elements prevail throughout this voluminous book: an 
overall feeling of non-validity of the author’s experience as it occurs, as he himself 
describes, the loose referential relation between experience and its subject, the 
mortuary hue of the experience – which doesn’t seem to achieve any real, lived 
dimension. What emerges as a predominant function of art – and which Proust 
attempts by recounting the Lost Time – is the re-particularization of the experience, 
but this time liberated from phenomena and thus made valid. Experience in art is 
‘divorced from a securely locatable subject of experience.’275 Bersani draws a parallel 
between Proustian repetition and Kleinian restoration:  
 
We can see the basis for a return to Proust in this psychoanalytic echo of 
the Proustian notion of art as a redemptive replication of damaged 
experience: in both cases, sublimations integrate, unify, and restore. But 
this restorative activity would make no sense if it were not being 
performed on earlier or original experience. The very function of art in 
Proust would be threatened if it introduced us to a world of authentic 
difference: in an aesthetic of reparation, the artist’s life – a life at once 
‘translated’ and made ‘more real’ – is the only legitimate subject of art.276 
 
The foundation of ‘redemptive’ art in previous, existing experience – a replaying of 
that experience – reveals a salient feature of reenactment. A material of real events, 
life once lived but not yet fulfilled, finds expression in a double, a reflection that 
allows a distancing from and a remodelling of reality.277 This vivid idea of 
                                                
274 ‘In Kleinian terms, sublimations are symbolic reparations of damaged experience; they are spectral 
replications of experience, entirely bound to the shattering and shattered fantasies they repair, but at the 
same time liberated from those fantasies by virtue of repeating them as knowledge, without affect.’ 
Bersani, op. cit., p. 97. 
275 Ibid. p. 11. 
276 Ibid. p. 20. 
277 Bersani links the thought of Walter Benjamin to this redemptive aesthetic: ‘In Benjamin we find the 
traits most deeply characteristic of this culture: the scrupulous registering of experience in order to 
annihilate it, and the magical and nihilistic belief that immersion in the most minute details of a 
material content will not only reduce that content but simultaneously unveil its hidden redemptive 
double.’ Ibid. p. 54. 
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reenactment that emerges in the first chapter of The Culture of Redemption is a ritual 
performance of life in suspended relations of causality, time and space. Reenactment 
is a contemporary ritual that redeems personal and collective history and allows a 
reappearance of phenomena, as the Proustian novel illustrates.278 Through the polemic 
of reducing reality into its essentials by extracting its truth through art, the novel 
concludes in the very crude, immediate experience of reality itself: a re-enactment of 
the pure appearance of phenomena, a world seen from a point of view freed from 
desire, which haunts the present. Art, in this resurrection, acquires a purely mediating 
role of re-presenting the crude material of reality: it reenacts the phenomenological 
experience of the world. In the ritual that art performs the audience is reintegrated into 
an experience of the world that it could not otherwise assimilate.  
 
 
8. An encounter with the past – I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S. 
 
‘To restore to the body its role as meaning producer’279 
 
As a viewer previously unfamiliar with James Coleman’s work, my encounter with 
I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S.280 at the Documenta 11 in Kassel in 2002 was the following:  
 
The work was a slide show with an audio narration as a voiceover. I was confronted 
with a slide with a grouping of figures in preparation for a photo shoot. The first scene 
appeared in a blurred shadow, gradually emerging into clarity as if the lens was 
starting to focus. The figures helped each other dress up in costumes in some of the 
scenes, while in others they appeared in a hospital environment like a surgery room, 
which appeared to be adjacent to the previous studio set. The same actors performed 
different actions in the sets, but a sense of allocated roles was somehow, though 
                                                
278 In Rod Dickinson and Tom McCarthy’s Greenwich Degree Zero (Beaconsfield Gallery, 2006), a 
fictional change in the outcome of an historical event advanced a sense of ‘compensation’ in art by the 
chance for a democratic participation in redefining history. This quality also appears as a disjunction, in 
some practices, between a reconstruction of time and place, as in the bewildering text that accompanies 
Eran Schaerf’s work Scenario Data 39, reproduced in Life, Once More, op. cit., p. 9-15. 
279 I have devised this phrase out of a sentence from Jean Fisher’s text on James Coleman’s 
I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S.: ‘[…] the role of the dead or decaying body whose role as meaning producer is in need 
of restoration.’ In Michael Govan, James Coleman: Projected Images 1972-1994, Dia Center for the 
Arts, 1995, p. 24. 
280 James Coleman’s slide work I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S was made in 1994. 
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vaguely, clear. Their gazes were strikingly fixed on something invisible to the viewer, 
somehow penetrating inwardly, frozen in their postures with an intensity that was 
enhanced by the prolonged stillness of the slide projection. From costumes and 
coloured backdrops there was a shift to the coldness of the seemingly abandoned 
surgery room, and when the characters entered this otherworldly, out-of-time place, 
all coherent sequence between actions evaporated and everything became an uncanny, 
inexplicable yet serene and stoic leap between two dimensions. A stack of old hospital 
beds and rusty equipment appeared while the dressing and undressing, the persistent 
staring and the preparations for some operation continued without any clear narrative. 
A voice was heard at disparate times during the projection, a haunting, childish voice 
uttering words in whispers and fragmented sentences mysteriously out of joint with 
the actions on the screen. ‘It’s hard to make out…the I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S….,’ the voice 
said. While the characters seemed cut off in their own isolated worlds, the voice-over 
identified with them all, and at the same time with none.  
 
The film was set, I later read, in a derelict former tuberculosis hospital outside of 
Dublin; there was an intense theatrical element in this place. The action went on in a 
dream-like state; enigmatic and compelling, it was discomforting at the same time.  
 
Not too long before visiting the Documenta, I spent some time in hospital for an 
operation. More than anything else, I remember my thoughts when I came round from 
the anaesthesia. The experience of anaesthesia had preoccupied me for years before 
that time, mainly to do with how different degrees of sedation affect the state of the 
mind. On a previous occasion when I had been sedated I had experienced a peculiar 
state between vigilance and dreaming, but where the realness of my thoughts was 
unlike dreaming, somehow not even located in either time or body, yet entrapped in 
absolute stillness with no sense or memory of embodiment whatsoever. There was a 
crude actuality about these thoughts, enhanced by the actual body pain. This state was 
the effect of a semi-anaesthesia, which, although physically painful, was curiously 
interesting: it was a wholly unfamiliar experience, unlike a dream or a hallucination. 
 
However, the second time that I was sedated for an operation, my long-planned 
watchfulness and alertness on how my state of consciousness would mutate abruptly 
receded, plunging me into a state of unconsciousness, an empty gap. As I was waking 
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up, I had a feeling of emerging into reality from nowhere, from absolute inexistence 
of memory, not aware of myself yet. In that moment, this was the order of things: 
what I perceived as the hospital, the operation and the state of recuperation was felt as 
the rule, a substratum of consciousness, a permanent condition of being, a dimension 
of normality – as if the state of recovering from being constantly operated upon was 
part of a biological routine. At the same time the first thought of the world outside, as 
if looked at through a lens, was the impression of a theatrical play: something acted 
on a superimposed level. The feeling of the two dimensions co-existing as if they 
were layers of reality was so powerful that I had an overwhelming feeling that the 
primary, crude real was the hospital-real and that surgeons were artists.281 
 
When I encountered James Coleman’s slide projection, this unconscious memory 
automatically emerged; the adjacent spaces of I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S. were the stage of an 
action of an unfixed subject and consciousness. The theatrical and the surgical seemed 
to embody two dense formulas of experience; the linguistic-representational and the 
visceral, traumatic. I was surprised to hear that the surgery room was called an 
‘operating theatre.’ I found it ironic. 
 
The projection of my own memory on the work as I described happened long before 
researching James Coleman’s oeuvre. I was intuitively drawn by its qualities; through 
the slide projection and the non-narrative action the images appeared as if directly 
drawn from a non-discursive site, an unconscious repository; the theatricality of its 
style was paradoxically enhancing the feeling of uncanny, unfathomable otherness, 
rather than fixing identities on the figures and the spaces. The displaced body as mere 
spectator was the recurrent theme of the work. 
 
…It’s hard to make out the initials…growing still…ex-communicating as we 
speak…282 
 
Coleman’s work portrays the conflict between the symbolic order of spoken language 
as an imposed system of representation and the impetus of claiming a personal truth. 
                                                
281 An interesting analogy is Walter Benjamin’s insight that the ‘magician’ has been replaced by the 
‘surgeon’ in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, from Illuminations, Schocken 
Books, 1969, p. 233. 
282 Govan, op. cit., p. 20. 
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As Jean Fisher remarks: ‘[…] it is the abandoned hospital interior itself, with its 
broken plaster surfaces, obsolete fixtures and machines, which once tyrannized 
patients, that now takes the role of the dead or decaying body whose role as meaning 
producer is in need of restoration.’283 In Fisher’s analysis, the spaces depicted in 
Coleman’s works, which are often stage sets, become the scene of re-integration of 
the body as agent of meaning.284 The collapse of spatiotemporal coherence in 
Coleman’s work is a strategy for transgressing a linear, representational vocabulary 
and disrupting automatic responses. It is the meaning-giving body itself whose 
primacy of response restores its own agency. This, Fisher locates as ‘the insistence on 
our sustained awareness of the phenomenological experience of the work.’285 This is 
the measure of resistance expressed from both maker and viewer.  
 
Line of Faith, one of Coleman’s projected slide works from 1991, bears a striking 
visual similarity with live action historical reenactments. It also alludes to tableaux 
vivants – a genre that stands between painting, photography and performance. One of 
Coleman’s references is Jean Luc Godard’s film Passion from 1982.286 In Passion, we 
are watching the making of a film production enacting tableaux vivants from famous 
paintings of Delacroix, Goya and Greco. The actual shooting never reaches 
accomplishment due to some persistence from the part of the director about 
insufficient or wrong lighting. Instead, the film wanders around the events outside and 
in preparation of the film, in complicated and paradoxical situations occurring among 
the contributors. No importance is given to the actual scenes or the narrative; it seems 
more likely that what is being shot is the shooting itself. There is something that never 
becomes realized but the way things are presented to us it seems like we are shifting 
between different dimensions. This overturns the habitual structure of the film 
                                                
283 Ibid. p. 24. Similar ideas are elaborated in Lapsus Exposure, a piece from 1993, that suggests in 
Fisher’s words: ‘a desire to restore meaning through the physicality of sound and body, through the 
rhythm of song and dance.’ Ibid. p. 26. 
284 She says: ‘[…] the set occupies the metaphorical space of the symbolic order - a relational space 
where identity is constructed and social relations are played out according to the structure and 
limitations of the law, figured through its representations. It is the spatiotemporal coherence aimed for 
by the social order, but placed under strain here, producing cracks in the familiar illusion. […] In 
Coleman’s manipulations, the set is presented as an allegorical site of production of a restored body - 
the reconstituted past, the playback that reintegrates the identity of the rock group, the generational 
reconciliation of the social body. These “bodies” are acknowledged as necessary artifices, but they are 
restructured according not to a preset pattern of codes but to a pattern subservient to the conditions of 
their real existence.’ Ibid. p. 28. 
285 Ibid. p. 28. 
286 Passion, (1982) Directed by Jean Luc Godard, Switzerland/France, Parafrance Films. 
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narrative as a linear development with hierarchical positions (protagonist, extra) and 
the weight of the action is disseminated in unlikely places. This disruption of 
certainties denies the secure ‘ending’ of a situation, letting open areas, gaps of 
meaning that one has to reconstruct. It is opening up the work as a construction site. 
 
The atypical narrative structures encountered in James Coleman’s work form an 
affinity with Godard’s avant-garde cinema. In Coleman’s slide shows the images 
emerge from an indefinite space – memory, fantasy, or crude worldly material – aided 
in this apparition by the medium of the slide show. In I.N.I.T.I.A.L.S., the explicit 
element of staging is maybe what affects the situation the most: we are urged into the 
consensus of a staged action, but once we have accepted its representational language 
it denies itself as such; the theatre and the operating room are a condition, the limits of 
the acting body, the depths of a traumatizing interchangeability. The viewer will not 
be able to decipher these spaces; still, these projected images reach into the 


















A gateway  
 
Since the 1960s there has been a turn of attention to the viewer’s experience as 
subject matter of art, which set new terms for staging: art stages a situation for the 
viewer, requiring different modes of engagement and introducing different patterns of 
connectivity. Yet there are more steps to be taken. 
 
It has been a longstanding project for aesthetics to provide an alternative model for 
the subject; now we reach the turn where an affective rendering – an affective re-
ordering – departs from (exhausted) notions of dematerialized object and decentred 
subject. Rather than collapsing positions of subject or object, spatial or ontological 
unity, art becomes a testing ground for a transitional encounter co-performed by artist 
and viewer – a co-created in-between-ness. This encounter presents an opportunity; 
we collectively create space and model meaning through the re-distribution of the 
sensible. As such the intersubjective connectivity moulded in this space and the 
communion with ineffable fields of vitality through affect become an aesthetic 
communication. What I have described as a transformative encounter allows a space 
for self-structuring through these aesthetic manifestations. There is a political 
dimension to the poetic – or rather, to the autopoietic force of the sensible. It is a 
double reach, then, that I visualize: an encounter that stretches to the distant past and 
hauls a primal pulse, and one that speeds ahead, shaping a practice of self-creation 
through extra-systemic functioning. 
 
In this exploration of staging, affect, and the encounter, I have examined the scene of 
sculpture as a construction site and rehearsal space for a general cultural shift. If 
sculpture’s expanded practice hybridizes social space by becoming an autonomous 
stage, today’s ‘traumatic’ sculptural assemblages reflect the crises of late modernity. 
A restructuring of sculpture into a scene where performative agencies interact 
implicates the viewer into a staging where artistic medium is repurposed as aesthetic 
support and transitional zone. The expanded agency of staging – in contradistinction 
to a theatrical/scenic notion – spans from an intrinsic modality of art (art stages 
presentation) to the sculptural modality of situating objects in space.  
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The platform for a two-fold perspective staged in several recent spatial practices fuses 
positions of the viewing subject, revealing the potential of the aesthetic for modes of 
understanding that deviate from normative signification. The autonomic emergence of 
affect grafts together in the space of the work the biological, the psychic and the 
cognitive. Its autopoietic agency is connective, co-creative. The modality of art to 
‘sculpt’ us through affect meets a diachronic function; we simultaneously encounter 












Translator’s Introduction to Euripides’ Medea 




Translated from Greek by Antigoni Pasidi 
 
Notes on my translation: 
 
I have tried to preserve the original punctuation and typographic style of the text as 
intact as possible, and added clarification notes either inside the text or as footnotes: 
- An asterisk * is the original footnote by the author Y.H. 
- What is in a parenthesis ( ) is part of the original text. 
- What is in a square bracket [ ] is my addition to clarify words or the meaning. 
- What is in a curly brace { } is the original Greek word/term in the text. 
- Where a word or meaning needs clarification I append footnotes.  
- Greek words than exist in the English language with a slightly or quite 
different meaning are either: Preserved in the text (i.e. eros), explained in 
square brackets and then analyzed in the terminology appendix, or: Translated 
according to meaning/context and then contained in curly braces, to provide 
the etymological connection. 
- English words that have more than one equivalent in Greek are given in 
English in the text and in the original Greek word in curly braces, to stress the 
different meaning (in particular with the word ‘emotion,’ as either synkinesis 
or synaesthema, where synaesthema can also be ‘feeling’ or ‘sentiment’). 
                                                
287 Yorgos Heimonas (1938-2000) was a Greek novelist, translator and doctor. He studied medicine in 







THE RAW MATERIALS OF THE TRAGIC*: materials, for tragedy gives me the 
sensation of a solid, pure body; in reality, it concerns basic, elemental life functions of 
this body. 
 
In other occasions too I have expressed my belief that Katharsis in tragedy isn’t, 
essentially, but a matter of analogy, in relation to the complex scheme of extreme 
disproportion which precedes – if as “disproportion” we consider the deadlock of 
conflicts which is created during the advancement of the drama between its rival 
characters, in whichever ideological, moral, psychological burdens they have 
shouldered and which they refuse, until the end, to lay down. However, it will be 
difficult to conceive the significance of the strict symmetrical movements which 
balance the elements of this disproportion, of those linear gestures which lead in a 
natural manner (precisely, with Katharsis) to the final, definitive, to the necessary 
calmness which will settle on the troubled and disquieting situation of the drama, the 
silence which falls abruptly when the work of art is completed – we’ll find this hard to 
comprehend, if the fundamental regulation which governs and organizes Greek 
thought and Greek art escapes us: m e t r o n [measure]. On the condition, that we 
fully grasp the mode of use, of application of this metron from the Greek author – for 
whom metron does not mean compression, prevention, prohibition; above all it 
signifies danger: to impose metron on that which has no metron. 
 Greek tragedy is the only – at least so clearly, so logically – logos [speech] in the 
history of art that achieves this anxious acrobatics (and collaboration) between 
kosmos [world] and chaos, order and anarchy – indeed while concealing its anxiety 
undisturbed, behind the large, rough volumes of its constructions. But it is not my 
intention to go back to the traditional ideas of the apollonian and the dionysian – if we 
wanted, by simplification, to attribute metron [measure] to Apollo and ametro 
[immoderation] to Dionysus; I’d like to move much further ahead and try to detect 
                                                
* This text (1.), written in greater length, was my address at the V’ International Conference of Ancient 
Greek Drama in Delphi (29 June – 6 July 1989), whose subject was “Tragic logos and today’s world 
theatre.” 
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certain elementary, raw materials which come into view (and not just that, they 
function drastically) through the crevices which I sense there are in this firm, 
impressively harmonious synthesis that tragedy is – between the visible, which 
establishes itself with metron, and the invisible, which glows from deeper within, 
from that which cannot have metron and will never have form. For I believe that the 
awe before tragedy derives, i n  p r i n c i p l e, from the constant, though indeed 
unclear, sensation the viewer has of precisely these crevices. 
 
 
I discern two elements: the first relates to emotion {synkinesis} – but I mean an 
outpouring of the emotion as a holothymic288 cataclysm of consciousness and not 
individual, distinct emotions which are released because of the overwhelming but 
specific happenings of tragedy; the second element relates to mourning – which, 
again, I mean as a painful submission, from the beginning, to the accomplished fact 
[fait accompli]: accomplished fact, not during the “realistic” stream of dreadful events 
of the tragedy narration – but to  s o m e  accomplished fact which is already inscribed 
in consciousness (to which I certainly incorporate the so-called unconscious) and for 
which the human mourns throughout all his life, experiencing the intrinsic, the natural 
feeling {synaesthema} of existence – if existence can have a feeling {synaisthema}; 
melancholy, to which I would however give a much calmer name: sorrow. 
 
 
How does this emotion {synkinesis} function and what is this accomplished fact? In 
tragedy a descent to the old layers of the psyche {psychismos} is taking place, much 
deeper than the space where those emotions {synaesthemata} which are distributed 
and in constant preparedness are located – a descent to the undifferentiated, 
exceptionally strong thymic tensions for which no qualitative, not even categorical, 
determination can apply: if for example they are positive or negative tendencies of 
attraction and adaptation towards the encroaching emotional {synkinesiac} stimulus 
or, conversely, tendencies of aversion or terror towards it. These latter, particular 
responses are born in the more superficial levels of emotional {synaesthematic} 
                                                
288 ‘Holothymic’=all {olon}+thymic. ‘Thymic’, according to Plato, is the part of the psyche that 
includes its emotional phenomena and those relating to human will – still in use in Modern Greek as 
‘thymiko,’ with the same meaning. What Heimonas means here is the totality of these elements – a 
totality lived by all this part of consciousness. 
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responsiveness and have a well-discernible and causal relationship to the specific 
events of the tragedy; consequently, those emotions {synkineses} are qualitatively 
recognizable as “relative,” and although the viewer seems to be possessed by them, 
nevertheless (and because of them – how could it be any different?) the emotional 
{synkinesiac} outcome ends up transforming from qualitative, that is specialized, 
differentiated, to qualitative, that is liberated, undifferentiated, dissolute. The viewer 
is now thoroughly {katholika} affected, he suffers pulsating towards all directions 
because the emotional {synkinesiac} stimulation abandons – or rather traverses, 
indeed violently, the distinct categories of direct psychological responses and 
stimulates this amorphous emotional {synkinesiac} material deep within, which in its 
nature is uncontrollable and limitless – as much as indeterminate. The transcendence 
of an emotion {synaesthema} renders it tragic; for example, Medea’s eros [love](: text 
2). In tragedy, thus, we are rather dealing with an immeasurable amount of primordial 
emotion {synkinesis} than with a quality of an although powerful, yet specified 
reflexive emotion {synkinesis}: with an emotional {synkinesiac} alarm rather than an 
emotional {synaesthematic} subjection – and at this moment a phrase by Sophocles 
springs to my mind: Ἄσκοπος ἁ λώβα=destruction {katastrophe} has no purpose. I 
distort it: emotion {synkinesis} has no purpose. And thereby what I want to say is that 
emotion {synkinesis} in tragedy, in great art (beyond and behind the schemata 
[shapes], the metra, that define it but also familiarize it – I would say: tame it), this 
emotion {synkinesis}, which often adopts the characteristics of an obscure, 
threatening euphoria, remains inexplicable to the end. It cannot but be inexplicable; it 
has to be inexplicable. 
 But how does tragedy manage to approach this fortified emotion {synkinesis}, which 
music only of all arts (with other means, more direct – via other routes, much shorter) 




Mourning is the second raw material, which surrounds drama and invests its heroes. 
Something much more: there is a diffuse, but impalpable, eros of mourning in the 
atmosphere. (It is self-evident that the mourning of which I speak, a kind of 
ontological grief, has a very remote connection to the normal grief that justifiably 
torments the hero because of a death or a humiliation and should not be confused with 
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it.) Observing the hero very closely, you can feel him resist, refusing to give up – 
certainly not from the big deed for which he has been called for, but from pain 
{algos}: he is a lover of mourning. You perceive that his mourning has started long 
before the unjust, the abominable events occurred, which identified him as a merciless 
instrument (and, at the same time, a poignantly frail victim) of a justice; you become 
convinced, that parallel to the uncompromising motive of collective moral conscience 
that dictates and legitimates his inexorable decisions, there functions also a paradox 
fixation towards a mourning – as if his fate were mournful from the start, and not only 
can he not escape from it, but without it, without its very mourning, he would not be 
able to be, that is to act. Mourning is his only, as much as his natural situation. 
Moreover: mourning produces and constantly magnifies his inhuman boldness. And 
even more: he hedonizes [delights] himself from mourning. 
 
 
This imperceptible, profound eros of mourning seems to decant to the other characters 
of the drama as well; they all shift, with the hero at the head, without complaint, 
obediently, within the dim memory of an irretrievable (and moreover once 
unavoidable) Fall: this must be the fait accompli that I meant earlier – the brutal 
detachment of individual being {on} from common {koinon} being, namely the birth 
of death. And from this fait accompli germinated the emotion {synkinesis} and took 
its first, the most purebred form which is a mourning. Ever since, whatever will 
overwhelm man will be pain. And whatever excavates pain will be hedonic. 
 So the tragic originates from prehistoric, in human’s spiritual {pneumatikon}289 
journey, – from propatoric290 losses and condemnations of his existence; and these 
propatoric stigmata have not given birth to our Guilt, as we thought, but have 
eternally sealed us with Mourning. 
 
 
These invariable, crude functions of tragedy, the total emotion {synkinesis} and the 
eros of mourning, certainly remain intact – so far as the psyche {psychismos} that still 
needs them to cleanse291 itself to the greatest depth of its self-knowing remains 
                                                
289 See Terminology Appendix for ‘pneumatikos.’ 
290 ‘Propatoric Sin’ is the Original Sin of Christianity – also implying from time immemorial. 
291 In the text ‘kathairetai,’ which has the same root as ‘katharsis.’ 
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unaltered too. And for as long as the aesthetic of the dramatic will apply at this depth, 
an aesthetic of visceral-ness and ritual (- and the stage director who will neglect these 
two elements should not even consider that he actually stages a tragedy). Especially 
today, tragedy acquires perhaps a different authority: denoting, from its birth to 
eternity, the bloodstained realization of the responsibility that the human being bears 
against the World {Kosmos} (responsibility: without the demagogic sense of a social, 
moral, etc, “debt” = cognitive {gnostic} responsibility) – today that this responsibility 
is tested more crucially than ever, Greek tragedy looks like a cave painting that 
suddenly starts to glow within a new, oblique {loxo} lighting. 










                                                
292 ‘Loxias’ Apollo (loxos means slanted, oblique) is one of the many names of Apollo that have been 






THE ORIGIN OF EROS IS BARBARIC. If we fail to see, even glimpse, at some 
point in this tragedy, the distorted erotic [of love] face of Medea, we won’t catch her 
during the barbarity of her erotic stripping – from all expectation from Jason, from all 
her erotic memories from him, if the time where eros can really be (and only therein) 
is memory. We won’t catch her: she will quickly have faded to the woman who has 
been insulted {hybris-ed}, to the queen who has been disarmed, to the human, even, 
whose eros wasn’t rewarded. But Medea’s drama is played out, from its beginning to 
its end, with a rigidity which is absolutely erotic, that is to say strongly and endlessly 
closed; endlessly: Medea will lead her erotic story to an end, not in order to finish it 
but to apotheosize it (and to repose it, to secure it) within a terrifying, barbaric union. 
For the purpose of eros is the union by all means and its barbarity whichever act will 
achieve it. 
 Medea, twice barbarian – by origin and by eros. It is not accidental. 
 
 
The tragedy of Medea, this most erotic of all plays ever written, is a text that is 
nightmarishly dry: in no word of Medea do we hear the slightest erotic sound, the 
only tenderness that moistens her dry speech is when she speaks of her children. 
There is only anger; nothing else. With vast anger, but with composure too, she 
engineers Jason’s ruin: she is going to kill his new wife and her father – but she will 
also kill her children, who are Jason’s children. This second decision of hers is taken 
from the start, the Nurse {Trofos} has realized it straight away, she has already told us 
before Medea speaks of her plans. What is all this unrestrained annihilation mania of 
hers – punishment, revenge, justice? pain and “expanded” suicide, where the suicide 
draws all the beloved ones to his death? And where does it come from – from 
jealousy, from degradation and humiliation, the panic of exile? from her useless 
sacrifices, from her futile erotic bravery? All this, one by one, is uttered, or implied, 
by Medea in front of the Chorus, in front of Jason, in front of us. And it is of course 
all of this – and foremost her definitive and unjust end. But you feel her withdraw 
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behind all this, vanishing – only to reappear unbearably visible with the murder of her 
own children. Now she withdraws deeper and deeper into the darkness that eros is –
there must be darkness in eros not to see that the Other is missing, there must have 
been a lot of darkness in Medea’s barbaric eros since Jason never was with her: he is 
not now and therefore never has been. But she has always been there, she will be there 
until the end (this there reaches up to the specific location of the story even: the drama 
breaks out when Kreon sends Medea away from the town); she never got out of her 
darkness – and her ultimate erotic act towards Jason is to oblige him, by force, to meet 
with her through his pain for his murdered children. She is not to blame, she has no 
other way, for none other of his feelings {synaesthema} does she find – there is none, 
for her to use: his pain for the children, is the last, her sole artifice {technasma} which 
will subdue him to the most torturous, the most true (for there is no other truth 
{aletheia} left from their marriage) of his union with her. She doesn’t care. Jason 
enters the darkness.  
 
 This ascension, at the end, of Medea in the sky, on the chariot with the flying 
dragons, is a phantasmagoria that the poet suddenly decides to bestow her. It signifies 




















- Metron: a fundamental principle of Greek thought (typified in the expression 
Métron áriston, = ‘moderation is the best thing,’ or ‘all in good measure’). Its 
function is illuminated in Heimonas’ analysis (page 1): its role is not one of a 
restraining law but rather the safeguarding, rational thought which regulates 
the dark, uncontrollable mass of primordial instincts and violent extremities of 
human nature. Metron symbolizes human reason against the primitive disorder 
of chaos and passion. 
 
- Logos: Logos counts more than 50 meanings in Greek; it is a very expanded 
notion, used primarily as speech, reason and logiké – logic or sense.  
 
- Synkinesis / synaesthema: there is an important distinction between the 
notions of synkinesis and synaesthema, mainly as active and passive forms of 
emotion, respectively. Both Greek words signify affect and emotion, but 
whereas synkinesis is a composite affect that signifies movement (= kinesis, 
which is also clear in the word emotion), synaesthema is a feeling, sentiment 
or emotion centred on the sensibility that emerges within the subject 
(etymologically syn+aesthema = sensation, affect). In everyday Greek 
synkinesis means becoming moved by something, feeling emotional, usually 
provoked by somebody’s presence or action. It requires an agency; the syn- 
prefix reveals a joint movement. In synaesthema this prefix denotes a joint 
stimulation of the senses. 
 
- Psychismos: psyche means soul in Greek. Psychismos is the quality or 
structure of the human soul, composed of both personal, but also collective 
characteristics. The distinction between soul (psyche) and mind (pneuma) can 
be rigid, pertaining to the principle of trinity of mind, body and soul of human 
nature; however psyche and pneuma can also coincide as spirit, the intangible 
qualities of human nature. Also see pneumatikos.  
 
- Katholika: wholly, thoroughly, from ‘olon’= all (root of holistic).  
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- Eros, erotic: a pivotal idea in ancient Greek literature, poetry and philosophy. 
Eros is a principle of love that is often contrasted to death, as life force, but 
also paralleled to it as a drive. In foreign translation ‘eros’ tends more towards 
the dimension of ‘sexual love,’ as in the adjective erotic. The ancient Greek 
concept of eros combines passion, force, heroism, and love. This meaning 
remains unchanged in Modern Greek. 
 
- Hedoné: delight. Hedoné is closely related to eros and opposite to algos – an 
equivalent of the pain/pleasure dualism. Although hedoné alludes to sexual 
pleasure in Modern Greek, in ancient Greek it has a broad meaning of pleasure 
– it can be mental pleasure or gratification.  
 
- On: being (root of ontology). 
 
- Koinon: common, shared, general, universal. 
 
- Pneumatikon: spiritual as in relating to the spirit (pneuma = mind/intellect) in 
contrast to the soul (psyche). In this case too the translation of pneumatikon 
into ‘spiritual’ lacks the more prominent dimension of ‘intellectual’, mental 
(relating to the mind). 
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Some thoughts on Yorgos Heimonas’ Translator’s Introduction to Euripides’ Medea 
 
I discern an analogy between Yorgos Heimonas’ analysis of the functions of Greek 
tragic drama and Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain.  
 
The main character in the Magic Mountain, Hans Castorp, is a reserved young man 
who dwells comfortably in his urban environment and is about to embark on his 
career. His visit to his consumptive cousin in a sanatorium in the Swiss Alps signals a 
change of route, which is forever to mark Hans Castorp. His discovery of a different 
realm there, an altered time, an addictive freedom – and soon a discovery of the realm 
of the body, its laws and functions – has a deep impact on the young man. Curious to 
learn, he studies the body and the vital processes that cycle from birth to decay. He 
learns about the dark, impure impulses that the body develops into illness. There is a 
substratum of pathos that the whole process is based on: desire. On encountering 
desire himself, in the face of Madame Chauchat, an exotic Russian woman who he 
hopelessly falls in love with, he encounters the relentless reality of this vital force that 
casts him into his passion. His mentor Settembrini, an Italian humanist scholar, is 
trying to reason him, to bring him to recognize the noble pursuit of knowledge, the 
call of duty that awaits him, the feat of civilization against barbarity. But it is a lost 
case: Castorp is already ill; he has contracted tuberculosis himself – only so slight an 
infection as to actually secure his residence ‘up there’ for sometime – but most of all 
he is physically succumbing to the reality of his instincts, his newly discovered 
nature. He contemplates time, and in doing so the artificial construct of the everyday, 
the mundane social reality is exposed before his eyes: everything that he lived before, 
‘down there,’ seems dim and false in relation to the dimensions he discovers ‘up 
here’: a time that, deceptive and unfathomable, is the real measure of everything. 
  
When Hans Castorp succumbs, involuntarily, to the passion of his love for Mme 
Chauchat, he begins to see what has so far been invisible to him and he lives, for the 
first time. His encounter with his own nature is kathartic, and fills him with a 
jouissance that is existential, an emotion of self-awareness. He begins to overturn the 
fixed beliefs that had once ruled him, and to his delight he finds a sense of things, a 
sense of time and a sense of nature. He comes to feel the raw, conflicting cycle of life 
that grows and withers; the beautiful, harmonious schemes that his idealist friend tries 
 122 
to instil in him are not convincing anymore. Castorp is a man who has experienced 
loss at a very early age; losing both his parents and growing up in the care of his 
grandfather, he has a familiarity with death and mourning which he consciously 
admits that draws him to decay. He feels at home with the idea of death: this is what 
he knows of himself.  
 
Hans Castorp is riveted, up on the Magic Mountain, because he has caught a glimpse 



















Kutiyattam – The theatre form by Kapila Venu  
 
Kutiyattam is a theatre form that has the richness and depth acquired from an ancient 
history and a long and unbroken performance tradition of more than 2000 years. 
 
Koothambalam meaning ‘temple for theatre’ is the exclusively designed venue for the 
performance of this unique theatre. Actors (Chakyar and Nangiar), musicians, 
costume and stage specialists (Nambiar) come together to realize the performance. 
 
Performances are usually based on Sanskrit texts and their elaborate interpretations 
and dramatisation. The actor reigns in Kutiyattam. The ‘performance space’ and 
‘performance time’ sets free a well trained actor like a bird to explore the sky.  The 
actor is followed by the accompanying Mizhavu (pot drum) that breathes life into 
every pulse, movement and emotion. 
 
The craft and techniques of acting are a blend of both elements – high stylisation and 
folk (daily, rustic, worldly). The actors and musicians undergo several years of 
intense training and conditioning to master the complex techniques and skill and 
simultaneously acquire the capability of having the altered existence onstage. 
 
Performances can hardly be time bound. The presentation of a single act of a play 
can go on for several days and nights, moments can be frozen and explored for hours 
in an almost meditative relationship between actor and sahrdya (one of good heart, 
spectator). 
 
The theatre style embraces south India’s indigenous culture of conception and 
representation as well as the acting technique described in Bharatha’s Natyashastra, 
the treatise on Indian dramaturgy. Therefore it internalizes both the rigour and 
vitality of all the folk, ritual and martial arts together with the concepts of classical 
Sanskrit theatre in India. 
 














In the city of Bhaktapur in Nepal there is a small Hindu shrine, like a little outdoor 
temple, housing a small statue of a goddess. Facing the gateway of the shrine is 
another statue, of an angel bowing in veneration of the enshrined deity. The figure 
represents the pilgrim and the encounter with the divine. The place of the viewer is 
rarely represented or included within symbolic or religious western art in three-
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Path, 2006; paper, rubber matting, wax, wood, 4.5 m x 1.5 m x 0.9 m 
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- Autopoiesis: Jakob Arnoldi describes: ‘Autopoiesis is […] a certain form of 
(self-) organization, that is, a recursive process where the system produces its 
own elements and integrates them in its own network.’ [In Theory, Culture, 
Society, Volume 23, Numbers 2/3, March-May 2006, p. 116]. Marvin Carlson 
writes: ‘The term was first utilized by the Chilean biologists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela to point to the unique self-producing 
operations of living systems. While all other kinds of machine produce 
something different from themselves, autopoietic systems are simultaneously 
producers and products, circular systems that survive by self-generation.’ [In 
Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A New 
Aesthetics, Routledge, 2008, p. 7]. Erika Fischer-Lichte has written 
extensively on the autopoietic feedback loop that transforms actors, 
spectators, and the performance itself in performance art and theatre. She 
writes: ‘There no longer exists a work of art, independent of its creator and 
recipient; instead, we are dealing with an event that involves everybody – 
albeit to different degrees and in different capacities.’ [Ibid. p. 18]; In his 
introduction to the book, Carlson writes on autopoiesis: ‘As a self-organizing 
system, as opposed to an autonomously created work of art, it continually 
receives and integrates into that system newly emerging, unplanned, and 
unpredictable elements form both sides of the loop.’ [Ibid. p. 8]. Fischer-
Lichte, again, writes: ‘A shift in focus occurred from potentially controlling 
the system to inducing the specific modes of autopoiesis.’ [Ibid. p. 39]. A 
‘twist’ in this idea of autopoiesis can be read in relation to Brechtian theatre, 
described by Raymond Williams: ‘Essentially, what Brecht created, after long 
experiment, was a dramatic form in which men were shown in the process of 
producing themselves and their situations. This is, at root, a dialectical form, 
drawing directly on a Marxist theory of history in which, within given limits, 
man makes himself.’ [Raymond Williams, Drama from Ibsen to Brecht, 
Oxford University Press, p. 279].  
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- Performance: Peggy Phelan describes performance’s ontology as 
‘representation without reproduction’ [Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics 
of Performance, Routledge, 1993, p. 146]. Phelan writes: ‘Performance’s only 
life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or 
otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: 
once it does so, it becomes something other than performance.’ [Ibid. p. 146]. 
At stake in performance is a singular action in present time; as such, 
performance subverts the capitalist production economy and demands 
attention to be paid to the present and to bodies as articulating its essence. In 
the context of my thesis, I use both performance and performativity to 
describe tensions between agents (objects and viewers) in the space of the 
work of art. 
 
- Performativity: Although performativity implies repetition, ‘[…] in 
performance theory it has been used adjectivally and quite generally to denote 
the performance aspect of any object or practice under consideration.’ [In 
Loxley, Performativity, op. cit., p. 140]. There is a distinction between a 
‘performative utterance’ (in J. L. Austin’s formulation) and performative 
action in performance theory, which signifies ‘an adjective that can be applied 
to the dramatic or theatrical aspects of a situation or object of study.’ [Ibid. p. 
169]. Loxley writes: ‘‘Performativity’ would therefore mean only the rather 
general quality something might have by virtue of being a performance.’ [Ibid. 
p. 140]. 
 
- Self-seeing: this recurring term is largely established through a notion of 
simultaneous positions and experiences that converge vision with the 
production of experience. It is used to describe a distinctive sensation in the 
affective experience while encountering or moving in the space of the work of 
sculpture and installation. It is a pivotal term in the writings of Olafur 
Eliasson, and as such I see it as bound to the mechanics of staging, art as 
encounter, and what aesthesis such an encounter may produce. Eliasson says: 
 
The reason I think it’s important to exercise this double-
perspective phenomenon is that our ability to see ourselves 
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seeing – or to see ourselves in the third person, or actually to 
step out of ourselves and see the whole set-up with the 
artefact, the subject and the object – that particular quality also 
gives us the ability to criticize ourselves. I think this is the 
final aim: giving the subject a critical position, or the ability to 
criticize one’s own position in this perspective. [In 




- Subject produced by an encounter with a work of art: an encounter as a 
transformative and autopoietic experience (see also autopoiesis); as such the 
subject is not a given in this term since it is always changing, caught in this 
move, produced before, during and after, and therefore we cannot speak of a 
subject; a subject produced by an encounter is a process. At the same time, 
what is implied in this transitional term is the possibility of a (paradox) 
oscillation between states: between affect and becoming (and multiple 
positions, decentred-ness, in-between-ness) and a self-reflection that includes 
the act of seeing and the state of becoming as a combined process (a 
production of one through the other). 
 
- Work of art: in the context of this thesis I will be using the phrase ‘work of 
art’ to explore spatial works, sculpture and installation; in general with ‘work 
of art’ I will be focussing on visual art unless otherwise stated (as for instance, 
in the context of the chapters where I discuss particular theatrical 
performances). 
 
- Theatricality: ‘[i]t is a mode of representation or a style of behaviour 
characterized by histrionic actions, manners, and devices, and hence a 
practice; yet it is also an interpretative model for describing psychological 
identity, social ceremonies, communal festivities, and public spectacles, and 
hence a theoretical concept. It has even attained the status of both an aesthetic 
and a philosophical system. […] Thus, to some people, it is that which is 
quintessentially the theatre, while to others it is the theatre subsumed into the 
whole world. Apparently the concept is comprehensive of all meanings yet 
empty of all specific sense.’ [Thomas Postlewait and Tracy C. Davis, 
Theatricality, op. cit., p. 1]. They also note: ‘Binary awareness is crucial to 
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theatricality, which is understood as “a process that has to do with a ‘gaze’ 
that postulates and creates a distinct, virtual space belonging to the other, 
from which friction can emerge”.’ [Ibid. p. 28. The authors quote Josette 
Féral, ‘Theatricality: The Specificity of Theatrical Language,’ Substance 
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